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No doubt throughout all past time there actually occurred a series 
of events which, whether we know what it was or not, constitutes 
history in some ultimate sense…The event itself once occurred, but 
as an actual event it has disappeared; so that in dealing with it the 
only objective reality we can observe or test is some material trace 
which the event has left—usually a written document. With these 
traces of vanished events, these documents, we must be content 
since they are all we have; from them we infer what the event was, 
we affirm that it is a fact that the event was so and so.1 
 
 
As the nation’s archives, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) preserves 
and provides access to records that document how our government conducts business on behalf 
of the American people—past and present. For the American citizen, NARA provides a form of 
accountability through the records within its custody which affect the nation’s collective 
memory. A plethora of these records, however, contain evidence of the federal government’s 
misconduct in episodes in American history which affected public trust.  The Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study records are a prime example of records within the custody of NARA that continue to have 
a lasting affect on public trust in the federal government. Even though NARA disclosed 
administrative records that document the government’s role in the study, the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study records continue to challenge the institution on a variety of archival issues such as access, 
privacy, collective memory, and accountability. Through historical case study methodology, this 
study examines the National Archives and Records Administration’s administrative role in 
maintaining and providing access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, especially the 
                                                 
1 Carl Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian,” American Historical Review 37 (January 1932): 221. 
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restricted information. The effect of the changing social context on NARA’s recordkeeping 
practices of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records is also explored. 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... X 
ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT ........................................................................................XI 
1.0 OVERVIEW OF AN ARCHIVAL PROBLEM........................................................ 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 PURPOSE OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................. 5 
1.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY ......................................................... 7 
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY.......................................................... 7 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................... 10 
2.1 ACCESS.............................................................................................................. 10 
2.1.1 Summary...................................................................................................... 28 
2.2 PRIVACY........................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.1 Summary...................................................................................................... 42 
2.3 COLLECTIVE MEMORY............................................................................... 43 
2.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 49 
3.0 A QUALITATIVE STUDY: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING NARA’S ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT OF THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS................................................................................................. 51 
3.1 HISTORICAL RESEARCH............................................................................. 51 
3.2 CASE STUDY .................................................................................................... 53 
3.3 HISTORICAL CASE STUDY.......................................................................... 55 
3.4 DATA.................................................................................................................. 56 
3.4.1 Interviews..................................................................................................... 56 
3.4.2 Government Records .................................................................................. 63 
3.4.3 Legal Documents......................................................................................... 66 
 vii 
3.4.4 Secondary Sources ...................................................................................... 67 
3.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 68 
4.0 THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS: CASE STUDY.................... 69 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 69 
4.2 HISTORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY.................................. 69 
4.3 DISCOVERY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS ....... 73 
4.4 POLLARD V. U.S. CIVIL SUIT...................................................................... 76 
4.5 RECORDKEEPING HISTORY OF THE OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY RECORDS WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION .................................................................. 81 
4.6 TRANSFER OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS TO 
THE NARA ......................................................................................................................... 88 
4.7 THE RECORDKEEPING HISTORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY RECORDS WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) ............................................................ 91 
4.8 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 99 
5.0 MANAGING AND PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY RECORDS .................................................................................................................. 101 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 101 
5.2 QUESTION ONE: WHAT IS NARA’S POLICY TOWARD 
ADMINISTERING ACCESS TO RECORDS THAT CONTAIN RESTRICTED 
INFORMATION THAT ARE IN ITS CUSTODY? ..................................................... 103 
5.3 QUESTION TWO: IN LIGHT OF THESE POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 
HOW WERE THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS TREATED? ....... 111 
5.3.1 May 30, 1990 Memorandum .................................................................... 113 
5.3.2 Are the Records Unique? ......................................................................... 114 
5.3.3 NARA’s Decision to Release the Records in 2004.................................. 124 
5.4 QUESTION THREE: DOES NARA’S ACCESS POLICY TOWARD 
RESTRICTED INFORMATION AND THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) UNDERMINE THE SPIRIT OF THE FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION ACT WITH RESPECT TO THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
 viii 
STUDY RECORDS? IF SO, WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IN THIS 
PARTICULAR CASE?.................................................................................................... 127 
5.5 QUESTION FOUR: WHAT DO THE RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES 
OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS REVEAL ABOUT THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF NARA’S ACCESS POLICY TO PROTECT THE 
PERSONAL PRIVACY WITH THOSE RECORDS? ................................................. 131 
5.6 QUESTION FIVE: HOW HAVE THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS AFFECTED THE COLLECTIVE 
MEMORY OF THE STUDY? ........................................................................................ 134 
5.6.1 Memories of Tuskegee Syphilis Study Participants and Their Families
 137 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS ...................................... 151 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................. 151 
6.1.1 The Importance of This Case Study........................................................ 154 
6.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS...................................................................... 155 
APPENDIX A. LISTING OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS ..................................................... 159 
APPENDIX B. RECORDS RETENTION SCHEDULE (CDC) .......................................... 167 
APPENDIX C. DISPOSITION OF RECORDS (NARA) ..................................................... 172 
APPENDIX D. OVERVIEW OF RECORDS BY CDC........................................................ 176 
APPENDIX E. REQUEST TO TRANSFER TO NARA ...................................................... 179 
APPENDIX F. REQUEST TO TRANSFER ADDITIONAL RECORDS .......................... 185 
APPENDIX G. NARA MEMORANDUM OF TRANSFER................................................. 191 
APPENDIX H. ASST ARCHIVIST RESPONSE TO MEMO............................................. 193 
APPENDIX I. INDEX OF RECORDS ................................................................................... 195 
APPENDIX J. FOIA REQUEST TO NARA ........................................................................ 197 
APPENDIX K. NARA’S RESPONSE TO FOIA REQUEST............................................... 200 
APPENDIX L. REDACTED MEDICAL RECORD ............................................................. 203 
APPENDIX M. INDEX OF TUSKEGEE SYPHILLIS STUDY RECODS ........................ 228 
APPENDIX N. IRB CONSET FORM .................................................................................... 250 
APPENDIX O. INTERVIEW SAMPLE ................................................................................ 254 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 260 
 ix 
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 




The successful completion of this dissertation is owed to a number of people. First, I would like 
to thank my committee: My dissertation advisor, Dr. Richard Cox, Elizabeth Yakel, Ellen 
Detlefsen, Margaret Kimmel, Joe Trotter, and Stephen Thomas. Words cannot express how 
indebted I am for their enduring support, commitment, understanding, and encouragement. I 
would especially like to thank Dr. Stephen Thomas and Highmark Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
for financial support to complete my research. I am grateful to the staff at the Southeast Region 
Center of the National Archives and Records Administration and to NARA’s Office of General 
Counsel for their assistance. NARA’s decision to open the medical records of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study in 2004 instead of 2030 is a personal triumph as well as a victory for those who 
now have the opportunity to view the records. I would also like to thank the individuals who 
were interviewed. The interviews were invaluable to this study. 
There are so many friends to thank for their undying support, love, devotion in making 
sure that I completed this study and school. Special thanks to my parents Ezra Whorley and 
Lucille Payne. I would especially like to thank my best friend Karen Carrington, Jennifer 
Marshall, Lynda Bishop, Elaine Westbrooks, Vanessa Pitts Bannister, Vendetta Knight, Marcy 
Walls, and Jeannette Bastian. When one decides to pursue a Ph.D., that person will need friends 
and family to rally around them, especially towards the end. I would say to all of you who were 
there for me: “I did not take your support for granted. This degree is as much yours as mine.” 
 xi 
ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT 
SF  Standard Form 
 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
FRC  Federal Records Center 
 
RG  Record Group 
 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
NARA  National Archives and Records Administration and National Archives 
 
NARS  National Archives Records Service 
 
U.S.C  United States Code 
 
C.F.R  Code of Federal Regulations 
 
FOIA  Freedom of Information Act  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). 
  
Exemption 6  
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000) 
HEW  Department of Health Education and Welfare 
1.0  OVERVIEW OF AN ARCHIVAL PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The significance of archival records cannot be overstated. Archival records serve as instruments 
of accountability and building blocks of collective memory. John McDonald notes the 
connection between records and accountability, stating “without records, there can be no 
demonstration of accountability. Without evidence of accountability, society cannot trust in its 
public institutions.”1 Thus, the records within the custody of the National Archives and Records 
Administration2 are the bedrock for holding the federal government accountable to its citizens. 
Such records “provide evidence of actions, decisions, and intentions, both legal and illegal, 
proper and improper,” which is “…an inherent part of the accountability function and 
recordkeeping systems.”3 When records reveal illegal and improper governmental actions, 
archivists must not hesitate to expose the improprieties. As Kent Haworth states, “The essence of 
archives are the records in our care…the purpose of the archivist is to hold in trust for society the 
                                                 
1John McDonald, "Accountability in Government in an Electronic Age," (paper presented at the 
International Records Management Trust Electronic Records Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia , 25 June 1998).   
This paper is no longer available through the International Records Management Trust website, but can be accessed 
through the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20010726105930/www.irmt.org/education/malpaper2.html.  
2 The National Archives and Records Administration and its acronym NARA will be used interchangeably. 
3 Richard J. Cox and David A. Wallace, eds., Archives and the Public Good: Accountability and Records in 
Modern Society (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2002), 4, 11.  
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evidence of the truth, the evidence of justice and injustice in the society our archives 
document.”4
The “Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male (1932-1972)”5 continues 
to have a major impact on society socially and medically. More importantly, the records 
themselves are critical to revealing government misconduct that gave rise to this notorious 
episode of American history. In their edited volume, archivists Richard Cox and David Wallace 
assert, “We need to remember that records are critical to societal awareness and the memory of 
pivotal events, and that their use may be part of controversies forcing archivists to take stands on 
access to records.”6 Such is the case with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, where access to 
restricted records is a controversial issue. 
In 1932, in Tuskegee, Alabama, the United States Public Health Service (PHS) began a 
study to observe the natural course of syphilis in 399 African-American men until they died in 
order to determine whether or not there were any racial differences between whites and blacks in 
the natural progression of the disease.7 As a control, a comparable group of 200 African-
American men without syphilis were observed. The infected men were never told that they had 
                                                 
4 Kent Haworth,“The Principles Speak for Themselves: Articulating a Language of Purpose for Archives,” 
in The Archival Imagination: Essays in Honour of Hugh A. Taylor, ed. Barbara L. Craig (Ottawa: Association of 
Canadian Archivists, 1992), 94. 
5 This is the official title of the study. However, over the years there have been a number of titles for this 
study such as: Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Syphilis Study at 
Tuskegee, Tuskegee Study, Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment and Tuskegee Syphilis Project. For this research study it 
will be referred to as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
6 Cox and Wallace, 11. 
7 A similar study had taken place earlier in Oslo, Norway where white males and females were monitored. 
Such a study had not been done in the United States, particularly with African Americans. The United States PHS 
physicians saw this as an opportunity to track the natural progression of syphilis in the African-American male in 
Tuskegee, Alabama. 
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syphilis; they were merely told that they had “bad blood.” With the cooperation of state and local 
physicians, the researchers prevented these men from receiving any kind of treatment or 
discovering what “bad blood” meant. As a result of this concerted effort, the study continued for 
forty years. Often called the longest non-therapeutic experiment on human beings in medical 
history within the medical field, the study was exposed to the world on July 25, 1972. This 
controversial and unethical study officially ended in November 1972.  
Public disclosure of the study has engendered a much closer scrutiny of many aspects of 
governmental and research practices. This study was instrumental in creating safeguards for 
those who would participate in future research experiments. The Tuskegee survivors and their 
families have received compensation from the federal government as well as free medical care 
for life. More importantly, they received a long awaited official apology from President William 
J. Clinton on May 16, 1997. 
The records generated from the study revealed how meticulous the United States Public 
Health physicians were in carrying out this forty year study in which they deliberately withheld 
treatment. In addition, the records showed that from the inception of the study the participants 
believed they were in a treatment program. As a result of such recordkeeping, those same 
documents proved to be crucial in a lawsuit brought against the government. 
Today the original records are in the custody of the National Archives and Records 
Administration. The records include a total of eighty-seven boxes. Almost half of these boxes 
pertain to individual patients. NARA had initially restricted the medical records until 2030 in 
order to protect the personal privacy interests of the participants. It seems obvious that protection 
of the Tuskegee participants medical records is non-negotiable, given the humiliation these men 
and their families have already endured. It is not that simple, however. Access to all of the 
 3 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study records is a hotly contested issue among NARA, researchers, and the 
African-American community because of the conflict between the public’s right to know what 
happened and the protection of the personal privacy interests of the participants. 
Scholars interested in medical records for historical research purposes, face many 
obstacles which include confronting access and confidentiality issues relating to their research 
agendas. For archives, medical records raise special issues. Providing access to sensitive material 
has been and continues to be a balancing act. Thus, the challenge for repositories which have 
holdings containing medical information lies in protecting individual privacy interests while 
providing access to the intellectual content of the material. 
NARA is bound by federal statutory laws that prohibit the release of sensitive or personal 
information.  The public’s right to be informed, to know, and to have access to important 
information is in direct conflict with the right to personal privacy. For archivists working at the 
National Archives, administering access to records that contain personal information is a 
challenge, given the nuances of the federal statutes they must follow, specifically the Privacy Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).8 As Heather MacNeil points out, for government 
archivists “personal information collected and maintained by government agencies eventually 
ends up in their custody, leaving them with the unenviable task of reconciling legitimate but 
conflicting interests—the individual’s right to privacy and society’s need for knowledge.”9 The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study is an opportunity to examine the way in which NARA balances these 
two competing interests.   
. 
                                                 
8 Freedom of Information Act and its acronym FOIA will be used interchangeably. 
9 Heather MacNeil, Without Consent: The Ethics of Disclosing Personal Information in Public Archives 
(Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1992), 5. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The records that document the Tuskegee Syphilis Study contain sensitive information about the 
participants and their family members. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
restricted the medical records under Exemption (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act which 
protects personal information within medical files. Upon transfer, NARA agreed to continue the 
restrictions to access enforced by CDC. While NARA’s mission is to provide ready access to 
government records within its legal custody, it must balance the disclosure of information against 
the invasion of personal privacy. NARA was encouraged by the researcher to re-examine its 
restrictions on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records in order to determine whether or not 
the situation had changed, warranting full or partial disclosure since their transfer to NARA in 
1991.  
Both NARA and CDC determined that since the participants were deceased and there 
was limited third-party information within the files, the medical records should be opened. Since 
privacy rights diminish upon death, NARA decided that the balancing test favored full 
disclosure. Thus, during the course of this case study, the medical records were opened in 2004.  
NARA’s decision, however, does not affect the thesis of this case study that even though 
NARA reviews its access policy on a case by case situation, its management of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records was inconsistent with providing access to restricted information. This 
inconsistency affected the public’s increasing demand for access. Although NARA thought it 
was providing access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, it was not under its own 
regulations and federal statutes. It took a Freedom of Information Act request for NARA to 
initiate a review of its access policy toward the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. 
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In order to accession the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, NARA agreed to the CDC’s 
arbitrary restrictions placed on the medical records which were not based on any federal statute 
or regulation, which had been placed on the medical records by CDC. In formal practice, NARA 
does not approve the transfer of records from agencies that contain unreasonable restrictions that 
are not covered under statute or regulation. As a result, upon the transfer of historical records to 
NARA, agencies must have legal justification for their restrictions. However, NARA did not 
comply with formal policy and accepted the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records based on the 
CDC’s restrictions. NARA’s actual practices of receiving historical documents from government 
agencies without legally based reasons generated the following research questions: 
1. What is NARA’s official policy toward administering access to controversial records 
that contain restricted information?                            
2. In light of those policies and practices, how are the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records 
treated? 
3. Does NARA’s access policy toward restricted information and the agreement with the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) undermine the spirit of the Freedom of 
Information Act with respect to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records? If so, what are 
the consequences in this particular case? 
4. What do the recordkeeping practices of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, reveal 
about NARA’s effectiveness in protecting personal information in those records? 
5. How have the restrictions on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records affected the 
collective memory of the study?  
 6 
1.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study records document the longest non-therapeutic medical study in 
American history. The records illuminate government misconduct and allow an additional 
opportunity for the public to hold the federal government accountable for this misconduct.  
These records exemplify the National Archives and Records Administration’s access policy and 
its attempts to reconcile the right to know with the right to personal privacy. The National 
Archives entered into an agreement with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)10 intended to 
insulate the participants from the public by forbidding disclosure of their identities. Such 
information, however, has nonetheless found its way into the public domain. In addition, a 
researcher can challenge the release of all or part of the restricted information based on FOIA. 
Richard Cox and David Wallace state that “records frequently provide the scaffolding for the 
stories relayed and sometimes they even play central roles, yet they are rarely explicitly surfaced 
as objects receiving concentrated attention.”11 As a result of the public’s increasing requests for 
access, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records are now receiving that attention in this study.  
1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY 
This case study is limited to an examination of the recordkeeping policies of the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) for 
maintaining the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records and is not the history of the study itself. The 
study itself was officially terminated in November 1972, and in 1976, the Centers for Disease 
                                                 
10 The Center for Disease Control and its acronym CDC will be used interchangeably. 
11 Cox and Wallace, 2. 
 7 
Control officially scheduled the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records for permanent retention. In 
1991, the records were transferred to the National Archives Southeast Regional Center in 
Atlanta, Georgia.12 Although the National Archives became responsible for the maintenance of 
those records, an agreement between it and the Centers for Disease Control prohibited all general 
and research access to the medical records in their entirety. 
The case study is limited to primary documents concerning the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
which include the records themselves, court documents, appraisal and accession records. It also 
considers secondary archival literature regarding access; privacy and collective memory; and 
issues relating to access to medical records. The case study focuses on the Freedom of 
Information Act which outlines how access requests are typically handled by NARA. It also 
examines NARA’s Code of Federal Regulations regarding access to and transfer of records. In 
addition, this study includes interviews with archivists, records managers, attorneys, historians, 
health professionals, and Freedom of Information Act specialists. NARA’s restrictions on the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study records had been central to the overall management of those records. 
The data collected for this case study examines this management.  
The case study does not limit the scope of personal privacy to the individual participants 
but broadens it to consider third party interests i.e. family members. The public’s right to know 
what happened included the identification of the participants. Prior to disclosing the records in 
2004, NARA had not released any personal information about the participants, including their 
names. However, the names are in court documents which are available to the public. Fred Gray, 
a civil rights attorney who a filed lawsuit against the government on behalf of the participants, 
has written a book about the case.  In his book, Gray names the 625 men who were a part of the 
                                                 
12 The NARA Southeastern Region has moved to Morrow, Georgia in 2005. 
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study.13 Some of those same men and family members have openly given interviews and 
participated in events associated with the public outcry. This case study examines how NARA 
interprets personal privacy when using the balancing test between the public’s right to know and 
personal privacy. This study considers two ways of interpreting personal privacy: individual and 
third party. Will NARA consider both the participant’s personal privacy interest and that of their 
families or only that of the participants themselves? How NARA interpreted personal privacy 
affected its decision to disclose the medical records.  
This case study does not include a discussion of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA). Established in 1996, the purpose of HIPPA is to protect the health 
insurance of workers who leave or change jobs by transferring medical information 
electronically. There are national standards created to protect the privacy and confidentiality of 
patient information: health status, health care, or payment.14  
Even though HIPPA is a statutory law, the Freedom of Information Act governs access to 
government records. NARA investigated the researcher’s request for access to the medical 
records under FOIA. It analyzed whether or not to disclose the medical records based on the 
contract between the Centers For Disease Control and Prevention  and NARA which referenced 
FOIA, and on the balancing test when considering Exemption 6 under FOIA. Exemption 6 is one 
of nine reasons that NARA can deny access to its records that contain personal information. The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study records are considered historical records. Whether or not HIPPA is 
retroactive to historical medical records is a question for future research.
                                                 
13 Fred D. Gray, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study: The Real Story and Beyond (Montgomery, AL: Black Belt 
Press, 1998), x. 
14 Carl E. Schneider, “HIPPA-cracy,” Hastings Center Report (January-February 2006): 10-11. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study records challenge the archival community on a variety of archival 
issues such as access, privacy, collective memory, and their connection to accountability. 
Although there is considerable literature on each topic, there is little written about how these 
areas are interrelated, especially on the subject of recordkeeping practices. As a result, this 
literature review will focus on the accountability nexus between access, privacy, and collective 
memory. The literature review begins with separate discussions access, privacy, and collective 
memory as they relate to archives and records.  
2.1 ACCESS 
Initially the primary purposes of medical records were to facilitate diagnosis, treatment, and 
patient care. During the twentieth century, however, medical records have served an increasing 
number of secondary uses. Medical records document patient symptoms, costs, treatment and 
other administrative and legal matters. The medical records constitute a vital body of data and 
information for both medical and historical research. As the result of increased interest in social 
history, researchers have used medical records to attempt to understand the lives of ordinary 
people. Researchers have examined documents such as birth records and marriage records to 
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study people and this has led to an increased interest in the use of medical information.1 
However, for archivists, developing access policies for such records has and continues to be a 
challenge. 
 
In “The Origins of Restrictions on Access to Personal Papers at the Library of Congress 
and the National Archives,” Raymond Geselbracht discusses two different access policies for 
donated papers that developed from the historical manuscripts tradition and the public archives 
tradition. He contends that the National Archives’ access policy for personal papers is 
inappropriate for collections that lack significant public policy interest, such as the papers of 
artists or novelists. He recommends that the Manuscript Division’s policy be expanded to include 
collections that have high public policy interest. Geselbracht maintains that such collections 
should not be closed for long periods of time and suggests establishing guidelines to identify 
documents requiring restriction, while opening the remainder of the collection.2
 Written in the mid-1980s, Geselbracht’s article provides a benchmark for archivists who 
have the responsibility of writing or revising their repositories access policies. Geselbracht points 
out that archivists must understand the history behind access issues in order to create policies 
that reflect their times. If not, then “they will lose the opportunity to shape the conditions under 
which they must live and work.”3 Many of the questions that Geselbracht raises regarding access 
policies are pertinent today, especially when dealing with sensitive material. For example, should 
                                                 
1 Joel D. Howell, “Preserving Patient Records to Support Health Care Delivery, Teaching, and Research,” 
in Nancy McCall and Lisa A. Mix, eds., Designing Archival Programs to Advance Knowledge in the Health Fields 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 33-51. 
2 Raymond H. Geselbracht, “The Origins of Restrictions on Access to Personal Papers at the Library of 
Congress and the National Archives,” American Archivist 49 (Spring 1986): 161-162. 
3 Ibid,162. 
 11 
entire collections or series be restricted, or should the restriction decision be made on the item 
level? Even though Geselbracht contends that agreements must be made among donors and 
archivists so that the archival profession may formulate a position on the issue of access policies, 
this has yet to happen. Through the morass of ever-changing and often contradictory contexts of 
public access to information and personal privacy, archivists are not setting the agenda for 
establishing a publicly agreed upon and widely disseminated set of criteria for access to personal 
information in medical records. 
One of the major impediments to the use of research resources in the health fields has 
been the reluctance of archival and manuscript repositories to deal with the issues of 
confidentiality that affect access to these materials. Many repositories have refused to collect 
documentation that includes patient and human-subject materials. As a result, a key segment of 
documentation is being lost and overlooked.  In addition, repositories are confronted with an 
array of legal and regulatory requirements regarding access and use. Policy makers have to 
weigh the necessity of restricted controls for access against archival programs’ obligations to 
facilitate the activity of research.  For example, governmental archives have to deal with 
providing access to and use of sensitive information within their custody and at the same time 
preventing unwarranted disclosure of personal identities. Often the government has refused to 
grant access to medical records and thus is accused of duplicity. Diane Nixon, however, points 
out that “sometimes minimized is the government’s responsibility to preserve the privacy of 
innocent parties mentioned in its records, its right to withhold information it has received in 
confidentiality or intends to use in litigation, and its need to protect its sources and ongoing 
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procedures.”4 There are a number of cases where researchers, news media, and ordinary citizens 
have demanded access to sensitive records in the custody of the government. 
Allen Hornblum’s Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison: A True 
Story of Abuse and Exploitation in the Name of Medical Science reveals that prisoners were used 
as guinea pigs in experimental research. Hornblum alleges a scandal ranking with the Tuskegee 
study. The story centers on Holmesburg Prison near Philadelphia where dermatological 
experiments occurred with the support of federal and local officials. In order to expose the 
inhumane experimentation taking place at the prison, Hornblum interviewed former inmates who 
were test subjects. However, the inmates lack of knowledge as to what chemicals and substances 
they were exposed to or the purposes of the experiments meant that a thorough historical 
investigation was warranted. Although he interviewed hundreds of prisoners, doctors, and others 
who had come in contact with the Holmesburg experiments, it was obvious to Hornblum that 
acquiring objective documentation of the prison research would be essential if the story was ever 
to be revealed.5  
Hornblum decided to orchestrate a thorough search of government documentation on the 
Holmesburg medical research program. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) proved key in 
obtaining these important and highly informative documents. Through FOIA requests, Hornblum 
acquired thousands of pages of material that revealed the little known but questionable 
experiments on prisoners.  
                                                 
4 Diane S. Nixon, “Providing Access to Controversial Public Records: The Case of the Robert F. Kennedy 
Assassination Investigation Files,” The Public Historian, 11 (Summer 1989): 29. 
5 Allen Hornblum, Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison: A True Story of Abuse and 
Exploitation in the Name of Medical Science (New York: Routledge, 1998), xiii-xxi. 
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The full investigation of the wide-ranging nature of the studies undertaken at the prison 
necessitated more FOIA requests from other governmental departments.6 The documents that 
Hornblum obtained from these departments provided a nuanced and complete understanding of 
what took place at Holmesburg Prison. The Holmesburg prison experiments highlight the need 
for a change in the culture of clinical investigations. 
Jonathan D. Moreno’s Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans uncovers other 
observational studies conducted during the 1950s which caused hundreds of deaths. Unlike the 
Tuskegee scandal, these experiments were the outgrowth of cold war military needs. Moreno 
exposes the military’s role in exploiting its own men. For example, Marshall Islanders were 
continually exposed to an unnaturally radioactive environment, including the food they ate, in 
the decades following the South Pacific atomic tests. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
carefully followed the islanders’ physiological reactions through its doctors, who also provided 
the islanders with routine medical care. But like the Tuskegee Study, the doctors did not explain 
to their patients that they were research subjects or that their injuries were radiation-related. 
Similarly, Air Force physicians studied the thyroids of Alaskan natives who were exposed to 
nuclear fallout in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Moreno, they too were not informed of the 
reasons for the U.S. Military’s interest in providing medical care.7
 
In order to tell the story of human experimentation, Moreno relied on primary materials. 
Moreno examined previous government investigations, newspapers clippings, interviews with 
                                                 
6 Hornblum made FOIA requests to the Department of Defense concerning the U.S. Army’s chemical 
warfare studies, the Central Intelligence Agency’s role in similar studies, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s files 
on radioactive isotope use, and the Food and Drug Administration’s files on the DMSO investigation. 
7 Jonathan D. Moreno, Undue Risk: Secret State Experiments on Humans (New York: W.H. Freeman and 
Company, 2000), 220-221. 
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experts, and earlier studies of biological and chemical warfare research. Through his research, 
Moreno concluded that government secrecy is “corrosive to democracy, constituting a true threat 
to our way of life.”8
Eileen Welsome’s The Plutonium Files: America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold 
War uncovers the darker side of human experimentation in America during the Cold War. While 
Moreno mentions this episode in American military history as part of a long stream of human 
experimentation, Welsome delves into the military’s involvement in injecting American citizens 
with plutonium during the mid-1940s. Welsome reported that between April of 1945 and July 
1947, eighteen people (men, women, and children) scattered in hospital wards across the country 
were injected with plutonium. When Welsome interviewed the families of the victims, she 
discovered that none of the doctors ever told them that the real purpose of their study was to 
measure the plutonium circulating in the family members’ bodies.9
The public disclosure of the experiments prompted President Clinton to appoint an advisory 
committee on Human Radiation Experiments. The committee’s job was to examine archives, 
including classified documents to reconstruct events and policies. At the request of Hazel 
O’Leary, then Secretary of Energy, Clinton ordered the declassification of those documents in 
order to get at the truth of the experiments. The advisory committee was also charged not only 
with resolving questions of medical ethics but with determining who was harmed and 
recommending just compensation. What is important to note about Welsome’s discovery is that 
it started out as an investigative report and ended up influencing the president to declassify tens 
                                                 
8 Ibid, 16. 
9 Eileen Welsome, The Plutonium Files: America’s Secret Medical Experiments in the Cold War (New 
York: Delacorte Press, 1999), 6. 
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of thousands of documents that underscored the culpability of the government in using its 
citizens as guinea pigs in the name of national defense. 
In “Some Problems in Placing Modern Medical Records in Public Archives,” Irene 
Kearsey discusses the practical problems of depositing modern hospital medical records in a 
public archival facility. The objective of the archives is to make records available for public 
access seventy-five years after the date of last contact of the patient with the hospital or sooner 
under certain specified circumstances.10 Even though Kearsey is examining this issue from the 
Canadian perspective, many aspects of her study are relevant for other countries, including the 
United States. Kearsey states that there are a limited number of instances when it is generally 
accepted ethical practice to release medical information: with the patient’s consent, when the law 
requires it, or when duty to society overrides the duty to the patient.11
Kearsey argues that placing medical records in a public archives breaches confidentiality. 
By examining the exceptions, she assesses whether this breach can be justified. Kearsey has 
problems with obtaining expressed or implied consent from patients for permanently maintaining 
their medical record. She contends that ethical issues arise as to when it is proper to make such a 
request. For example, patients might suspect a sinister reason that their records are wanted for 
permanent retention when they know others have not been so informed. Kearsey insists that a 
selection process must be in place that identifies a record for permanent retention.12 To ask all 
patients for informed consent would only create more problems.  
                                                 
10 Irene Kearsey, “Some Problems in Placing Modern Medical Records in Public Archives” American 
Archivist 17 (November 1989): 183-196. 
11 Ibid, 185. 
12 Ibid, 186-187. 
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Kearsey is troubled by the release of medical records that are in the public’s best interest. 
She asserts that the public’s best interest would apply if enough patients benefited significantly 
from the availability of the record as well. If this were the justification for permanency, then 
every record should be retained, which is clearly beyond the capabilities of hospitals. Kearsey, 
however, admits that release of medical records where duty to society overrides duty to the 
patient has some relevancy. For example, death certificates are already available for public 
scrutiny and thus duty to the patient might have completely disappeared by the end of the closure 
period.13
Kearsey asserts that the only grounds on which confidentiality of medical records can be 
breached is when the law requires it. Since there is a legal requirement, there is justification for 
breaching confidentiality by placing patient records in a public archive. For Kearsey, placing 
hospital patient records in a public archives is permissible when assessed against current 
requirements for the confidentiality of records. During the closure period, an ethics committee of 
the original record owner assesses each research project and researcher and specifies conditions 
under which work can be done. For example, any request for records will be referred back to the 
original hospital for permission to grant access. Eric Ketelaar suggests that in the case of 
restricted access the archivist can, after consultation with the creating agency, lift a restriction at 
the request of an applicant if using the records outweighs the interests served by the 
restrictions.14  
A review of the archival literature related to access illustrates an emphasis in three 
general areas: public demand to restricted collections, implications of disclosing sensitive 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 187. 
14 Eric Ketelaar, “The Right to Know, the Right to Forget? Personal Information in Public Archives,” 
Archives and Manuscripts 23 (May 1995): 8-17. 
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material, and equal access to open collections. Moreover, much of this literature focuses on 
broader issues of access. For example, in “The Ethics of Access,” Elena Danielson’s 
fundamental objective is to point out the continuing debate about personal privacy versus public 
interest and the archivist’s difficult role in applying guidelines and codes to appease those 
involved i.e. heirs, donors, collectors, researchers, and home institutions. Danielson contends that 
archivists have a tougher job of administering unpublished papers than librarians who handle 
printed material.15  
Danielson points out that archivist’s play a key role in mediating these conflicting 
interests in order to avoid the ultimate threat: “the destruction of embarrassing but historically 
important documentation.”16  Archivists must have succinct standards for access policies in order 
to make decisions. Danielson provides examples of collections that emphasize the difficulties 
archivists face in implementing the concept of equal access to restricted or sensitive records and 
her study has far reaching ramifications for archivists who deal with medical records. Her study 
underscores the point that with the public’s demands for greater openness, archivists cannot be 
asked to protect the reputations of public figures indefinitely.  
Most restrictions proposed by donors of personal papers fall within the scope of privacy 
considerations. These stipulations are intended to prevent the embarrassing disclosure of private 
facts concerning donors or other individuals whose names appear in  donated materials. In 
appraising collections of personal papers, archivists must be prepared to discuss the implications 
of sensitive materials with potential donors. In instances when donors do not apply restrictions to 
collections of personal papers that contain patient records, the repository accepting the collection 
                                                 
15 Elena Danielson, “The Ethics of Access,” American Archivist 52 (Winter 1989): 55. 
16 Ibid, 59. 
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must assume responsibility for protecting the privacy of the patient and assign the appropriate 
restrictions where necessary. The privacy of patient and human-subject information, however, is 
widely protected by laws, institutional regulations, and the ethics of the health professions. 
Repositories at institutions in the health fields are bound to uphold their institutional policies 
regarding access to patient and human-subject information and must regulate access in 
compliance with these policies. 
In “State Archives and Issues of Personal Privacy: Policies and Practices,” Alice Robbin 
contends that archivists struggle with these competing values because policies and practices for 
responding to requests for restricted records are not well developed. Her survey of fifty state 
archives revealed that archivists are neither well informed about confidentiality and access 
statutes nor politically active.17 Lacking formal policies and clear definition of privacy limits, 
archivists are unable to determine when an invasion of personal privacy might be warranted by 
the public disclosure of personal information held in their archives. Hence, archivists are unable 
to manage access to sensitive information such as medical records consistently. Archivists who 
are responsible for the management of patient records in their holdings should obtain copies of 
their own state laws governing medical records as well as follow the regular discussion in the 
medical literature on the topics of confidentiality and the disclosure of patient information. By 
understanding state laws covering medical records and following relevant professional literature, 
archivists can be well informed when they are confronted with a particularly complex issue 
regarding access to medical records in their holdings, archivists can be well informed.  
                                                 
17 Alice Robbin, “State Archives and Issues of Personal Privacy: Policies and Practices,” American 
Archivist 49 (Spring 1986): 163. 
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The objective of the volume Designing Archival Programs to Advance Knowledge in the 
Health Fields is to demonstrate the ways in which medical archives programs can be transformed 
to meet new demands for services. The editors, Nancy McCall and Lisa Mix, developed the 
volume as a catalyst and a guide in accomplishing a new alignment for archives in medical 
centers. The volume covers all aspects of medical archives management. Specifically, Deborah 
McClellan, Nancy McCall, and Ann Slakey have a discussion on “Promoting and Facilitating 
Wider Use of Holdings.”18 According to these authors, a major goal of this volume is to promote 
greater awareness and use of archival resources in the health fields. McClellan, McCall, and 
Slakey present a model for use of archival holdings from the health field that fosters open 
intellectual inquiry within the bounds of legal and ethical requirements.19  
These authors emphasize that archivists in charge of holdings that contain patient and 
human-subject records face a daunting situation. Legal and ethical codes require that they protect 
the privacy of the individuals who are represented in these records. But precedents exist in the 
health fields for research involving the collection of clinical data and information. Archivists in 
the health fields are therefore in a position to protect the disclosure of private information while 
promoting open inquiry for intellectual studies. The authors insist that even though information 
about available holdings should be freely obtainable by all users and policies and procedures 
regarding access should be clearly set forth, an archivist must respect the restrictions that limit 
access to specific holdings. Thus, instituting a procedurally fair process for reviewing 
applications for access to restricted materials that weighs the legitimacy of each request is 
                                                 
18 Deborah McClellan, Nancy McCall, and Anne Slakey, “Promoting and Facilitating Wider Use of 
Holdings,” in Nancy McCall and Lisa A. Mix, eds., Designing Archival Programs to Advance Knowledge in the 
Health Fields (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 125-146. 
19 Ibid, 126-27. 
 20 
probably not discriminatory.20  For example, if personal identifiers are protected, then 
researchers may be given access to the intellectual content of records. The thrust of the decision 
then focuses on the merit of the proposed research. As a result, in reviewing applications for 
access, archivists are considering the following issues: protection of personal identifiers, purpose 
of the research, quality of the research plan, and credentials of the researcher.21
When preparing guidelines for access to the holdings of individual repositories, archivists 
must first articulate a set of ethical principles that pertain to the access issues associated with 
their own holdings. More importantly, because of the legal, regulatory, and ethical restrictions at 
archival repositories in the health fields, the administration of policies and procedures for access 
is particularly complex. As a result, McClellen, McCall, and Slakey assert that archivists “must, 
therefore, combine a broad based knowledge of the fields that are represented in the 
holdings…and a strong commitment to archival ethics.”22
In many cases, access to archival materials has been restricted for physical rather than 
intellectual reasons. Because archival holdings are essentially irreplaceable, the risks posed by 
physical handling should also be addressed when specifying conditions for access. For 
preservation reasons, a repository may have to limit the handling of documents and artifacts that 
are in a poor state of conservation. Because archives bear a responsibility to protect users and 
staff, conditions on access should afford protection from exposure to hazards that may be in the 
holdings. Mold or insect infested documents may require special treatment in order to make them 
safe for research use.  
                                                 
20 Ibid, 140. 
21 Ibid, 137. 
22 McClellan, McCall, and Slakey, 145. 
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Whenever archival materials have to be withheld from direct examination because of 
fragility or hazardous conditions, the archivist should make every effort to provide researchers 
with pertinent descriptions of the materials. In some instances, however, this does not happen. 
Also, the handling of records in hard copy with personal identifiers is more complex because 
there is usually no feasible way of removing identifiers without defacing original materials or 
engaging in a labor-intensive process of photocopying  documents and deleting identifiers on 
photocopied documents. Developing coding mechanisms to identify the individuals in order to 
prevent disclosure of their names and at the same time permit wider use of the research data and 
information is warranted. Deleting the names and other personal identifying information of the 
patients can influence the results of a research project. For Elizabeth Yakel ensuring the 
confidentiality of patients impacted her data analysis. She further states that for future studies, 
“better provisions for handling confidential data are necessary.”23
Although patient records are potentially useful for research, there is no well established 
standard in the United States for the length of time that patient records should be retained. The 
American Hospital Association had advised hospitals to store each record for ten years after the 
most recent date of patient care. They also note that the retention period for patient records 
depends on the purposes for which the record is being kept. The legal retention requirement 
established by state law varies from three years retention to permanent retention.24  
The retention of records has become more expensive, and the decision as to whether it is 
possible to save all records is often fundamentally financial. Records managers and archivists at 
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some point will be forced to make decisions about what to discard. Those who elect to discard 
some subset of hospital records while attempting to maintain a useful research resource should 
be aware of the consequences of that decision. First, if some types of research such as X-ray 
films are to be eliminated, researchers wishing to use older images will probably discover that 
they have been destroyed. Second, if one wishes to preserve records to document specific events, 
and if one cannot predict in advance exactly which records document those events, one is forced 
to save all of the records. Third, if the aim is to preserve the possibility of research on low 
frequency events, large samples will be needed. The act of selecting a sample of records to keep 
necessarily eliminates some research possibilities. If the sampling is done appropriately, 
however, it can allow researchers to document broad characteristics of a population.25
Once the specific type of information to retain is determined, archivists must focus on the 
proper storage medium particularly for medical records in paper formats. Microfilming has long 
been an appropriate method of preservation. The activity of the records is the key factor in 
determining the retention and microfilming schedule. The level of complexity involved in 
finding a desired record and the number of people who need access to the information are some 
of the considerations related to the choice of a microfilming system.   
Although archival repositories have employed microfilming as a primary measure for 
preservation, academic health centers have largely resisted this widespread use. Problems 
experienced in the access and use of microfilmed records have led to the unpopularity of the 
process in the health fields. Clinicians and scientists assert that accessing and retrieving 
documentation from microfilm systems is often time consuming and difficult because of 
inadequacies in indexing and technical processing. The greatest concern for personnel in the 
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health fields is that the integrity of content is frequently diminished in the microfilm process. 
Health professionals are demanding that the integrity of content be maintained whenever the 
microfilm process is employed.26
Content, format, and medium of documentation determine the researchers’ primary mode 
of access to information. To ensure appropriate controls over access and use, policies and 
procedures regarding user services must make provisions for the range of content and the 
representation of formats and media. While the format of documentation largely determines the 
means of intellectual access, the medium primarily controls the means of physical access. For 
example, if an archive has extensive holdings in microfilm and in computer media, special 
technical accommodations will have to be made to facilitate access to these media. Microfilm 
readers and computer terminals are  necessary equipment for the repository’s reading room.  
Gaining access to personal or sensitive information collected and maintained by 
government agencies can also be a difficult task. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was 
established to assist the public in gaining access to information about government activities. The 
archival literature has focused on the impact of FOIA on archives and specifically government 
agencies. In Archives and Manuscripts: Law, Gary M. Peterson and Trudy Huskamp Peterson 
point out that “each agency must administer the act independently, relying for advice on the 
Department of Justice. Consequently, the implementation of the act has revolved around the 
Department of Justice and its interpretation of the act.”27  
In her assessment of the amended federal Freedom of Information Act, Trudy Peterson 
examined the impact of the revised legislation on records creation, records disposition, and 
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records availability. The 1974 amendments required that “any reasonably segregable portion of a 
record” be released, set tight time limits for responses, amended two exemption categories, and 
established penalties for non-compliance. According to Peterson, most archivists supported the 
new amendment. Following a five year examination of the impact of the new FOIA amendments 
on government agencies, Peterson suggests that in order for confidential information not to be 
released, agencies must “define more clearly for their employees the type of information that is 
covered by an exemption, and … be consistent in the application of that definition…through 
good guidelines, handbooks, and repeated training sessions.”28 Peterson also asserts that public 
trust is key. According to her, the public sector must trust that government agencies will use the 
appropriate exemption, delete or redact identifying information in records released, and that the 
courts will apply the right exemption in cases before them. The most serious impact of the 
amendments for the archivist is records disposition. Peterson, however, points out that in many 
cases FOIA has been used as an argument to prevent destruction. Overall, she contends that 
FOIA remains a challenge for archivists. Although the issue seems to be striking a balance 
between releasing some information that the agencies would like to withhold and withholding 
some information that requesters would like released, “it is up to archivists to state the concept of 
records so clearly that everyone—agencies, researchers, lawyers, and even judges—will 
understand it.”29
Several articles examine how NARA and government agencies have complied with FOIA 
and the public’s right to know—a public right of access to government information. When 
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, the statute was weak and had little 
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impact. During the Watergate scandal in 1974, however, Congress passed major amendments to 
the bill, giving it more power. Important features of the Act are the nine exemption categories. 
Peterson points out that of the nine categories, two are mandatory: Exemption 1 on national 
security classified information and Exemption 3 about information specifically exempted by 
other statutes. The other seven exemptions are discretionary. “This means that an agency can 
decide whether or not to release information that is covered by one of the seven discretionary 
exemptions.”30 Thus, FOIA allows agencies to make determinations on some sensitive 
information. In addition, record availability is implicit, which means that the federal government 
has to justify withholding documents.  
In “Researchers, Archivists, and the Access Challenge of the FBI Records in the National 
Archives,” James Gregory Bradsher contends that researchers face challenges of knowing what 
to ask for and discerning what they received in response to their FOIA requests.31 As for 
archivists, Bradsher observes that the challenge is in deciding what information should be 
withheld, specifically as it relates to issues of privacy and confidentiality.  Bradsher points out 
that in deciding what information must be withheld from researchers, NARA archivists must rely 
on two sets of access restrictions: first, NARA access regulations, which provide general 
restrictions that are based on the FOIA and specific restrictions that agencies impose in 
conformance with the FOIA, and second, restrictions imposed under the FOIA. He contends that 
this task will be difficult because archivists have to balance the right of personal privacy with the 
public’s right to know.  
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Gary and Trudy Peterson have noted in their manual that “It is the tension between the 
two ideas—to provide access to research materials and to protect confidentiality—that creates 
the frustration archivists feel when confronted with access problems.”32  Furthermore, the 
Petersons state that “every archivist wishes there was a nice little checklist that could be 
followed to determine whether a particular record or set of records must be restricted. The plain 
fact is that there isn’t. Restricting records is making judgments. It is a matter of knowing the 
applicable law and its interpretation…understanding when the access problem involves a law and 
when it involves an ethical or practical issue.”33  James Bradsher proposes that reference 
archivists be knowledgeable about laws, institutional regulations, and “the contents of their 
records.”34 He suggests that this will reduce the frustration archivists incur in making records 
available to researchers.  
In “Need to Know: An Attitude on Public Access,” William H. Harader discusses the 
concept of “need to know.”35 Harader maintains that our need to know or right to access to 
government information is a mechanism for political accountability in our democratic society. 
Although FOIA is the tool used to regulate the regulators, Harader points out that there has been 
opposition to the true spirit of the Act. For example, many FOIA requests went to courts where 
judicial remedy was inadequate. Due to a lack of management support, FOIA responses were 
delayed by government agencies. Progress in governmental attitudes toward the need to know 
has come gradually and according to Harader, such change has occurred through training, 
experience, and stronger amendments to the FOIA.  
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In “Archival Adventure Along the Freedom of Information Trail: What Archival Records 
Reveal About the FBI and the Universities in the McCarthy Period,” Sigmund Diamond asserts 
that “archivists, as custodians of the records of our times, have an ethical obligation to support 
the freest possible public access to public records.”36 If  archivists do not support open access, 
then scholars will continue to experience unduly restrictive access conditions. Diamond lamented 
the difficulties he encountered researching the article referenced here. The number of written 
requests and correspondence between Diamond and the FBI reached 1,700 letters. According to 
Diamond, the progress of the research was painfully slow. Diamond found that efforts to use the 
Freedom of Information Act created problems that were time-consuming and costly but at the 
same time yielded some discoveries. For the archivist, Diamond insists that “It should be 
enlightening, even inspiring, for archivists to know that their responsibility extends far beyond 
the custody and maintenance of records. It is no exaggeration to say that they are charged with 
the custody of the republic itself.”37  
2.1.1 Summary 
A review of the literature on access to records encapsulates three key points relevant to this 
study: archivists have difficulties providing access to personal information, specifically medical 
information in government and private institutions; protecting personal privacy remains a 
challenge as does developing policies that can both provide access and protect privacy; and, 
since the establishment of the Freedom of Information Act, the public has taken advantage of 
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submitting requests to the government about its activities. Today the public wants to know 
everything without regard for personal privacy interest.   
Medical information has become the center of this debate. Access to information is the 
mainstay of the archival profession. The upsurge of requests seeking to know everything has 
archivists questioning their own access policies. How does such information contribute to the 
disclosure of governmental activity? How will private and governmental archivists solve the 
problem of determining when public interests outweigh personal privacy? In “Trusting 
Archivists: The Role of Archival Ethics Codes in Establishing Public Faith,” Glenn Dingwall 
discusses archivists’ dilemma in making ethical decisions. He touches upon how the two 
questions raised above are interrelated by pointing out that: 
The records we care for have the potential to do great good. The 
[records] also have the potential to lead to tremendous harm if used 
improperly…We try to draw a line between right and wrong acts, 
differentiating between those that contribute to the public good and 
those that detract from it…Sometimes the lines shift, sometimes 
you lose sight of where the line is, and sometimes forces beyond 
our control push us across that line.38
2.2 PRIVACY 
A review of the archival literature on privacy reveals that it has been a challenge for archivists to 
strike a balance between privacy and freedom of information since the establishment of the 
Privacy Act of 1974. Personal and sensitive information in their custody poses a unique 
dilemma.  This section discusses some of the interpretations and the practical implications for 
archivists whose holdings contain personal and sensitive information by providing an overview 
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of the challenges relating to privacy and the legal nuances under which archivists work. One of 
the major principles of the archival profession is the responsibility to encourage free and equal 
access to the public records and historical documents. The profession has attempted to balance 
such a principle through legal and ethical guidelines that lay out specifically what information 
should be restricted. For example, information considered to be an unwarranted invasion of an 
individual’s privacy constitutes an archivist or donor imposing certain restrictions. 
Although not explicitly granted in the U.S. Constitution, this founding document implies 
that everyone has a conditional right to privacy. In their landmark article “The Right to Privacy,” 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis cogently expressed the individual’s “right to be let 
alone.”39  Their article expanded the concept of the right to privacy as a distinct right and has 
since been cited in many court decisions confronting the issue. Warren and Brandeis also 
clarified the point that “…the principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions…against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, 
but that of an inviolate personality.”40
As a result of governments maintaining large amounts of information about private 
citizens, the right to privacy is a major concern. Much of this personal information gathering 
coincides with the development of new technology that could maintain, access, and link 
information in data banks. In “Problems of Confidentiality in the Administration of Personal 
Case Records,” Virginia Stewart points out that “…computerization of records presents a new 
dimension to the questions of personal privacy versus social utility. Whether the data is recorded 
on typed pages in files or by magnetic impressions on tape, the problems of privacy are 
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conceptually the same. Someone must delineate policy on access to and acceptable use of data 
which exists in record systems.”41 In her examination of the impact of new record practices on 
personal case records in the custody of health and welfare organizations, Stewart describes how 
personal case record information is being disseminated among third parties “with justifiable 
claims for access to records formerly regarded as the exclusive property of the creating 
institution or professional.”42  
Furthermore, the type of research in case records has changed and expanded to include 
the social historian. During the late 1960s, there was a general shift among historians from 
focusing on traditional, political, diplomatic, socioeconomic, and military subjects to examining 
the history of the masses, especially women, racial and ethnic groups. This change is known as 
the new social history. Social historians put old records (such as census figures, legal 
documentation, medical records, and personnel information) to new uses. Hence, a greater 
concern emerged among government agencies and the public with respect to the protection of 
individual privacy. Stewart cautioned that efficient records management of personal information 
can be antithetical to scholarship. In these cases, she insists that the archivist “must overcome a 
certain reluctance to deal with confidentiality issues posed by personal case records in order to 
preserve them for future uses. At the same time, the archivist must recognize that in assuming 
custody over case records he becomes responsible for administering materials in which two 
social values—public’s right to know and the individual’s personal privacy—come into potential 
conflict.”43
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In “Historians, Archivists, and the Privacy Issue,” Walter Rundell, Jr. and Bruce F. 
Adams discuss the growing conflict among government officials, archivists, and historians about 
obtaining access to information. They point out that “serious questions have been raised about 
whether a democratic society can function properly without easy access to information generated 
by its government.”44 Before Congress made several amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act, Rundell and Adams described how government officials made access to their agency 
records very difficult, especially for historians. Rundell and Adams asserted that government 
agencies were using the FOIA as a shield. “In this sense, the agency is maintaining its own 
privacy against unwarranted intrusion.”45 Furthermore, government officials at the time harbored 
a proprietary feeling about their agencies, which was promoted ahead of the public’s right to 
know about government activity.  
According to Rundell and Adams, such government operations “belie any effort or 
intention of complying with the Freedom of Information Act and can only create in citizens 
distrust and cynicism for their government.”46 However, both insist that archivists must demand 
and provide access to the records of the American experience. They assert that as archivists, “We 
will have to remind our government and ourselves that we do serve a function in this society, that 
the study of history…does help us understand and deal with the complex forces of our political, 
social, and economic life,” and that “We should appreciate the antagonistic forces in the clash of 
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secrecy, privacy, and the historian’s need to know,” and if not, then government will continue to 
“use privacy to cloak dishonesty and other activities inimical to the public good.”47
In the early 1980s, the issue of individual privacy was a major concern for archivists and 
historians. In “The Public’s Right to Know and the Individual’s Right to Be Private,” Ruth 
Simmons points out that governmental documents are a major source of documentation of non-
elite groups. Simmons believes that researchers should have access to part of the record provided 
that all personal identifiers are protected. Simmons insists, however, that, “Archivists must not 
lose the opportunity to help resolve the question of whether there is a point in time when the 
right to know overcomes the need to protect confidentiality.”48
In “Privacy and Confidentiality: The Responsibilities of Historians,” David H. Flaherty 
acknowledges that historians, especially social historians who are focusing on the lives of 
ordinary people, are confronted with “sensitive issues in the use of personal information, 
especially those pertaining to the protection of the privacy and confidentiality of individuals.”49 
Flaherty states that historians are exempt from establishing or following any rules or guidelines 
governing the use of information and personal data. But now that way of thinking has become an 
issue for other academic professions, Flaherty insists that the historical profession should 
reexamine its position on its code of ethics, pertaining to accessing and using confidential 
materials. He contends, “Historians should at least attempt to standardize and make explicit in 
general terms the conditions which govern their use of sensitive personal information and data 
for any type of historical research.” If not, “…the historical profession, among others, runs major 
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risks to its integrity and reputation from the occurrence of even one significant well publicized 
breach of confidentiality, whether using information on individuals in the hands of government 
or in private depositories.”50 Flaherty suggests that historians establish detailed and explicit 
ethical codes to protect the confidentiality of personal data and that professional organizations 
form appropriate rules and regulations for information use. Even though establishing ethical 
guidelines on information use is not a simple task, Flaherty insists that it is necessary if “holders 
of data and the general public are to be persuaded that the research community is trustworthy.”51
In “The Archivist’s Balancing Act: Helping Researchers While Protecting Individual 
Privacy,” Judith Schwarz affirms that as an archivist, “Weighing issues of privacy while trying to 
meet the access and informational needs of researchers is one of the most difficult balancing acts 
that archivists perform in carrying out their professional duties.”52  Schwarz emphasizes that by 
constructing policies that protect privacy, archivists can encourage donors to save and donate 
revealing materials. As a collector herself, Schwarz states that she too encountered what 
historians face on a regular basis—denied access to materials. From her experience, Schwarz 
believes that “classification and written but flexible policies on access give archivists ways to 
balance conflicting concerns.”53 As the coordinator of the Lesbian Herstory Archives, Schwarz 
is sensitive to the information contained in her archives. More importantly, she understands “the 
impulse to suppress material or at least to restrict its use for a time…to protect both the 
reputations of individuals and families and the welfare of the institutions.”54 Schwarz points out, 
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however, that the archivist must continue to “figure in these stories as balancers of competing 
concerns and interests.”55 As Kent Haworth succinctly explains, “While the purpose of the 
historian may be the search for truth, the purpose of the archivist is to hold in trust for society the 
evidence of the truth, the evidence of justice and injustice in the society our archives 
document.”56
In the 1990s, the archival literature continued to discuss access issues relating to case 
files (legal, medical, social work) held in public archives as well as confidential information 
collected by the government. In “Private Lives: Confidentiality in Manuscript Collections,” Sara 
Hodson discusses ethical and legal concerns archivists face when acquiring an individual’s 
papers. Hodson points out that a collection that contains personal information could represent an 
invasion of privacy if released. In order to prevent this, Hodson contends that “restrictions may 
be placed on all or part of a collection.”57 She suggests either a specified time (ten, twenty, or 
fifty years) or until the individual’s death. Hodson asserts that such restrictions are reasonable 
and set clear guidelines. These restrictions protect the privacy of the donor or that of a friend or 
family member while providing unambiguous access guidelines for the archivist. More 
importantly, Hodson insists that as archivists or curators, “it is in our hands to safeguard the 
privacy of those who cannot do so themselves. Yet…imposed restrictions must be used with 
great caution.”58 Hodson also recommends that an institution store restricted materials in a 
separate location. In addition, a list of restricted material should be distributed to the staff in 
order to ensure that restricted items will not be provided to researchers by mistake. Hodson 
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notes, however, that despite the efforts of archival institutions to restrict this material, the 
information does make it into the public domain. She believes that despite the risks of exposure, 
there is hope that archivists can manage modern research collections ethically and legally 
without restricting freedom of access into perpetuity.  
Unlike Hodson, Mark Greene contends that archivists are not as hopeful about their 
ability to provide unrestricted access to collections. Greene asserts that instead of discussing the 
theoretical and practical issues associated with disclosing private information in manuscript 
collections, archivists are imposing restrictions beyond the wishes of donors. Furthermore, he 
argues that the discussion on access to private papers has become confusing.59 Although a trend 
towards openness emerged in the early 1990s (less restrictions or qualifications on access), 
publicized incidents involving J.D. Salinger, James Joyce, and Thurgood Marshall have placed 
archivists in an awkward position in dealing with freedom of access and fair use issues.60 In 
trying to answer what would cause an individual injury and embarrassment, Mary Jo Pugh 
concludes in her 1992 Society of American Archivist (SAA) manual,  Providing Reference 
Services for Archives and Manuscripts, that: 
Privacy protects not only good reputation, but also any personal 
information that individuals want to keep from being known. Some 
people do not care if their age is known; others feel considerable 
interest in keeping such information to themselves, perhaps with 
good reason because they have witnessed or experienced age 
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discrimination. The concept of confidentiality refers first to private 
communications. Confidential communication between two people 
is restricted to them alone, and unauthorized inquiry into the 
content of the communication is forbidden. Communications 
resulting from friendship, may not be protected by law, but 
archivists may need to recognize and protect the confidentiality 
implied in them.61
 
Greene insists by this definition, every document not created by the donor of a collection 
is a potential confidentiality problem, “if not a lawsuit waiting to happen.”62 He asserts that 
archivists should not be burdened with making such difficult decisions. Instead, Greene wants to 
place more responsibility on the donor, allowing the individual donor to make decisions granting 
access to the restricted portions of the collection. Furthermore, Greene states that donors are 
“almost always in the best position to judge the sensitivity of their papers.”63 According to 
Greene, in order for a policy of donor-controlled access to have any chance of working properly, 
the archival institution would have to explain to donors what donating their papers means in 
terms of public access. Although he agrees with Hodson that separating restricted materials from 
the rest of the collection is a good idea, Greene contends that the archival profession should 
“formulate concrete and realistic guidelines (or a broad and useful body of case studies) for 
determining what kind of information would represent an invasion of privacy if opened to 
researchers while the creators were still living.”64  
The archival discussion thus far suggests that if such guidelines are not re-formulated or 
re-thought, then individuals and their families will face the dilemma of whether to donate 
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personal papers. In Private Matters: In Defense of the Personal Life, Janna Malamud Smith 
faced such a dilemma in trying to determine the disposition of her famous father’s papers. In this 
cogent discussion of the history of privacy, Smith questions the trend toward the disclosure of 
intimate, private details of individuals’ lives with the assistance of the media, computerization 
and electronic surveillance. She defines privacy as “…enjoying the freedom of being 
unobserved.” Smith insists that our right to privacy is threatened when we do not have “control 
over when, how, to whom, and where you disclose personal material.”65 Furthermore, Smith 
asserts that as a society we have become spectators, which fuels the need to know more intimate 
details about individuals, especially famous ones. For Smith, the biography has become that tool 
by which society views public individuals. She states that “we read biographies, we search for a 
friend, a mentor, a kindred spirit, and ultimately for ourselves.”66 However, for Smith 
“biographies welcome us to the table without demanding that we earn our place.”67
Smith’s experience with biographers taught her a valuable lesson about privacy, which 
inspired her book. When explaining why she turned down biographers, Smith stated that “among 
many reasons for wishing to fend off his biographers was a wish to protect him from my own 
desire to write and thus invade his privacy. I was also hiding from myself as a potential 
violator.”68 Smith also believes that as a society we need to be cautious when protecting our 
individual privacy. And, if we are more careful, then “we will have to examine the sale or 
exposure of all kinds of personal information more carefully than we have of late…[and] write 
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laws and reinforce them.”69 But Smith points out that until we see our individual privacy 
connected to that of others, we run the risk of destroying it. She asserts that “If we continually, 
gratuitously, reveal other people’s privacies, we harm them and ourselves, we undermine the 
richness of the personal life, and we fuel a social atmosphere of mutual exploration.”70 Overall, 
Smith’s discussion of privacy underscores how important it is for archivists to be sensitive to the 
nature of privacy when granting access to collections that contain personal information as well as 
the psyche of their donors. 
The administration of personal information in government archives and the complex 
access issues associated with it has generated much discussion within the archival literature. In 
Without Consent: The Ethics of Disclosing Personal Information in Public Archives, Heather 
MacNeil discusses the challenges government archivists confront when they take into custody 
records containing personal information. MacNeil points out that archivist’s must be sensitive to 
the individuals who are the subject of records that contain personal information. She states, 
“Archival professional ethics demand that, in administering access to records containing personal 
information, archivists demonstrate a sensitivity to the sensibilities of the individuals represented 
in the records and, more specifically, that they actively work toward ensuring the protection of 
the individual’s right to privacy,”71 which is “integral to the notion of proper archival 
management of records.”72  
MacNeil has suggested ways in which government archivists can reconcile research and 
privacy interests while closing the gap between theory and practice. She insists that proper 
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archival management of such records requires a strong and systematic policy that is consistent in 
administering access to restricted records. Before such records are transferred, confidentiality 
issues need to be worked out, including exceptions to the non-disclosure rule. Institutional 
guidelines should “specify the conditions under which access to records normally restricted to 
protect personal privacy will be allowed to accommodate research and statistical purposes.”73 
Furthermore, MacNeil insists that it is extremely important that archivists realize that they are 
acting in the best interest of the individual who is unaware that records concerning him or her are 
being used for research purposes. MacNeil concurs with Roland Baumann in his assessment of 
state archival policies for administering access to confidential records that if such a coherent 
policy and clearly defined procedures for administering access to records containing personal 
information were in place, then this would “reduce…the undue amount of discretion archivists 
themselves are sometimes inclined to exercise in their dealing with researchers seeking access to 
restricted records.”74 More importantly, archivists would be actively contributing to improving 
“the archival status quo in matters relating to privacy”75 and not “paralyzed with apprehension or 
indecision.”76
The archivist’s arduous task of understanding the concept of privacy is now discussed 
fully in the edited volume Privacy and Confidentiality Perspectives: Archivists and Archival 
Records. Editors Menzi L. Behrnd-Klodt and Peter J. Wosh have gathered a variety of views and 
case studies about how archivists have dealt with privacy. Previously written articles by Elena 
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Danielson and Sara Hodson are included. Behrnd-Klodt and Wosh have assembled this volume 
to support their idea that “archivists do think about privacy in their own special way.”77  
 
 
The Behrnd-Klodt and Wosh volume contains a section on administrative perspectives. In 
this section, archivists Sarah Rowe-Sims, Sandra Boyd, and H.T. Holmes discuss the controversy 
of providing access to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records. The Mississippi 
State Sovereignty commission was formed after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education. Its 
objective was to protect Mississippi from the interference of the federal government and to 
promote states rights. Promoting states rights included investigative, public relations, or advisory 
activities. 
The state archivists were in charge of determining what records would be disclosed to the 
public. The archivists confronted people who wanted the records concealed and those who 
wanted full disclosure. After battling this issue in state courts from 1977-1994, a compromise 
was reached which allowed the records to be open to the public while respecting the personal 
privacy of those mentioned in the records. This case represents the influence of the public’s right 
to know about how the Commission conducted itself. Like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, 
the Commission records caused a stir that pitted the public against the individual. However, 
balancing the two interests “…affirms the archival role in enabling people to see for themselves 
just what the state government did and allows Mississippi citizens to hold the government 
accountable.”78  
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The book entitled The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and 
States’ Rights chronicles the history of the Commission from 1953-1973.79 Because of the 
release of the official records of the Commission, Yashuhiro Katagiri provides in great detail 
about why it was created, its activities, and its impact on the history of Mississippi, especially 
during the civil rights movement. It should be noted that while researching the agency at 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History in Jackson, Sarah Rowe-Sims, Sandra Boyd, 
and H.T. Holmes assisted Katagiri with his research. As a result of the court case and the ensuing 
compromise of allowing access to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission records, 
Katagiri was able to educate and increase the knowledge of the public about the agency. 
 
2.2.1 Summary 
The review of the literature on privacy has progressed from the issue of individual privacy to 
developing practical management guidelines to keep donors contributing their papers. Discussion 
has focused on setting a time limit for disclosure of such information, allowing the donor to 
participate actively in the decision-making regarding restrictions and the archivist’s autonomy in 
dealing with such matters. As Greene states, however, there need to be “realistic guidelines.” 
There are not enough case studies to generate a new discussion about protecting personal 
information, defining the characteristics of personal information and who is affected by the its 
disclosure. This dissertation initiates a discussion of how archivists define personal information, 
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how governmental archivists use this information and how disclosure affects individuals or third 
parties (i.e. families) referenced in sensitive records.  
This study suggests that personal information is data an individual would not usually 
disclose to the public (i.e., sex life, medical condition, financial situations) because of the 
potential effect on his/her life. As a result, personal information is defined by the privacy 
interests (disclosure or nondisclosure to the public) of the individual. Keep in mind that the 
disclosure of personal information differs for each individual. In the ideal case, the donor 
determines what is private. In information created or collected by the government, individuals 
are protected by the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. However, the discretion of 
the federal agency can determine whether or not public knowledge outweighs personal privacy. 
2.3 COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
In light of the profusion of literature on collective memory in several disciplines, this section of 
the literature review will focus on the connection among collective memory, history, and myth 
all of which are linkages to the past. Although each one can provide access to the past in its own 
way, they are “neither fixed nor firmly bounded; they overlap and shift their focus.”80 Thus, this 
literature review will underscore how the creation and structure of collective memory is 
influenced by other linkages to the past—history, myth, and archives. Maurice Halbwachs, the 
French sociologist, influenced the collective framework in which the study of memory would 
take place over the years. In On Collective Memory, Halbwachs argues that collective memory is 
                                                 
80 David Lowenthal. Possessed By the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (New York: 
Free Press, 1996), 3. 
 43 
a socially constructed notion which may include family, religion, class, and the delimitation of 
time and space. In addition, Halbwachs contends that present situations affect how the past is 
remembered or “reconstructed.”  He states that “our conceptions of the past are affected by the 
mental images we employ to solve present problems, so that collective memory is essentially a 
reconstruction of the past in the light of the present.”81 Moreover, Halbwachs believes that 
despite the fact that recollections of past are based on distortions, memory does serve a collective 
function. He asserts, “As soon as each person and each historical fact has permeated this 
memory, it is transposed into a teaching, a notion, or a symbol and takes on a meaning.”82
Although Halbwachs’ analysis of memory did not focus on the connection between 
collective memory and history, historians have taken up Halwbachs’ framework and applied it to 
their analyses of the creation of group and national pasts. In “Memory and American History,” 
David Thelen is interested in how people construct and narrate memories in the “social 
dimensions of memory.” He writes that “the study of memory exist in different forms along a 
spectrum of experience, from the personal, individual, and private to the collective, cultural, and 
public.”83 Furthermore, postulating a dichotomy between memory and history negates the 
political dimensions of both collective memory and history. Thelen asserts that “the struggle for 
possession and interpretation of memory is rooted among the conflict and interplay of social, 
political, and cultural interests and values in the present.”84   
In Phantoms of Remembrance, Patrick J. Geary states, “All memory, whether 
‘individual,’ ‘collective,’ or ‘historical,’ is memory for something, and this political purpose 
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cannot be ignored.”85 In Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, Paul Antze and 
Michael Lambek agree and state that “memory has found a prominent place in politics as a 
source of authority and as a means of attack.”86 Thus, if historical memory is essentially 
political, so too is collective memory. 
  Jacques Le Goff believes that there is a relationship between memory and history. He 
insists that although each is distinct, history and memory are interdependent on one another. For 
example, Le Goff states that “the discipline of history…seek[s] to be objective and to remain 
based on the belief in historical truth. It is true that history involves a rearrangement of the past 
which is subject to the social, ideological, and political structures in which historians live and 
work.”87 Le Goff further states that “memory is the raw material of history. Whether mental, 
oral, or written, it is the living source from which historians draw.”88 He points out that memory 
and history are subject to manipulation by time and societies but insists that history and memory 
can help each other connect the present and past. He states, “Memory, on which history draws 
and which it nourishes in return, seeks to save the past in order to serve the present and the 
future. Let us act in such a way that collective memory may serve the liberation and not the 
enslavement of human beings.”89 Even though Le Goff views collective memory as mythic, 
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deformed, and anachronistic, he believes history is present to “illuminate memory and help it 
rectify its errors.”90
Peter Burke suggests that social memory is transmitted through oral traditions, histories, 
memoirs and other written records; images, pictorial or photographic, still or moving; actions; 
and space. Burke reminds us that oral traditions are passed down but can be altered over time, 
thus affecting the collective memory of a particular group. Written records are not “innocent acts 
of memory but rather attempts to persuade, to shape the memory of others.”91 Images have been 
constructed in order to “assist the retention, and transmission of memories.”92 Actions are re-
enactments of the past, including commemoration and “…attempts to impose interpretations of 
the past.” They are in every sense collective representations.”93 Space places “images that one 
wishes to remember in particular locations such as memory palaces or memory theatres.”94 Peter 
Burke also suggests that the remembered past can turn into myth. He insists that he uses myth to 
illuminate a story that has “…symbolic meaning.”95 He does not use myth in a negative way. 
Burke contends that for social or collective memory, the past and myth are useful in defining 
individual and group identity. 
In The Myths We Live By Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson point out that “…this 
persistent blindness to myth undeniably robs us of much of our power to understand and interpret 
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the past.”96 Samuel and Thompson contend that oral historians can observe the distortions, 
omissions and reinterpretations through which myths in individual and collective memory take 
shape. They insist that life stories “should be seen, not as blurred experience, as disorderly 
masses of fragments, but as shaped accounts in which some incidents were dramatized, others 
contextualized, yet others passed over in silence, through a process of narrative shaping in which 
both conscious and unconscious, myth and reality, played significant parts.”97 Furthermore, “to 
identify the element of myth in oral sources is certainly not to say that we are working with 
memories of a false past.”98 The authors assert, however, that if the subjective and the 
unconscious come into play with memories, it does not mean that the scholar must choose one 
and abandon the other. Thus, it is the facts (or lack thereof), the omissions and the shaping of 
these stories of the past that make it a myth, a way of structuring memory and exploring life 
experiences. 
Samuel and Thompson also claim that “…the most powerful myths are those which 
influence what people think and do: which are internalized, in their ways of thinking, and which 
they pass on consciously or subconsciously to their children and kin, their neighbors, workmates, 
and colleagues as part of the personal stories which are the currency of such relationships.”99 In 
particular, they contend that such myths are extremely important to minorities or marginalized 
groups in a society. They state that “…for minorities, for the less powerful, and most of all for 
the excluded, collective memory and myth are often still more salient: constantly resorted to both 
in reinforcing a sense of self and also as a source of strategies for survival. Survival of defeat or 
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humiliation is a common thread, not only in the myths of minorities, but more widely in other 
persecution myths or common horror stories”100 Thus, Samuel and Thompson point out “To call 
such stories myths is not to deny their roots in real incidents and real social conflicts. It is rather 
to indicate that, however, we evaluate their literal meaning, the very fact that they recur so 
widely is real symbolic evidence of a collective sense of injustice and both anger and pride in 
having personally come through such hardships.”101 Furthermore, Samuel and Thompson urge 
historians to understand that the mythical elements in memory (written or oral) need to be seen 
both as evidence of the past and as a continuing historical force in the present. Colin Grant would 
agree that despite the truth, “…myths stay with us…They are the visual, intellectual, and 
spiritual atmosphere in which we live.”102
  William G. Doty provides a comprehensive overview of the approaches to studying 
myths and rituals today. Doty points out that disciplines such as religion, anthropology, political 
science, and sociology take a positive approach to myths. Myths are “seen as really existing, 
important social entities that express and mold culture”103 and “forming a constitutive part of a 
society’s worldview.”104 Like Samuel and Thompson, Doty contends that myths serve a 
function. Doty, however, believes that myths are multilayered and multifunctional—evolving to 
meet the demands of social, intellectual, and political life. 
Doty has included a list of questions to address the significance, meaning, and value of 
mythic texts. The five parts of the questions are: social context; psychological aspects; structural 
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aspects; literary, textual, and performative aspects; and other interpretive matters. The social 
context questions focus on how the myth functions within the society and the psychological 
questions center on what part of the psyche the myth addresses in the individual or the group. 
The structural questions concentrate on the dynamics itself while the literary, textual, and 
performative questions target the characteristics of the myth. The other questions refer to other 
functions of a myth in society; whether or not it is constructive or destructive. These questions 
can also apply to contemporary oral myths. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Although access, privacy, and collective memory were discussed separately, in unison they 
underscore throughout the study the archival challenges confronted by the National Archives in 
maintaining and providing access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The access literature 
points out what researchers confront when attempting to achieve access to sensitive material 
such as medical records, especially those in the custody of the government. In addition, 
researchers also deal with personal privacy issues. When it comes to access to sensitive material, 
the archivist has to decide who can see what. 
 Issues of access and privacy can in turn affect the collective memory of a particular event. For 
this study, collective memory will be defined as “the perceptions and uses of the past by the 
public—including both government and citizens.”105 More importantly, the interrelation of the 
literature will highlight the public’s right to all records that explain the circumstances 
surrounding the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and  NARA’s attempt at balancing privacy and 
                                                 
105 Richard J. Cox, “The Concept of Public Memory and Its Impact on Archival Public Programming,” 
Archivaria 36 (Autumn 1993): 122. 
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freedom of information. Francis Blouin concludes that what archivists do affects how people 
view the past.106 Thus, if people still have unresolved questions or myths about the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study, access to the records should answer those questions and challenge the legitimacy 
of those myths. According to Blouin, “When extant documentation challenged a belief, then the 
authority of the documentation often settled the question.”107
                                                 
106 Francis X. Blouin, Jr., “Archivists, Mediation, and Construction of Social Memory,” Archival Issues 
24:2 (1999), 102. 
107 Ibid, 104. 
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3.0  A QUALITATIVE STUDY: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING NARA’S ADMINISTRATIVE TREATMENT OF THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS 
To receive approval from University of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), the 
research protocol for this study had to be sound in its methodology, objectives and specific aims. 
This qualitative study implemented the historical case study method to examine and analyze the 
National Archives and Records Administration’s (hereafter cited as NARA) access policy toward 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records within the context of three archival issues: access, privacy, 
and collective memory. Historical data as well as secondary sources were utilized to detail the 
history of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records and to provide a description of NARA’s 
recordkeeping practices. 
3.1 HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
Stephen Isaac and William B. Michael note that the purpose of historical inquiry is “to 
reconstruct the past systematically and objectively by collecting, evaluating, verifying, and 
synthesizing evidence to establish facts and reach defensible conclusions, often in relation to a 
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particular hypothesis.”1 Historical research seeks to interpret past events. The subject under 
investigation is interpreted through an explicit hypothesis, which includes an examination, 
evaluation, and explanation of the event. Primary sources and interviews provide an interpretive 
narrative, the conclusions of which will either support or invalidate the initial hypothesis.  
Historical research can contribute to the body of knowledge about a particular 
phenomenon, and it can also enhance our understanding of when, how, and why past events 
occurred and the significance of these events. Charles Busha and Stephen Harter state that in 
order to carry out an effective historical research project the following procedures must be 
followed: 
a. Recognition of a historical problem or the identification of a 
need for certain historical knowledge. 
 
b. The gathering of as much pertinent information about the 
problem or topic as possible. 
 
c. If appropriate, forming a hypothesis that tentatively explains 
relationships between historical factors (variables). 
 
d. Rigorous collection and organization of evidence and the 
verification of the authenticity and veracity of the information and 
its sources. 
 
e. Selection, organization, and analysis of the most pertinent 
collected evidence, and the drawing of conclusions. 
 
f. Recording of conclusions in a meaningful narrative.2  
                                                 
1 Stephen Isaac and William B. Michael, Handbook in Research and Evaluation, 2nd ed. (San Diego, CA: 
Edits Publishers, 1981), 44. 
2 Charles H. Busha and Stephen P. Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and 
Interpretation (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 91. 
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 To determine the authenticity and veracity of the data collected, the researcher must 
subject them to additional evaluations. In historical research, data are evaluated using external 
and internal criticism. External criticism of records is concerned with the authenticity of each 
document used (i.e., whether the document is what it purports to be). Internal criticism judges the 
value of a document’s contents and is concerned with the question of whether the information 
contained in the document is factual or false. Busha and Harter assert that using the historical 
research method successfully “will depend greatly upon the ability of the researcher to 
adequately conceptualize the purpose and problem of the research, to vigorously evaluate and 
categorize the collected evidence, and to analyze data intelligently in view of research 
objectives.”3   
3.2 CASE STUDY 
The case study research method allows for the concentrated examination of a particular 
phenomenon and results in the development of a comprehensive understanding of a specific 
context. Raya Fidel contends that in case studies, “analysis of the data is performed throughout 
the duration of the study. New data are constantly analyzed and results of previous analysis 
direct future investigations.”4  In addition, the case study method offers the researcher flexibility 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 115. 
4 Raya Fidel, “The Case Study Method: A Case Study,” in Jack D. Glazier and Ronald R. Powell eds. 
Qualitative Research in Information Management (Englewood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, 1992), 38. 
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in dealing with unexpected findings and safeguards against assumptions that may turn out to be 
incorrect. The case study approach is most appropriate for “how” and “why” questions. 
Researchers often strive to expand their case-specific findings into more generalized 
theoretical statements applicable to related phenomena happening outside the specific case being 
examined. Fidel cautions researchers against extracting too much from a single case or even 
from multiple cases because “one cannot satisfactorily determine which regularities are general 
and which are unique.”5 Thus, a researcher must be aware of this potential pitfall and abstain 
from drawing too many connections from the particular to the general. 
The case study approach utilizes a wide array of data-gathering methods which include 
interviews, documents, archival records, physical artifacts, participant-observation and direct 
observation. Busha and Harter point out that researchers interested in a single phenomenon 
“attempt to gather extensive data about it so that relationships among variables associated with 
the observed phenomenon can be identified.”6 Case  studies offer “thorough and detailed 
examinations and analysis of a research problem so that findings can be applied directly to the 
object of inquiry.”7 Therefore, the case study approach is appropriate for studying the 
relationship between NARA’s access policy toward the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records and on 
restricted information. 
The case study method complements the historical research method when used to analyze 
a single problem. The historical method supports the case study by allowing the subject of the 
case study to be evaluated over time, while the case study aids historical analysis by closely 
                                                 
5 Ibid, 39. 
6 Busha and Harter, 151.  
7 Ibid, 152. 
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focusing attention upon a specific phenomenon. Combining the two methods allows the 
researcher to draw upon the strengths of each. 
3.3 HISTORICAL CASE STUDY 
Through historical case study methodology, this qualitative study examines the National 
Archives and Records Administration’s administrative role in maintaining and providing access 
to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, especially the restricted medical records. The 
combination of historical and case study methods enables the researcher to describe and analyze 
in detail a historical case while examining a particular phenomenon in-depth. The context and 
events surrounding the accession of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records by NARA are detailed 
and analyzed through the historical study of primary and secondary sources, while the effects of 
the administration of the records by NARA is described as a case study through interviews and 
primary sources. Both methodologies provide a discourse for the five research questions:  
1. What is NARA’s official policy toward administering access to controversial 
records that contain restricted information? 
2. In light of those policies and practices, how are the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records treated? 
3. Does NARA’s access policy toward restricted information and the agreement 
with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) undermine the spirit of the 
Freedom of Information Act with respect to the Tuskegee Syphilis records? If 
so, what are the consequences in this particular case? 
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4. What do the recordkeeping practices of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, 
reveal about NARA’s effectiveness in protecting personal information in 
those records? 
5. How have the restrictions on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records affected the 
collective memory of the study? 
A triangulation of data and methodologies resulted in a narrative that highlights the 




The interviews were designed to supplement the documentation collected to address the research 
questions. The interviews underscore the impact of federal legislation and agency regulations on 
records, access rights, individual and third party rights, and government archivists’ commitment 
to preservation and promotion of information.  
Nine interviews were conducted with individuals who have consulted the records for 
research, legal, administrative and work related purposes. Each interviewee provided a unique 
perspective towards dealing with the records. The interviewees consisted of a retired Public 
Health Service officer, civil rights attorney, federal government attorney, federal records 
manager, manager of CDC benefits program, historian, FOIA officer, federal government 
archivist, and former surgeon general. The professional background of each interviewee and their 
connection with the records are as follows: 
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Peter Buxtun is the retired Public Health Service employee who exposed 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in 1972. In addition to being the whistleblower, he 
discussed documents that he found while uncovering the circumstances of the 
study in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
Civil rights attorney Fred Gray represented some of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study participants in a civil suit against the government. In addition, he 
recalled the type of records he received in order to bring the civil suit. 
 
As records manager for the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Jimmy Harrison was responsible for arranging the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records to be accessioned by the NARA. 
 
Bill Jenkins, Ph.D., is the former manager of the Tuskegee Health 
Benefits Program at the National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention of the 
Center for Disease Control and is familiar with the issues surrounding the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. In addition, he maintained contact with those 
participants who were living and their family members. 
 
James Jones, who wrote the definitive book on the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, entitled Bad Blood, also provided Fred Gray with the records to bring his 
lawsuit against the government on behalf of the participants. 
  
Ramona Oliver the FOIA Officer, Office of the General Counsel, 
National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II, College Park, 
Maryland), investigated my FOIA request regarding access to the medical 
records. I also wanted her to explain to me the process of investigating my FOIA 
request and others. In addition, we discussed NARA’s access restriction policy 
and how it relates to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. 
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Charles Reeves, former Director of Archival Operations, National 
Archives Southeast Region was in direct contact with the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study records and is familiar with NARA access regulations. 
 
Sarah Rutgers, Assistant Attorney of the Office of the General Counsel 
(Archives II, College Park, Maryland) investigated my FOIA request. She and 
Ramona Oliver worked together on this request. In addition, she explained the 
role of the Office of General Counsel in assisting NARA with FOIA requests 
involving personal privacy. 
 
Dr. David Satcher, M.D., is the former Surgeon General of the United 
States (1998-2002) and was director of the CDC and Administrator of the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry from 1993 to 1998. Dr. Satcher played 
a key role in influencing President Clinton to make an apology to the participants 
in 1997 and encouraging access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. He is 
currently director of the National Center for Primary Care at Morehouse School of 
Medicine located in Atlanta, Georgia. He made an effort to make sure that records 
related to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study found at the National Center for Infectious 
Diseases were transferred to NARA. 
 
Of the nine interviewees, four were African American, two were women, and seven were 
males. The issue of race affecting the release of the records was raised. For this study race is a 
peripheral issue that does not affect the outcome of this study. However, it does warrant a brief 
discussion.  
The remaining six interviews did not take place because the people were adamant about 
maintaining their privacy.  
Interviews ranged from forty-five minutes to two hours, with an average interview time 
of an hour and twenty minutes. All interviews were tape recorded. The researcher transcribed all 
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tape recorded interviews. The tapes remain with the researcher and will not be made available to 
the public. Interested parties must make a special request to the researcher in order to get access 
to the transcripts.  
Interviews took place over a three month period in-person (interviewee’s home or office) 
and via email. The researcher traveled to several sites, including Atlanta, Georgia; San 
Francisco, California; Washington, D.C.; and College Park, Maryland.  
NARA officials were personally contacted by the researcher to get permission to 
interview staff who were familiar with the records. She contacted the records manager at the 
Center for Disease Control via email to request an interview. The remaining interviewees were 
contacted via email and telephone.  
The identities and job titles of the individuals were important to this research study 
because they provided context for the case study and for the analysis of NARA’s access policy 
for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The researcher sought permission to identify individual 
interviewees. The interviewee and researcher discussed the consent form which had to be signed 
by the interviewee in order for the interview to take place (see APPENDIX N). The form stated 
that with their permission, their identities would be included in the research study and that direct 
quotes might by used in the final analysis. Interviewees were also advised that they had a right to 
remain anonymous.  
Individual interviews were one of the primary sources used to address the questions for 
this study. They were used to “fill in meanings of [open gaps],”8 which the written records could 
not explain. Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman assert that “qualitative research is 
                                                 
8 Carol A.B. Warren, “Qualitative Interviewing,” in Jaber Gubrium and James Holsten,eds., Handbook of 
Interview Research: Context and Method (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 85. 
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appropriate when the issue or interaction being explored are ambiguous or unclear.”9 As a 
qualitative technique of collecting data, interviewing these individuals provided a means of 
filling in gaps that were unclear. The questions for the interviews were mostly open-ended. 
However, obtaining similar information from all interviewees, as well as allowing them to 
elaborate on certain questions, was crucial as well. According to Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, 
“…[the] qualitative interview uses three kinds of questions: 
1. Main questions with which to begin and guide the conversation. 
2. Probe questions to complete and clarify the answer or to request examples and 
evidence. 
3. Follow-up questions that pursue the implications of answers to the main 
questions.10  
This study used a combination of all three. In addition, these interviews provided an 
opportunity for participants to express their issues and interpretations regarding these records. 
Carol Warren points out the “…qualitative interview tends to be more constructionist than 
positivist.”11 The combination of the primary sources and the individual interviews increased the 
validity and reliability of this study.  
The interviews were semi-structured and consisted of specific questions as well as open-
ended questions that allowed for flexible responses. The semi-structured questions were 
applicable to the interviewee and the basis of each experience with the records. The five core 
questions that represented the types of questions asked of the interviewees were as follows: 
                                                 
9 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1995), 45. 
10 Herbert Rubin and Irene Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1995), 145-146. 
11 Ibid, 183. 
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1. Does the public have the correct information about the study? If not, what is 
the correct information?  
2. Does the public’s right to know about what happened in this study outweigh 
the participants and their family personal privacy? Please explain. 
3. Should the public have access to all the records, including the medical 
records? Please explain. 
4. Why have the myths continued about the study? How does this affect the 
memory of the study, particularly in the African American community? 
5. How important are these records? 
6. When did you first hear about the study? 
7. How should NARA provide access to the restricted records, especially the 
medical records? 
8. Please describe your experience with the records. 
9. Do you think that NARA has deliberately denied access to the medical 
records? 
10. Do you know of anyone who has filed a FOIA request seeking access to the 
medical records? 
In analyzing the interviews, the researcher concluded that the core and general questions 
focused on NARA’s experience with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records than its general access 
policy (see APPENDIX O). As a result, the study shifted its focus toward examining NARA’s 
management of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The questions covered the importance of 
the records and the public’s right to know versus personal privacy. The historian, James Jones 
states the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records “has a large claim to the public’s attention…People 
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still care about this…it hasn’t gone away.”12  The NARA FOIA official and the attorney 
representing Office of the General Counsel discussed the balancing test. The balancing test 
determines whether the public’s right to know about government activity outweighs revealing 
personal information about an individual. In the case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical 
records, NARA released the records because all of the participants were deceased and there was 
limited third-party data within the files (see APPENDIX K).  
All of the interviewees discussed the issue of personal privacy. Access to the medical 
records sparked a discussion that challenged each interviewee personally and professionally. The 
CDC records manager, Jimmy Harrison states that “…I battle with the fact that we need to be as 
open as possible…I don’t think there is ever one clear answer to these issues [privacy and 
access]…how we respond to that defines us in terms of what our values and opinions are and in 
some cases there maybe mistakes.”13 Bill Jenkins, former manager of the Tuskegee Health 
Benefits Program of the CDC wanted the medical records destroyed. According to Jenkins, no 
new knowledge could be gained from making these records available to the public. After 
spending many years with the participants and their families, Jenkins felt that opening the 
medical records would do more harm than good.  
The objective of the interviews was to gather information from subjects intimately 
familiar with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The researcher originally planned to 
interview fifteen individuals, but was only able to interview nine. She was unable to interview 
participants in the study and family members of the participants, whom she found were unwilling 
to speak about their experiences with the study. The nine individuals who were interviewed, 
                                                 
12 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
13 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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however, still provided invaluable and varying degrees of perspectives on how NARA should 
administer access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, especially the medical records.   
3.4.2 Government Records 
In order to elicit answers for the questions, the researcher examined records that were accessible. 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Administrative Records 1930-1980 (Record Group 442, Box nos. 
1-20 and 20a.) were examined.14 The Administrative records provided the history of the study. 
The voluminous documents revealed that the Public Health Physicians knew from the inception 
of the study that the participants were unaware of the objectives of the study. The files consisted 
of records created during the course of the study that related to: individual patients; publications 
based on findings of the study; correspondence between medical personnel; administrative 
records; and   photographs of various medical tests or procedures. In addition, the documents 
reveal how meticulous these physicians were in carrying out the initial steps of the study. 
However, as the researcher examined the files, a document in the files stated that documents had 
been removed to protect personal privacy. Removal of certain documents suggested that the 
records had been sanitized to a degree. What had been removed? The researcher was told by a 
NARA archivist that the documents removed contained names and addresses and other sensitive 
information about the participants. For the researcher, this proved to be a limitation of examining 
those records. In addition, the challenge was gaining access to those documents without 
revealing sensitive information.  
NARA archivists at the Southeastern Regional Center provided the researcher with the 
index of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Records. The index outlines what is restricted. The only 
                                                 
14 Records are available at the NARA Southeastern Regional Center at Morrow, Georgia. 
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drawback was that it does not identify why certain records were restricted. It is a list that 
identifies what is restricted or unrestricted, the box number, and title of the folder (see 
APPENDIX M). The index along with the sanitizing of the administrative records made it 
difficult to understand why the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records were managed in this manner. 
More importantly, after discovering that NARA had the medical records but denied 
access helped to frame the questions for this dissertation. The medical records pertain to the 
participants in the study. Those records are separate from the administrative records and are 
restricted for privacy reasons. The medical files (forty-seven boxes) and files from the 
administrative records were removed and placed in the stacks separate from the unrestricted 
administrative records (1 through 3 and 21 through 35 and 32a of the administrative records are 
restricted).  
NARA archivists provided the researcher copies of the accession records. The accession 
records documented the transfer of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Records from the Center for 
Disease Control to the National Archives and Records Administration’s Southeast Regional 
Center. The records were accessioned in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1999. According to 
the initial accession record, NARA agreed to the transfer of the records under the condition that 
the medical records be restricted until 2030. This document was crucial in filing a FIOA request 
with NARA. The CDC records manager who participated in this transfer admitted that 2030 was 
an arbitrary year chosen in order to please the former CDC manager of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Health Benefits program who had the records within his possession. The program was 
established to provide medical benefits to the surviving participants and their wives and children. 
Although the records were not being utilized for this program, this CDC manager felt he had to 
guard against anything or anyone destroying them. 
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However, to withhold access entirely was in direct violation of NARA’s Freedom of 
Information Act regulations on restrictions and use of records codified under 36 C.F.R § 1256 
(revised 6/30/2004). The regulations were examined to understand NARA’s formal access policy 
for government records. The researcher concluded that NARA was inconsistent in applying their 
access policy to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The archivists at the Southeastern 
Regional Center were relying on the agreement which prohibited access.  
Denying full access also compromised the spirit of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), as amended. This federal statute assists citizens in obtaining information about 
government activity. There is a presumption of disclosure with FOIA. Within the statute 
information can be made available to the public in part or in full. Since 1966, the statute has 
evolved from the public being obligated to provide reasons for access to federal agencies being 
required to justify nondisclosure. This statute holds the government accountable for its actions 
through public access to information. The concept of government accountability is crucial to the 
analysis of this case study. 
 With the data already gathered, the researcher filed a FOIA request to obtain access to 
the medical records. The researcher’s request initiated a second review by NARA to see whether, 
after the passage of time, releasing the records was in the best interest of the public.  As privacy 
rights diminish upon the death of the individual, the balancing test favored the public. As a 
result, the medical records were made available for research. The records revealed participant’s 
medical history, including the type of test done by the government physicians. 
The researcher also obtained the Center for Disease Control Appraisal Report on 
Disposition of Records (Nov. 3, 1977). The report states that the “Tuskegee syphilis study files 
(item 101) are proposed for permanent retention because these records provide information 
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linking health problems with racial and social conditions.” The former CDC manager of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Health Benefits Program was unaware of this document. He assumed 
that if NARA received the records, it would destroy them. The Center for Disease Control 
Records Disposition Authority (NCI-90-78-1, item 101) (January 27, 1978), enumerates the 
types of materials that were kept for permanent retention: medical records, pictures and charts, 
follow-ups with doctors, obligation documents, and x-rays of participants in the study. NARA 
received permission from the CDC to destroy the x-rays. Both documents stipulate that the 
records were kept for permanent retention. 
3.4.3 Legal Documents 
The case of Pollard v. United States15 was a class action suit filed on behalf of the participants 
against the federal government. The suit was filed July 23, 1973 in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Civil Rights attorney, Fred Gray sought three million 
in damages for each participant. The suit stated that the participant’s constitutional rights were 
violated. The court documents stated Gray charged that the men had suffered:  
physically and mentally disability, affliction, distress, pain, 
discomfort, and suffering; death; loss of earnings; racial 
discrimination; false and misleading information about their state 
of health; improper treatment or lack of treatment; use as subjects 
in human experimentation without informed consent; the 
maintenance of Plaintiff-subjects as carriers of a communicable 
disease that can cause harm to others, including birth defects in 
children born of mothers to whom the disease has been 
communicated and the shortening of their lives.16
 
                                                 
15 Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp.304 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
16 Jones, 217. 
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The matter was settled out of court in the amount of ten million dollars. The primary 
resources documenting these and other issues included docket sheets; plaintiffs’ filings; 
defendant’s filings; judicial orders and rulings; and depositions by several participants and 
family members representing deceased participants. The researcher learned NARA possessed 
those same documents. However, the public could not get access to them. Attorney Fred Gray 
mentioned in his interview that the researcher could gain access by contacting the court in which 
the lawsuit was filed: the Middle District of Alabama. Those documents were not sanitized. 
There were testimonies by participants that the researcher was able to use as direct quotes. In 
addition, the names of the participants and their family members were publicly documented. The 
researcher was well aware that the information in the court documents was limited. Even though 
the men stated they had syphilis, the medical record was more explicit about their medical 
history. Using the court documents and the medical records provided the researcher information 
that spoke to the participant’s experience in the study. 
3.4.4 Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources were used to augment the primary sources in analyzing the NARA’s access 
policy toward the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. In addition, they provided the context for the 
case study which details the journey of the records in chapter four. Also, the secondary sources 
were valuable in highlighting the discussion around government access, privacy (individual and 
third party), and collective memory. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In order to examine and analyze the NARA’s access policy toward the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records, the historical case study method was used. The historical research approach allowed the 
researcher to reconstruct the journey of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, while the case 
study allowed for an examination of NARA’s access policy toward the records. In addition, the 
case study approach offered the researcher flexibility to deal with unexpected findings such as 
refocusing the case study on NARA’s access policy toward Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, 
instead of NARA’s general access policy. Hence, the case study shifted as the research 
progressed.
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4.0  THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS: CASE STUDY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study records have played a significant role in exposing and terminating 
the study, and holding the United States accountable for its deliberate misconduct. Chapter four 
provides a brief overview of the history of the study and discusses the discovery of the records 
and analyzes their affect on the Pollard v. U.S. civil suit. The chapter then examines how the 
records were managed by the CDC, their transfer to the NARA, and analyzes their treatment 
while in the custody of NARA. Overall, this chapter explores the myriad of access challenges 
surrounding these records, including personal privacy issues and public access.   
4.2 HISTORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY  
In 1928, the Director of Medical Services for the Julius Rosenwald Fund, a Chicago-based 
philanthropy, approached representatives of the United Public Health Service (PHS) to discuss 
ways to improve the health of African Americans in the South. At the time, the PHS had just 
completed a study of the prevalence of syphilis among more than 2,000 African American 
employees of the Delta Pine and Land Company of Mississippi. Twenty-five percent of the 
sample had tested positive for syphilis, and the PHS and the Rosenwald Fund worked together in 
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treating these individuals. This arrangement led to the expansion of the treatment program in five 
counties in the South. Macon County, Alabama, was one of the sites that reported between thirty-
five and forty percent of all age groups testing positive for this disease.1 Those infected were 
treated with a certain amount of arsenic and mercury. Before the treatment phase of the project 
could really be implemented, the Great Depression set in and the Rosenwald Fund  withdrew its 
financial support. The PHS could not afford to continue the treatment program itself.2
Instead of terminating the treatment program, Taliaferro Clark, head of the PHS, decided 
to continue the study. Clark reasoned that the treatment project could be used to study the effects 
of untreated syphilis on living subjects. Although much is known about the natural history of 
syphilis, Clark wanted to know more about the effects of the disease on African Americans. At 
that time, there was no empirical knowledge about whether syphilis affected African Americans 
differently from Caucasians. Clark realized that there was a “ready-made situation…for carrying 
on the proposed study,”3 of untreated syphilis in African-Americans males in Tuskegee, 
Alabama. The PHS enlisted the support of the Tuskegee Institute4 where the John A. Andrew 
Memorial Hospital was established. Since the Tuskegee Institute had a history of service to the 
local African American community, its participation guaranteed the execution of the experiment. 
In return, Tuskegee Institute received money to train nurses and employ nurses at the John A. 
Andrew Memorial Hospital. The Public Health Service solicited the assistance of churches and 
community leaders and others to encourage African-American men to participate.   
                                                 
1 James Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Experiment (New York: Free Press, 1981), 85. 
2 Ibid., 87-88. 
3 Ibid., 94. 
4 The school has been renamed Tuskegee University. 
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For many of the African-American men who participated in the experiment, the 
examination by government physicians was probably the first medical attention they had 
received. For participating in the study, these men received a free examination, food, 
transportation to the hospital, and a fifty dollar burial stipend paid to the family. In order to 
receive the stipend, deceased participants and their family members agreed to allow the 
physicians permission to perform postmortem examination of these men.  
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was divided into two groups. Three hundred and ninety-
nine men were selected who had syphilis and two hundred men were chosen to be a part of a 
control group (see APPENDIX A for the names of the participants).5 Those who were infected 
with syphilis were never told that they had the disease. The men referred to what they had as 
“bad blood,” a term the physicians used as well to describe the participants’ condition. With the 
cooperation of state and local physicians, the researchers prevented these men from receiving 
any kind of medical treatment.6   
During World War II, many of the study participants wanted to sign up for the draft. 
However, draft boards were ordering enlistees to undergo treatment for syphilis. The PHS 
physicians convinced the draft board to exclude the study participants from consideration for the 
draft. More importantly, in 1945, when penicillin was being administered for syphilis, the 
participants were denied the medicine. In 1952, the PHS solicited local health departments to 
track participants who had left Macon County in order to prevent these men from receiving any 
kind of treatment for syphilis. As a result of these efforts, the study was able to continue for forty 
years. 
                                                 
5 Iniatally, 600 African-American men were chosen for the study. However, over the course of forty years, 
some men left the study (17%) and were replaced. At the end of the study, 625 were apart of the study. 
6 Ibid., 162. 
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On July 25, 1972, a front-page headline in the Washington Star read, “Syphilis Victims in 
U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years.”7 The article revealed the explicit details of the study. 
The Washington Star article highlighted how the experiment shifted from offering treatment to 
actively denying it. Public outcry came from everywhere. The federal Assistant Secretary for 
Health and Scientific Affairs appointed an ad hoc advisory panel to review the study. 
The nine member panel included people from the fields of medicine, law, religion, labor, 
education, health administration, and public affairs. The panel found that the study participants 
had willingly agreed to be examined. The panel also concluded that there was no evidence that 
researchers had informed the infected men of the study or its real purpose. In fact, the 
participants had been misled, and were not given all the information necessary in order to 
provide informed consent. With regard to informed consent, the panel stated that a human 
subject should not be “subjected to avoidable risk of death or physical harm unless he freely and 
intelligently consents.”8 According to the panel, these men were not given the opportunity to 
choose. The advisory panel found that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was unjustified and 
concluded that no formal protocol ever existed for this experiment. Department of Health 
Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that the “study” was unethical and should be 
terminated. The study officially ended in November 1972. 
In that same year, the federal government decided to provide life time medical benefits to 
the survivors of the study. The CDC took on the task of locating these men to inform them of the 
proposed benefits. In 1975, the government extended those same benefits to wives and children 
                                                 
7 The story also appeared in the New York Time the following day. Jean Heller, “Syphilis Victims in the 
U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 years,” New York Times, July 26, 1972, 1,8. 
8 “Selections from the Final Report of the Ad Hoc Tuskegee Syphilis Study Panel, Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, 1973.” In Susan Reverby, ed., Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 166. 
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of the participants who had contracted syphilis. According to James Jones, author of Bad Blood, 
the government’s failure to offer some type of compensations as part of its health plan made a 
class-action civil suit inevitable. 
4.3 DISCOVERY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS  
Before writing his book in 1981, James Jones, a graduate student at the time of the exposure of 
the study, had done some research at the National Archives. Under Record Group 90 (hereafter 
cited as RG) of the United States Public Health Service records, Jones had come across four 
letter boxes that referred to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. In 1969, he had no idea that the study 
was continuing. In Susan M. Reverby’s edited volume, Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Jones states, “I had seen other examples in my archival research of non-
therapeutic medical research studies and I had no way of knowing that the Tuskegee Study was 
still active. I was, after all, in an archives.”9  Jones assumption about the study was not 
unreasonable given the perceived role of archives in society, specifically governmental archives. 
Many historians have the notion that archives consist of records of the past that do not have 
value, unless they give them life through the form of a narrative. Jones discovered as a 
researcher, that his notions of an archive inhibited his ability to realize that he himself had 
unearthed a horrible experiment that was going at the time he was conducting research at the 
National Archives. 
                                                 
9 Susan  M. Reverby,ed.,  Tuskegee’s Truth: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), xi. 
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While a post doctoral candidate in the History of Medicine and Medical Ethics Program 
at Harvard University, Jones began investigating the study. According to Jones, the United States 
Department of Justice at the time had asked the National Archives “to produce the records but 
also to sequester the records and to let no one see them but attorneys from the Justice 
Department.”10  
In 1972, Jones knew where to look to begin his research. As a result, he called on his 
good friend, Albert H. Leisinger Jr., a high ranking official at NARA.11 According to Jones, 
Leisinger had an abiding belief that the public had a right to know and “that the role of the 
National Archives was to facilitate inquiry and to be forth coming.”12 When Jones contacted 
Leisinger, his friend claimed that the records could not be found and that archivists had been 
looking for them for almost two weeks. Once the records were found, however, the Department 
of Justice formally requested that the records be turned over and sequestered.13
Leisinger informed Jones that the records were not in the Washington D.C institution, but 
in the Federal Records Center located in Suitland, Maryland. With the assistance of staff 
members, Leisinger allowed Jones access to the records in the Federal Records Center. Jones 
conducted his own search, despite the fact that the Justice Department wanted the records 
                                                 
10 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
11 Albert H. Leisinger was a member and fellow of the Society of American Archivists (SAA).In 1941, 
Leisinger starting working for the National Archives. In 1961, Leisinger became head of the Exhibits and 
Publications Division, which is now called Educational Programs Division. He was special assistant to the archivist 
of the United States for academic relations, deputy to the assistant archivist and director of the Scientific and 
Technological Division. In addition, he was an expert on archival micrographics. In 1981, he retired from the 
National Archives. On March 3, 1991, Leisinger died of a heart attack. (Richard Pearson, obituary, Washington 
Post, March 9, 1991, B4). 
12 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
13 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
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sequestered once found. According to Jones, his friend allowed him access to the records 
because he did not trust the Justice Department. Leisinger believed that if the records were found 
and turned over to the Justice Department, there would be a cover-up.14
Jones stated that once he had found the records of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Leisinger 
directed him to copy all of the study records with the official stamp of the NARA. Leisinger 
wanted all documents officially stamped so that they could be admissible in a court of law. More 
importantly, if the original records were destroyed, Jones would have certified records. Jones 
complained at first about the difficult task of finding any records concerning the study and 
remembers that materials were misplaced in boxes or boxes were out of place. Jones went 
through an estimated four hundred boxes with the assistance of an index of RG 90. According to 
Jones, he discovered at least a thousand documents on the study.15 After finding those boxes, 
Jones admits that among those records were patient records. He states “I remember having a very 
strong ethical dilemma about whether I would look at actual patient record[s] and decided I 
wouldn’t. I just closed those.”16 After Jones copied the documents, he acknowledged that he did 
not know what happened to the original records.17
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 The papers that dealt with the early years of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study were found in the United States 
Public Health Service Division of Venereal Disease, Record Group 90 (1918-1936) in the Federal Records Center, 
Suitland, Maryland. 
16 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
17 During the civil rights movement, Fred Gray represented Rosa Parks when she was arrested for not 
giving up her on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. 
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4.4 POLLARD V. U.S. CIVIL SUIT  
In 1973, Charles Pollard, one of the surviving participants, contacted Fred Gray,18 a civil rights 
attorney in Tuskegee, Alabama concerning the “study.” Pollard and others believed that the 
federal government owed the participants compensation, lifetime medical benefits, and free 
burial services. Gray knew that it would be an uphill battle to win compensation and relief for 
these men. On July 24, 1973, Gray filed a class-action civil suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Alabama on behalf of the participants. The CDC was among the defendants 
named in the suit. The filing of this class action lawsuit placed a renewed focus on the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records.  
Fred Gray alleged that the federal government was stonewalling in providing key 
documents for the suit. The complaint enumerated seven allegations against the federal 
government in which he had to prove. As a result, Gray solicited the assistance of Attorneys, 
Michael I. Sovern, then dean of Columbia University Law School and Harold Edgar. Gray 
sought damages for the surviving participants and the heirs of those study participants who had 
died. 
For Gray, one of the major obstacles in preparing the case against the federal government 
was obtaining discovery. By way of background, discovery is the stage of litigation during which 
both parties exchange factual information that is relevant to each other’s claims and defenses. In 
order to obtain the information he needed from the federal government, Gray sought depositions, 
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interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents.19 According 
to Gray, when he filed a motion to produce the records of the study during its early stages, he 
was told that “no records were available so far as the government knew.”20 If Gray could not 
obtain those records within a particular time, his case would be dismissed. 
In 1975, James Jones, a Program Officer for the National Endowment for Humanities, 
followed Gray’s efforts in the media. When Jones read that Gray’s case would be dismissed due 
to lack of evidence, he contacted Gray by phone. Jones stated that “I am Jim Jones…I have in 
my possession several boxes of material on the origins of the experiment.”21 The next day Gray 
flew to Washington, D.C. to meet with Jones and discuss what he had in his possession. The 
lawyers representing the government, including the United States Department of Justice, asserted 
that they did not know where the records were or how they could find them. Gray stated that he 
knew there had to be records because “there were some 11 or 12 printed reports of the study that 
were general public information. It [articles] referred to a lot of details about the study. So the 
question was where are those primary records that these articles were written from.”22 Gray 
                                                 
19 Reverby, ed. “The Lawsuit,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 473-488. 
Gray states that interrogatories are written questions which must be answered in writing under oath. These questions 
were given to U.S. Public Health officials involved with the study. 
20 Ibid, 481. 
21 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
22 Attorney Fred Gray is referring to the thirteen articles that were written by the PHS physicians. They 
include: R.A. Vonderlehr et al., “Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro: A Comparative Study of Treated and 
Untreated Cases” Venereal Disease Information 17 (1936): 260-265; J.R. Heller et al., “Untreated Syphilis in the 
Male Negro: II. Mortality During 12 Years of Observation” Venereal Disease Information 27 (1946): 34-38; A.V. 
Deibert et al., “Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro: III. Evidence of Cardiovascular Abnormalities and Other 
Forms of Morbidity” Journal of Venereal Disease Information 27 (1946): 301-314; Pasquale J. Pesare et al., 
“Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro: Oberservation of Abnormalities Over Sixteen Years” American Journal of 
Syphilis, Gonorrhea, and Venereal Diseases 34 (1950): 201-213; Eunice Rivers et al., “Twenty Years of Follow-up 
Experience in a Long-Term Range Medical Study” Public Health Reports 68 (1953): 391-395; J.K. Shafer et al., 
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claimed that the information that Jones had in his possession helped with the case. Although the 
government attorneys had claimed that they did not know where the records were, both Jones 
and Gray knew the records existed because Jones had copies of records prior to 1936. Jones 
states, “I don’t see how they could have said that with a straight face because the fact that I had 
them was proof that they existed and if I had them somebody else had them.”23
Jones committed to spending his vacation time and weekends to help Gray with the case 
in exchange for access to all documents that he received from the government. Thereafter, Gray 
argued to the court that if Jones had discovered a thousand documents on the origins of the case, 
than more had to exist somewhere. Based upon Gray’s arguments, the court issued an order 
allowing Gray and his assistants, including Jones, to conduct an investigation at the CDC where 
the records generated from the study after 1937 had been placed. As stated earlier, when the 
CDC added the Venereal Disease Division in the 1950s, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study became 
apart of the Division. While working with the CDC’s records managers, Jones and an assistant 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro: A Prospective Study of the Effect on Life Expectancy” Milbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly 32 (1954): 262-274; Sidney Olansky et al., “Environmental Factors in the Tuskegee Study of 
Untreated Syphilis”Public Health Reports 69 (1954): 691-698.; Jesse J. Peters et al., “Untreated Syphilis in the Male 
Negro: Pathologic Findings in Syphilitic and Nonsyphilitic Patients” Journal of Chronic Diseases 1 (1955): 127-
148; Stanley H. Schuman et al., “Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro: Background and Current Status of Patients 
in the Tuskegee Study” Journal of Chronic Diseases 2 (1955): 543-558; Sidney Olansky et al., “Untreated Syphilis 
in the Male Negro: Twenty Two Years of Clinical Observation of Untreated Syphilitic and Presumably 
Nonsyphilitic Groups” Journal of Chronic Diseases 4 (1956): 177-185; Sidney Olansky et al., “Untreated Syphilis 
in the Male Negro: Twenty Two Years of Serologic Observation in a Selected Syphilis Study Group” A.M.A. 
Archives of Dermatology 73 (1956): 516-522; Donald Rockwell et al., “The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis: 
The 30th Year of Observation” Archives of Internal Medicine 114 (1961): 792-798; Joseph G. Caldwell et al., 
“Aortic Regurgitation in the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis” Journal of Chronic Diseases 26 (1973): 187-
194.  
23 James Jones, interview by author, December 3, 2003. 
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discovered “filing drawers of stuff on Tuskegee.”24  According to Jones, the records were in 
reasonably good order. However, to get a sense if the records had been tampered with, Jones and 
an assistant went through the records carefully to determine how complete the records were. As a 
historian, Jones stated that: 
We read all the stuff and made sure from examining the documents 
that there weren’t obvious lapses or holes in it where people had 
pulled stuff because if you sit down with files and you’ve done this 
as a historian you get a sense pretty quickly of how the story is 
going to play out and how the evidence will be consistent based 
upon other stuff that you’ve read and if there are big kind of 
glaring omissions or gaps you are to be forgiven for suspecting that 
someone had tampered with the evidence or someone has pulled 
stuff out of those files.25
 
Jones explained to Gray that he was very satisfied that the CDC did not withhold any 
significant material. The files consisted of: records created during the course of the study that 
related to individual patients; publications based on findings of the study; correspondence 
between medical personnel; administrative records; photographs of various medical tests or 
procedures; and minutes. More important, the documents revealed how meticulous these 
physicians were in carrying out the initial steps of the study during the early years.  
The records revealed how the government physicians secured the cooperation of the study 
participants and the local community. They gave a list of participants in the study to local 
physicians, both syphilitics and control. The physicians argued that cooperation was needed in 
the study, which included not treating anyone for syphilis because it would spoil the data. The 
doctors sent annual letters to participants informing them the federal doctors were returning to 
treat their “Bad Blood.” Initially, those deprived included syphilitics and controls that developed 
                                                 
24 James Jones, interview by author, December 3, 2003. 
25 James Jones, interview by author, December 3, 2003. 
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syphilis in the intervening years and had received no treatment for their condition. Those doctors 
knew that syphilis could be acquired or congenital. Because of the concealment about the 
severity of the disease from the participants by the government physicians, the participant’s 
wives and children were not only exposed but went untreated for syphilis. 
Overall, in December 1974, the discovery of the records uncovered facts, which probably 
motivated the government to settle out of court in the amount of $10 million dollars. The records 
revealed that:  
1. The study was financed by the federal government; 
2. The study started out as a short term survey (6 months); 
3. There were no rules or regulations governing the study; 
4. The participants  thought they were in a treatment program; 
5. The government physicians never told the study participants that they had 
syphilis.26 
In addition to the out of court settlement, the government promised to continue free 
medical and burial services to all surviving participants and their family members. The federal 
government established the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program in order to provide such services. 
Gray asserted that “Jim Jones is the person who really helped us break the case and get it 
over.”27  
                                                 
26 Fred Gray, interview by author, June 16, 2003.  
27 Fred Gray, interview by author, June 16, 2003. 
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4.5 RECORDKEEPING HISTORY OF THE OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY RECORDS WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
 
In order to explain the recordkeeping of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records while in the 
custody of the CDC, the creation of and the connection between the center under the United 
States Public Health Service with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study must be told. The Communicable 
Disease Center (now known as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) was established 
in Atlanta, Georgia in 1946. Under the Malaria Control agency, the CDC assisted in eradicating 
malaria in the southeastern states during World War II. The federal government renamed it the 
Communicable Disease Center and added programs to fight against infectious diseases. In 1967, 
the federal government changed the name to the National Communicable Disease Center. In 
1970, the name was changed to the Center for Disease Control to underscore the significance of 
its work while upgrading it to an agency. In 1980, a “s” was added to better describe the 
agencies expansion and structure (each major unit was redesigned as a center and subdivided into 
divisions, which were subdivided into branches).28  
In the 1950s, the CDC added the Venereal Disease Division. In 1957, the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study was transferred from the Public Health Service to the CDC. Initially the records 
of the study from 1918 to 1936 were a part of the PHS records. When the transfer occurred, the 
records generated from 1936 to 1972 were a part of the CDC records. As a result, the CDC 
records, including the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, were a part of the U.S. Public Health 
Service RG 90. The RG number is significant because it plays a crucial part in deciding under 
                                                 
28 Elizabeth W. Etheridge, Sentinel for Health: A History of the Centers for Disease Control (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1992), xvii-xviii. 
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which RG number the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records will reside when the CDC separates from 
the PHS.      
On May 5, 1975, the Centers for Disease Control officially became RG 442 at the request 
of the Records Officer of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW) to accommodate both the large number of records and organizational structure of HEW. 
HEW suggested that RG 90, records of the Public Health Service, should be a closed RG as of 
the dates that the organizational units were abolished. It was also recommended that all 
permanent records created during its operating years should be assigned to this RG when they 
were accessioned by the National Archives.29 However, the Records Officer of HEW at the time 
and a National Archives Records Services (NARS)30 official requested that record 442 be 
cancelled. They reasoned that RG 442 was unnecessary at the time and concluded that PHS was 
still an operating agency.31  They suggested that perhaps the title could be changed to reflect the 
current situation and cover a number of diverse health related records. As a result, RG 442 was 
cancelled on December 23, 1975.  
NARS officials concluded that if the CDC started to create huge quantities of records in 
the near future, consideration of a separate RG should be discussed again. On October 30, 1984, 
the Regional Archivist and Chief of Appraisal and Disposition Section sent a memorandum 
requesting a separate RG for the Centers for Disease Control. They insisted that the CDC records 
be withdrawn from RG 90.  Both officials of NARA stated, “We believe that structuring a 
separate record group for CDC records…will be both useful to NARA in that the records can be 
                                                 
29 Memorandum, Jane Smith, Director of Civil Archives Division, April 28, 1975. 
30 Between 1949 and 1985, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) was formally 
known as the National Archives Records Service (NARS). 
31 Memorandum, Meyer H. Fishbein, Director Records Appraisal Staff, June 27, 1975. 
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examined and administered by [an] archivist who will have physical access to the records and 
administrative responsibility, and will demonstrate to CDC officials that there concerns about 
access to their records are being dealt with and responded to.”32 In November 1985, the CDC 
records received its own RG number and were withdrawn from the PHS. In addition, on April 7, 
1993, the RG 442 title would change to the current name of the agency, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study records were accessioned into NARA’s 
Southeast Regional Center in Atlanta, Georgia beginning in 1990 under RG 442. 
The nonexistence of a separate RG for the CDC records between December 1975 and 
November 1985 explains why the CDC records schedule was drawn up in 1977 under RG 90. In 
1977, the CDC’s records were appraised and a records schedule was developed. The records 
were approved by the Records Disposition Division (NCD) of the Office of the Federal Records 
Centers (NC). A November 3, 1977 memorandum from Peter Laugesen, an archivist in the 
Records Disposition Division who appraised the CDC records and drafted the records schedule 
(see APPENDIX B), is revealing. In his memorandum to Thomas W. Wadlow, Director of the 
Records Disposition Division (NCD), Laugesen cited two cases of records which were 
“diseased-control efforts of special significance” that the CDC recommended be permanently 
retained. One was the polio studies, the records of that were to be retained “because the polio 
program received national attention and resulted in the virtual elimination of the disease.” The 
other study was the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (item 101) “because these records provide 
information linking health problems with racial and social conditions.”33
                                                 
32 Memorandum, Gayle P. Peters and Thomas W. Steinichen to Office of the National Archives (NN), 
October 30, 1984. 
33 Memo, Peter Laugesen to Thomas W. Wadlow, November 3, 1977. 
 83 
There are a number of memoranda from other NARS units that comment on Laugesen’s 
draft schedule and the November 3, 1977 memorandum. The units involved that reviewed 
Laugesen’s draft for the CDC are as follow: Civil Archives Division of the National Archives 
(NNF); Civil Archives Division (NNF); Records Disposition Division (NCD); and Audiovisual 
Archives Division (NNV). The Appraisal Report on Disposition of Records, Job Number NC1-
90-78-1 was signed on January 27, 1978 with all of the required approval and concurrence 
signatures (see APPENDIX C). Furthermore, the records schedule was drafted and approved by 
the CDC and other high ranking officials in 1976-1977 and authorized disposition of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study files, which included medical records, pictures and charts, follow-up 
surveillance, obligation documents, and x-rays of participants in the study were to be retained. 
The records were to be transferred to the Federal Records Center four years after the records 
closed and then offered to the National Archives sixteen years later.34
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) governs public access to federal records and 
files. Although disclosure is encouraged as a matter of policy under FOIA, there are exemptions 
to the statute’s disclosure requirements. With respect to requests for access to the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records, CDC officials often cited Exemption 6 of the FOIA, which is often 
referred to as the personal privacy exemption, to bar access to the study records (See 5 U.S.C.§ 
552(b)(6)). Researchers were told that they could not view any medical files due to Exemption 6, 
which permits federal agencies to withhold “personnel, medical, and similar files whose 
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy (See 5 U.S.C.§ 
552(b)(6)).” Usually information for study records requests would end there, especially 
                                                 
34 RG 64, Records of the National Archives and Records Administration [Series title:] External Disposal 
Jobs, FY 1978-1979, [Case No.] NC1-90-78-1, Public Health Service-Center for Disease Control. 
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considering that researchers were not familiar with the legal nuances of FOIA and the Privacy 
Act.35 Instead, CDC officials sent a list of articles about the study, a timeline of the study, a brief 
history of the study and the aftermath, and information about syphilis to researchers. For the 
researcher, their FOIA request would usually end at this point. However, the researcher of this 
study decided to seek further information about why the records were restricted. 
In 1990, the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program whose primary responsibility was to pay 
all medical costs for the remaining survivors and family members was inundated with FOIA 
requests to see the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. According to Jimmy Harrison, Records 
Officer for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the benefits program was operated by 
a small group of people and did not have the resources to answer such requests. More 
importantly, as Arzell Lester, Director of the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program acknowledged, 
responding to FIOA requests was outside their responsibility. As a result, Jimmy Harrison took a 
look at the CDC’s records control schedule and found that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records 
were scheduled for permanent retention by the CDC. He also realized from examining the 
records control schedule, it was time for the records to be transferred to the Southeast Regional 
Center. Jimmy Harrison stated that, “I was really kind of excited about the opportunity to look at 
and review and hopefully make efforts to make these records permanent and save them.”36
Jimmy Harrison went over to the Health Benefits Office to review the records. Harrison 
admitted that the employees working in Health Benefits Office did not trust him to review the 
records and were reluctant to turn over custody of the records to anyone, including NARA, 
despite the records control schedule. Harrison’s observation of the situation suggested how little 
                                                 
35 For information on these federal statutes see the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as 
amended and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a, as amended. 
36 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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the employees knew about NARA. Harrison asserted that the employees “didn’t understand the 
procedures about working with permanent records of the National Archives. They had not heard 
about what it means to store records in perpetuity. The laws of regulations which require 
permanent records to go to the National Archives did not filter down to the rank and file.”37  
Harrison convinced Arzell Lester, Director of the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program, to 
let him [Harrison] examine the records. Harrison stated “…I went into Ike Lester (Arzell) and we 
sat down…It was a matter of talking and talking and doing a lot of talking and just letting him 
know that what we were trying to do is not destroy the records or close access to them but to 
make them as open as possible and also allow people to know that these would be saved forever 
and preserved.”38
Harrison was allowed to examine the records briefly. He found three types of records: 1) 
administrative records that went from the inception of the study to the 1990s; 2) the 
epidemiological records that included the medical files of the participants; and 3) the physical 
records (i.e., specimens). Harrison remembered that there were files containing the most 
sensitive information. PHS physicians actually visited participants’ homes and asked these men 
very intimate personal questions about their sexual activity. According to Harrison, the record 
system was less than ideal. Folders were found in staff offices, including the directors’ personal 
file cabinets. In addition, boxes were stored in the director’s office and a back room. Harrison 
stated, “They were really a mess. They were really not very well kept.”39 Overall, the vast 
majority were at least in folders. 
                                                 
37Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001.  
38 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
39 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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Harrison and his assistant returned to try and bring some order to records before 
transferring them to the Southeast Regional Center in Atlanta, Georgia. They had a difficult task 
ahead of them trying to determine why certain records were organized a particular way. Harrison 
stated:  
I wouldn’t call them disarray. Disarray is probably too strong. I 
would call them maybe some of them were out of order. Maybe 
some of the folders were kind of fading and rotting. The records 
themselves looked in pretty good condition. I would call it more of 
that. I think you would actually have to go through and do a 
detailed study. We were not able to do that. We needed to get the 
records out as quickly as possible. So we wanted to make sure that 
they were in the box and we did not disrupt anything or try to do 
an investigation or reorganize them. We didn’t want to do that.40  
 
Harrison and his assistant basically did folder listings. In addition, they came up with 
their own dissection of the records (see APPENDIX D). This was sent with the transfer of the 
records to NARA. According to Harrison, it took him and his assistant three weeks to box the 
records in order to have them transferred.  
Further discussions with Harrison revealed how he felt about applying archival principles 
to these records. Harrison commented that there was loose material but most were in folders. He 
stated that “We tried not to organize them of course the old archival thing of respect des fonds. 
We were very fearful of doing anything much more than putting them in file folders, keeping the 
original arrangement with our key (see APPENDIX D).”41 The respect de fonds is the archival 
principle of provenance which means keeping the records together. It is not unusual that the 
archival principles of original order and provenance were not applied to the Tuskegee Syphilis 
                                                 
40 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
41 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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Study records at the CDC. As Harrison stated, he divided the records based on what he found 
and if there was some sort of order he and his assistant just did folder listings.   
4.6 TRANSFER OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS TO THE 
NARA 
After much discussion, Harrison finally convinced the Director of the Tuskegee Health Benefits 
Program to allow the records to be transferred to NARA. Harrison did not approach the director 
legally demanding the records. “There are all kinds of laws but in terms of following all these 
rules and regulations, sometimes people do what they want anyway.”42
Considering that the records had been boxed and were for transfer, issues regarding 
confidentiality and privacy emerged. Harrison stated that the Director of the Tuskegee Health 
Benefits Program would not transfer the records until an agreement was made between the CDC 
and NARA. The CDC, including the Director of the Tuskegee Health Benefits program, did not 
want anyone to have access to the medical information of the participants. NARA would try to 
make the other groups of records as open as possible with an initial review. The agreement 
between the two agencies, which was attached to the accession record, stated that: 
The National Archives and Records Administration will be responsible for preserving 
and maintaining the records in accordance with the approved CDC Records Control Schedule, 
item 101 (records will be preserved in perpetuity for future historical research) 
Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in these medical records of 
Tuskegee Study Health Benefit Recipients, and the potential negative effects on the subject 
                                                 
42Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001.  
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individuals and their families, disclosure is not permitted to the general public, including 
researchers, per 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), until the year 2030 (see APPENDIX E). 
According to the agreement, the National Archives became the responsible party that 
maintained the records in accordance with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 
and the Privacy Act.43 Harrison pointed out that “…our legal office looked at this issue and I 
indicated to them that I needed something to convince Arzell Lester [Director of the Tuskegee 
Benefits Program] and his employees that these records were not going to be blatantly open. 
That’s what they were fearful of because they work with these people and they didn’t want their 
medical records open and so the legal office came up with that [2030].”44
The National Archives obtained custody of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records by 
making numerous assurances to and entering the aforementioned agreement with the CDC. Even 
though NARA is federally mandated to take custody of records from governmental agencies, 
exercising this authority continues to be a challenge. There have been a number of reported cases 
where governmental agencies have failed to turn over records to the National Archives, 
especially records with sensitive information. MacNeil points out that the transfer of records to a 
governmental archive is a challenge when “…even in jurisdictions [mandated by legislation] 
archivists are often refused access to records containing sensitive personal information which are 
either maintained by the record-creating agency in perpetuity or destroyed before archivists have 
had an opportunity to determine whether they have archival value.”45 So if the Tuskegee Health 
Benefits Program had not been inundated with FOIA requests, NARA may not have received the 
                                                 
43 National Archives and Records Administration, Transfer, Approval, and Receipt of Records to National 
Archives of the United State, RG 442. Tuskegee Syphilis Study Administrative Records. Accession Nos. 4NN-442-
90-01.1992. 
44 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
45 MacNeil, 193. 
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records when scheduled which would have further undermined public accountability of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
On July 29, 1992, NARA officially had custody of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records.46 The files consisted of records created during the course of the study that related to: 1) 
individual patients; 2) publications based on findings of the study; 3) correspondence between 
medical personnel; 4) administrative files; 5) photographs of various medical tests or procedures; 
and 6) minutes. Between 1991 and 1999 more records have been found at the CDC and 
transferred to NARA (see APPENDIX F). These records include affidavits relating to: 1) the 
federal court case; 2) agendas and committee hearings; and 3) materials relating to public 
scrutiny to which the study and the agency were subjected once the study was exposed. 
Currently, there are forty boxes of the administrative files. Of the forty boxes, boxes one through 
twenty and twenty (a) are open to the public. The remaining boxes, an additional one through 
three, and twenty-one through thirty-five and thirty-two (a), which contain information about 
individual patients and the court case, are also restricted until the year 2030 in order to protect 
the personal privacy interests of the participants and their families. In addition, there are forty-
seven boxes of medical files, which according to the agreement are restricted until 2030. Thus, 
there are a total of eighty-seven boxes pertaining to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.  
Harrison recalled that there were a number of transfers from 1990 to 1999. There were 
several transfers because files were found throughout those years. Harrison stated that this 
happened due to less than ideal filing practices. Harrison conceded that folders were discovered 
everywhere. Dr. Bill Jenkins, the retired manager of the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program 
                                                 
46 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study records were transferred to NARA’s Southeast Regional Center. In 1992, 
the center was located in Atlanta, Georgia. 
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stated that, “As people found records…they would give them to me and I would hand them over 
to Jimmy.”47 In addition, Harrison found the records in the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program at 
the National Center for Infectious Diseases, now called the National Center for HIV, AIDS and 
Tuberculosis Prevention (NCHSTP). However, the methods for locating records varied. 
However, it does beg the question of what led to the poor condition of the records from 1973 to 
1990, particularly since the records were officially closed?  
4.7 THE RECORDKEEPING HISTORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 
RECORDS WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND 
RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (NARA) 
Upon receiving the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, providing public access proved to be an 
issue for NARA. How would NARA handle requests for these records, especially sensitive 
information? In a memorandum dated May 30, 1990 Mary Ronan, a FOIA officer for NARA, 
expressed concern, particularly given that there was no case law yet regarding the privacy 
interests of third parties who have had relationships with deceased individuals. However, Ronan 
developed a solution (see APPENDIX G). Ronan stated, “I suggest we approach these records 
[Tuskegee Syphilis Study records] in a different way. First, remove names and personal 
identifiers from the files to protect the family members. Second, close the files until NARA 
receives a FOIA request” and “only then should we take on the project of sanitizing.”48 Trudy 
Peterson, assistant Archivist at the time of the transfer, agreed with Ronan (see APPENDIX H). 
                                                 
47 Dr. Bill Jenkins, interview by author, September 23, 2001.  
48 Memorandum, Mary Ronan, FOIA Officer to Trudy Peterson, Assistant National Archivist of NARA, 
May 30, 1990. 
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NARA’s treatment of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records was consistent with the CDC.  
Charles Reeves, Director of Archival Operations stated that files were placed in acid free folders 
and acid free boxes. But as stated in this chapter, some of them were and continued to be 
unarranged. Many of the folders did not have titles on them. As a result, such folders would say 
“unfoldered records with no title on them.” Reeves stated that just like Harrison, archivists at 
NARA left the records in the arrangement that they were in. 
The records would not receive any more attention until Dr. Henry Foster, an African-
American obstetrician-gynecologist from Tennessee, was nominated for Surgeon General by 
former President Bill Clinton in 1995. Foster’s willingness to perform abortions was among the 
reasons the Senate did not want to approve Foster’s nomination. However, the most disturbing 
allegation raised about Foster’s career was that he was a local physician that took part in the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Even though Foster served as chief of obstetrics and gynecology at 
Tuskegee Institute’s John A. Andrew Memorial Hospital from 1965-1973 and president of the 
Macon County Medical Society in 1970, he denied any connection to the study. He claimed that 
he heard about the study when it was revealed to the public at large.  
In 1995, as a general practice, when the Southeast Regional Center received a reference 
request, the staff would then work on processing more records. It was not until the Foster case, 
however, that the staff worked overtime to process even more records for access. Charles Reeves 
remembered that there was a lot of interest from the media, congressional offices, and the White 
House on whether or not Dr. Foster took part in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.  Reeves stated that 
Southeast Regional Center received a phone call from staffers of the Senate Committee. The 
Senate staffers informed the Southeast Regional Center that they were coming to Atlanta to look 
at the records. Reeves also mentioned that reporters were interested in the allegations about Dr. 
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Foster’s conduct with respect to the study. Although the White House did not send anyone, 
Reeves claimed that it too wanted to know whether there was anything with Foster’s name on it. 
Reeves insisted that they did not find anything that would indicate Foster’s involvement with the 
study and reported this to the White House.   
NARA invested a great deal of resources, which it did not have, to examine numerous 
documents. Reeves stated that two or three of them stayed until midnight examining records for 
the White House request. Reeves commented that “…we spent more time with those [records] at 
that time than any time probably before or since.”49 Reeves recalled that the only records that 
they went through were administrative files. If someone requested information, Reeves stated 
that they could go through and sanitize information in the administrative files. However, some 
folders have been pulled because they were completely restricted. Reeves commented that “its 
just too much.”50 What he was referring to was what Ramona Oliver spoke of in her interview 
concerning resources. She stated that: 
We don’t hold records wholesale. We apply the FOIA exemptions. 
We release segreable portions. The problem with these other files 
[other restricted documents] is that there is a plethora of 
information that would require withholding. And because of 
resources in Atlanta and elsewhere there is some files that we don’t 
take any action on until we have a FOIA request in hand for that 
requiring us to take some sort of action and so theoretically all the 
records could be open eventually but because we don’t have the 
time to systematically review all the files you have to make request 
at any information about deceased individuals more likely than not 
will be released at certain caveats to that rule.51
 
                                                 
49 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
50 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
51 Ramona Oliver, interview by author,  December 22, 2003. 
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NARA treated the medical records like the administrative files. These records were not 
arranged in alphabetical or numerical order. Considering that the records were restricted, no one 
bothered to rearrange the records in any order. Instead a red dot was placed on each box 
containing these records, which indicated they were restricted. When I requested a file, Charles 
Reeves had to check with the NARA’s Office of the General Counsel in order to get permission 
to grant my request. Afterwards, he selected a file, which had to be redacted of all personal 
identifiers. It took Reeves almost an hour to complete this task. Reeves commented that he was 
glad that he had done so because if someone else requested a medical file, he would have one 
already sanitized. 
For NARA, protecting the Tuskegee participant’s medical records appears to be a non-
negotiable goal, given the humiliation that the participants and their families have endured. 
However, protecting the personal privacy interests of the participants and their families is an 
issue for NARA. NARA restricting access to medical records continues to perpetuate suspicion. 
Furthermore, it undercuts the public’s right to know what happened.  
Since 2002, the researcher had tried to gain access to the medical files after realizing that 
such records could be accessed upon an initial review of a FOIA request. After examining 
NARA’s regulations, the researcher learned that NARA could redact any personal identifiers 
such as names and addresses while granting access to sensitive information such as medical files. 
Upon consulting with the Office of the General Counsel in Washington, D.C., Charles Reeves, 
the Director of Archival Operations at the Southeast Regional Center decided to allow me to 
make copies of two medical files after they were redacted. When I had called to find out if the 
files had been redacted, a staff member told me that I could not see such files because they were 
restricted under Exemption 6. Such a lack of knowledge brings up Jimmy Harrison’s point about 
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staff being uninformed about policies, procedures, or plain simple in-house decisions. Once I 
informed them that I had permission from the Director of Archival Operations, I was granted 
access to those specific files. NARA has an archival description of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records on-line. It gives a brief history as well as a general outline of the records within its 
custody (see APPENDIX I). Researchers only have access to the administrative files. The dates 
that are given, 1929 to 1970, refer to the study. However, records have been transferred that 
include documents after 1970 (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1999) which have been found 
over the years at the CDC.  
Documents within the administrative files have remained restricted. Charles Reeves 
states that when the records were transferred to NARA he and his staff went through as many 
files as they could to redact such information.  However, many of the documents had too many 
personal identifiers, and “you would have more holes than you would information.”52 According 
to Reeves, officials made judgment calls as to what information to redact. He also remembers 
that despite the agreement between the two agencies, he had redacted some medical files, which 
I had came across when examining the administrative records. Reeves commented that “as far as 
I know you are probably the first person who has looked at those medical records.”53 He asserted 
that if he had examined the agreement between the two agencies, I would not have had access to 
the medical files. I found this to be odd, since Reeves had consulted with the Office of the 
General Counsel in Washington, D.C. and subsequently provided redacted medical files to me. 
There were discussions back and forth between Reeves and the Office of the General Counsel 
about how to resolve my request. 
                                                 
52 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
53 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
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In Reeve’s opinion, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records are treated differently because 
of the agreement between the CDC and NARA. He felt that NARA is not only protecting the 
privacy of the participants but especially their families, which on the surface is not unusual. 
When trying to balance personal privacy and the public’s inquiry, NARA does have the 
discretion to determine on a case by case basis what documents will be released and what 
personal information should be redacted. Even though privacy ends at death, NARA does make 
exceptions. Reeves believed that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records required guidance on 
access. However, withholding the medical records in their entirety undermines the spirit of 
FOIA. After further discussion, Reeves did point out that the agreement between the CDC and 
NARA could be challenged.   
After my interview with the Director of Archival Operations at the Southeast Regional 
Center, I emailed NARA’s Office of General Counsel in Washington, D.C. in July 2003. I also 
submitted a written FOIA request to review the agreement between the CDC and NARA 
regarding access to the medical records. My request inquired: How did the CDC and NARA 
agree on 2030?; Why is NARA still protecting the names of the participants if they are already in 
the public domain?; Why are the medical files restricted even though most of the participants are 
dead (only two remained living)?; Do the participants’ rights diminish upon death or does it have 
to do with third party rights?; and are there any documents that speak directly to the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records that I could receive (see APPENDIX J)?  I also wanted to understand 
NARA’s policy regarding balancing personal privacy and the public’s right to know, especially 
in this specific case.  
I had the opportunity to interview Ramona Oliver, FOIA and Privacy Act Officer of 
General Counsel Office and Sarah Rudgers, Assistant General Counsel, who were responsible 
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for answering my request. Oliver and Rudgers described how they went about gathering answers 
to my questions. Both of them called the Southeast Regional Center to determine what their 
practices and policies were regarding the medical records. The NARA staff at the Southeast 
Regional Center forwarded to Oliver and Rudgers a copy of the transfer documentation which 
included the CDC’s recommendation that the medical records be restricted until 2030. 
Afterwards, Sarah Rudgers contacted the CDC to find out why 2030 was recommended. Rudgers 
explained that although the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records were now under the custody of 
NARA, the institution did “try to take into account the originating agencies policies and concerns 
before we make a determination.”54 Oliver and Rudgers learned from Records Officers such as 
Jimmy Harrison and attorneys, that the CDC was concerned about the privacy of both the living 
participants and family members. As a result, Oliver contacted the Director of Archival 
Operations and requested a representative sample (approximately 30 percent) of medical records 
to examine. Oliver’s job was to gauge the privacy interests of the affected parties. She 
commented that if the medical records contained intimate details about the participants or their 
family members, than such information was too sensitive to release to the public.  
Oliver and Rudgers found that the sample of medical files reviewed did not affect the family 
members of the participants directly. The files contained examinations over the course of the 
study and medical procedures. According to Oliver, family members were listed as points of 
contact if PHS physicians could not find a subject. Oliver asserted, “Keeping that in mind, we 
felt that third party privacy was a minimal issue.”55  Rudgers used this position with the CDC 
officials. Both Oliver and Rudgers believed that the CDC officials did not know what was 
                                                 
54 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
55 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
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actually contained in the medical records. After some discussion with the CDC, Oliver and 
Rudgers persuaded them to reconsider their recommendation, especially after they learned that 
two participants were living. NARA agreed to keep the medical records of those living restricted. 
Furthermore, the CDC was less concerned about those who were dead. Thus, as long as NARA 
could assure the CDC officials that there were no third party concerns and protected the medical 
records of the living participant, than the public could have access to the remaining medical 
records. 
In February 2004, I received a response from the National Archives and Records 
Administration’s General Counsel (see APPENDIX K). The letter stated that the CDC 
recommended that the medical records be closed until 2030 because at the time several 
participants and their immediate family members were still living. Although NARA claims that it 
never categorically withheld the medical records, public access after the transfer of those records 
was nonexistent. There are no records to indicate whether or not NARA made these records 
available to the public, or even redacted them. However, Oliver stated that “…ever since 1990, 
there has always been the possibility of these records being released if it was possible to redact 
personal identifiers in such a way that you have meaningful record without identifying the 
subject. So we have been dealing with this issue since transfer.”56 As Charles Reeves stated as 
far as he knew I was the first to see the records.  Overall, the Office of General Counsel pointed 
out “Given the special sensitivities and the subject matter of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
NARA decided not to release the names in order to protect both the living and survivors who 
might hold a privacy interest in the medical records.”57 In the interview, Oliver stated that: 
                                                 
56 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
57 Ramona Oliver interview by author, February 11, 2004. 
 98 
I think we do for medical records in some instances where we are talking about third 
party privacy we have a sound legal basis to invoke Exemption 6. And there is case law that 
supports even protecting deceased persons records because it may cause some problems or some 
anxiety or some depression or sadness for surviving family members. So I think we could 
continue to withhold the records.58
Moreover, Rudgers admitted that although NARA’s policy is to try to be as open as 
possible, it did not want to hinder the research efforts of the CDC. Overall, NARA treaded 
lightly in negotiating with the CDC in releasing the medical records. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
Overall, Rudgers and Oliver agreed with the arguments that I made in the email. Rudgers 
enumerated the factors that contributed to disclosing the records. For example, most if not all of 
the names of the participants have been published. In May 1997, President Clinton made a public 
apology to these men. Some survivors and their families attended the ceremony in Washington, 
D.C. while others watched from Tuskegee, Alabama. Oliver realized that the medical 
information was not that sensitive or descriptive. “The records didn’t talk about anything graphic 
with regards to sores…any other thing that would be indicative of having a STD59…it wasn’t 
really the type of intimate detail that would cause angst to the third party.”60 Rudgers pointed out 
that the Office of General Counsel had to factor in all those major points before making a final 
decision. Hence, the medical records had few intimate details about the participants, limited 
information about third parties, and much information already out there in the public domain 
                                                 
58 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
59 STD is the acronym for Sexually Transmitted Disease 
60 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
 99 
such as the names of the participants. Rudgers uttered, “It seemed like we weren’t protecting 
much by keeping these closed.”61  
My FOIA request for access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records had 
challenged NARA to review its own access policy of these records, opening the records in their 
entirety and creating the opportunity for the public to review these long awaited medical records 
in 2004 instead of 2030. Even though the records are open, Rudgers admits “The only hard part I 
think was making sure that we protected everybody’s interest, both the outside public’s access 
interest as well as the CDC’s concerns about its records and how we [NARA] manage them.”62
                                                 
61 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
62 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
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5.0  MANAGING AND PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS 
STUDY RECORDS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
NARA’s decision to open the records in 2004 instead of 2030 has an impact on this study 
because this decision reveals the process by which NARA reconciles personal privacy and public 
access with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. In order to understand NARA’s decision and to 
put chapter four into context, chapter five integrates and triangulates the data described in 
chapter three. The data collected analyzes the National Archives and Records Administration’s 
administrative role in maintaining and providing access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. 
The data collected for this study and the questions from chapter one underscore that even though 
NARA reviews its access policy on a case by case situation, particularly when privacy interests 
are involved, its handling of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records appears to be inconsistent with 
FOIA and NARA regulations and policies.  The maintenance of these records, makes NARA 
vulnerable to many questions: 
1. What is NARA’s official policy toward administering access to controversial 
records that contain restricted information? 
2. In light of these policies and practices, how are the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
Records treated? 
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3. Does NARA’s access policy toward restricted information and its agreement 
with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) undermine the spirit of the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? If so, what are the consequences in this 
particular case? 
4. What do the recordkeeping practices of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, 
reveal about the effectiveness of NARA’s access policy to protect personal 
information in those records? 
5. How have the restrictions on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records affected the 
collective memory of the study?  
These records document one of the most heinous governmental experiments in medical 
history. From the records, the public could examine when, how, and why governmental 
physicians deliberately denied valuable medical treatment. NARA archivists deemed medical 
records to be “unique” because of the nature of the experiment and personal privacy issues 
associated with the participants and their families.1 As such, the only records that were available 
to the public were the administrative records. These questions raise issues about the sanitized 
version that is offered to explain what happened to the participants. In addition, the issue of 
protecting these men and their families by not releasing any restricted information conjures up 
government secrecy. Thus, the data and questions point out that the public can get at the truth 
behind governmental conduct and still honor the participants’ privacy by redacting personal 
                                                 
1 Charles Reeves, Director of Archival Operations at the National Archives and Administration in the 
Southeast Region, commented that, “I guess this may be in the only instance in the National Archives that we agreed 
to protect the privacy of the dead. Basically to protect their heirs, who I am sure would not want made public that 
their father or mother had syphilis.” 
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information. However, the inconsistent management of the records by NARA in the past 
undermined the ability to strike this compromise. 
5.2 QUESTION ONE: WHAT IS NARA’S POLICY TOWARD ADMINISTERING 
ACCESS TO RECORDS THAT CONTAIN RESTRICTED INFORMATION THAT ARE 
IN ITS CUSTODY? 
 
According to its mission statement, the National Archives and Records Administration “ensures, 
for the citizen and the public servant, for the President and for the Congress and the Courts, 
ready access to essential evidence.”2 Even though NARA attempts to make as much information 
available to the public about governmental activity, information can be restricted by law. The 
Freedom of Information Act is the federal law that governs access to records under NARA’s 
control. Although FOIA is a public disclosure statute, it has nine exemptions to its disclosure 
requirements: 
1. National Security 
2. Internal Personnel Rules and Practices of an Agency 
3. Information Exempt Under Other Laws 
4. Confidential Business Information 
5. Internal Government Communications 
6. Personal Privacy 
7. Law Enforcement 
                                                 
2 National Archives and Records Administration’s Mission Statement at 
http://www.archives.gov/about/info/mission. 
 103 
8. Financial Institutions 
9. Geological Information3    
Under NARA’s regulations “access to archival records containing information access to 
which would invade the privacy of an individual is restricted.”4 To this end, NARA will balance 
the privacy interests implicated by the requested records against the public interest that would be 
advanced by the disclosure of the records. If NARA determines that the public interest far 
outweighs personal privacy and sheds light on government activity, then NARA will release the 
information.  
To determine such decisions, NARA receives legal advice from the Office of the General 
Counsel (OGC). The OGC has several responsibilities which include: 
• Legal advice; 
• Legal research and analysis; 
• Administrative and federal court litigation in support of NARA’s programs; and, 
activities, which would include the federal Statute FOIA; and, 
• Formulating, recommending  policy and providing advice to the NARA FOIA Privacy 
Act Officer.5 
 In compliance with 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), NARA will withhold records in personnel and 
medical and similar files containing information about a living individual that reveals details of a 
personal nature that, if released, would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
                                                 
3 A Citizens’s Guide on Using the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974 to Request 
Government Records, Second Report. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005. 
4 See National Archives and Records Administration’s 36 CFR 1256.56, amended 6/30/04. 
5 See Office of General Counsel at www.archives.gov/about/organizations/summary/general-counsel.html. 
The Office of the General Counsel advised the NARA FOIA officer in determining whether or not the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study medical records should be released to the public. 
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privacy.6  Under NARA policy, the types of information identified as private may include 
information that the individual has not made public or events that took place less than seventy-
five years ago. In addition, agencies that transfer their records to NARA can impose restrictions 
to decrease the public’s opportunity for access. However, such restrictions must comply with the 
FOIA. 
 For researchers, understanding access policies can be a challenge, especially requesting 
restricted information that requires the use of the balancing test which is an analytical framework 
under the FOIA to apply the personal privacy exemptions. Government agencies use the 
balancing test to evaluate the personal privacy interests of those affected by the requested 
information and the public interest in disclosure in that information. The public interest is 
defined as information that educates the public about government conduct. The two exemptions 
that require the balancing test are Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C).  The Supreme Court 
developed the framework for the test in a series of court cases which government agencies use 
when public interests and personal privacy interests conflict in FOIA requests under these two 
exemptions.7  
 NARA can make restricted information available by sanitizing or redacting personal 
information in compliance with the FOIA. NARA may grant access to  researchers who request 
information for biomedical research, if they have justified their use of the information. The 
Archivist of the United States may feel enough time has passed that such information would not 
affect the individual.  Ramona Oliver stated, “FOIA also gives agencies the discretion to make 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Some of the court cases include Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); Department of State v. Washington 
Post, 456 U.S. 595 (1982); FBI v. Alabama, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); National Archives and Records Administration v. 
Favish, 123 S. Ct. 1570 (2004). 
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certain types of records available.”8 This mechanism enables the public to hold its government 
accountable for its actions.  
Litigation stemming from NARA’s appraisal of the investigative case files of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raised issues about the access policy governing these records. In 
investigating the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its abuses, Theoharis 
supports the necessity of researching individual case files, which are considered sensitive 
information. Theoharis insists that “As historians of the American past and as citizens required to 
make an informed judgment about the role of the FBI in a democratic society, we need to know 
how extensively the FBI violated privacy rights in the recent past and how, in the process, the 
Bureau broke the law. And this knowledge can only come from uncensored research into FBI 
records.”9 He also calls attention to the significance of the incomplete record. For example, 
Theorharis learned of the FBI’s omission of break-in victims from research into the FBI files 
released under the FOIA. In this study and others, Theoharis has focused on how incomplete 
records should be interpreted.  Would the withholding of records rebut, modify, or confirm the 
conclusions of the recipient researcher?10
Theoharis questions the role of the National Archives in ensuring the preservation of the 
FBI records was questioned. One observer, Theoharis, wonders about the role of the National 
Archives in ensuring the preservation of the FBI records. He points out that the National 
Archives personnel had not reviewed FBI records in order to ensure the preservation of FBI 
historic records until a court order forced it to do so in 1980. According to Theoharis, the 
                                                 
8 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
9 Athan Theoharis, “FBI Files, the National Archives, and the Issue of Access,” Government Publications 
Review 9: 1 (1982): 29. 
10 Athan Theoharis, ed., A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the People’s Right to Know 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 
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National Archives looked the other way and approved FBI record destruction without insisting 
upon its legal authority of direct access to the documents. In effect, this discretion permitted FBI 
officials to destroy files which, if preserved, would have documented the scope and nature of 
FBI abusive practices. Theoharis has asserted that role of the National Archives constituted “a 
dereliction of its record retention responsibilities.”11   
NARA employee James Bradsher lays out myriad access challenges for the agency and 
researchers. After the 1980 lawsuit, the National Archives had to make available the case files of 
the FBI. This effort took a lot of manpower to appraise the records. A large percentage of the 
records were kept. However, access to the records proved to be a challenge. Both researchers and 
archivists would have a difficult time determining how to access this information because of the 
filing system kept by the FBI. According to Bradsher, who participated in this project, “the first 
challenges to researchers will be knowing what to ask for”12 Bradsher believed that researchers 
could not figure out what they needed without the index. 
Privacy presented another major issue for the National Archives. Bradsher states that 
individuals could request that part or all of their information be destroyed before the records 
even transferred to NARA. In this case, personal privacy outweighed the public’s right to know. 
For the researcher, this proved to be a battle that he/she could not win, but personal information 
was not needed to understand the FBI’s investigative activities.  
The FBI files tested the statutes and regulations that guided NARA when deciding what 
information to withhold from the public. NARA can restrict information based on the nine 
exemptions of the FOIA and restrictions imposed by the agency. In this case, the FBI did not 
                                                 
11 Ibid, 32. 
12 James G. Bradsher, “Researchers, Archivists, and the Access Challenge of the FBI Records in the 
National Archives,” Midwestern Archivist 11: 2 (1986): 97. 
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impose any specific restrictions on the files. However, Bradsher points out that the files would 
pose a challenge because of their age and whether or not they could be protected from disclosure 
under any of the FOIA exemptions, particularly Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), the ones 
dealing with personal privacy. If Exemption 6 or 7 (C) applied, then the archivist would have to 
decide what information should be released based on the balancing test and whether or not 
personal privacy outweighs the public’s right to know.  
 
Defining what information should be released was another challenge. Bradsher discusses 
how Exemption 7 protects the confidentiality of those who have participated in law enforcement 
investigations. The information that was considered intimate and personal in nature was not 
disclosed to the public. The researcher has the right to the information in a file requested. 
However, the archivist must decide if the information will be in the public’s best interest or will 
harm the individual. As a result, the archivist must make a decision to release all or part of a 
record. Bradsher contends that the information may be released with personal information 
redacted under the appropriate exemption. More importantly, the release of the information must 
be in the public’s interest not in the interests of “not individuals seeking information for their 
own benefit, particularly if it is to satisfy their curiosity.”13  
Disclosing part of a file does not mean that the public cannot continue to hold the 
government accountable for its actions. However, agencies placing extreme restrictions on their 
records can prevent NARA from releasing certain records. Such frustrations make it difficult for 
NARA to live up to its access policy. Bradsher states, “With patience and knowledge, the access 
challenge of the FBI’s records should be met in a manner which makes substantial quantities of 
                                                 
13 Ibid,102. 
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information available while at the same time protecting the privacy of individuals and the 
legitimate security and law enforcement concerns of the government.”14  
 
 
Another source of insight to a study of the handling of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
records is a recent Supreme Court case dealing with the privacy rights of third parties under the 
FOIA. In National Archives Administration v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004), the Supreme 
Court examined whether disclosing certain law enforcement investigative records, particularly 
photographs, under the FOIA would violate the surviving family members of a White House 
Official who allegedly committed suicide. The case involved the Deputy White House Counsel, 
Vincent W. Foster, Jr. On July 20, 1993, Foster was found dead in Marcy Park outside 
Washington, D.C. Several federal investigations determined that he had committed suicide. 
Official reports on his death were released in June 1994 and October 1997. After the official 
investigations were concluded, the records, including photographs, were turned over to NARA. 
Allan Favish, an attorney from California, challenged the official conclusions. Favish filed a 
FOIA request for specific photos of the death scene. After his FOIA request was denied, Favish 
sued the Office of Independent Counsel in order to gain access to certain photographs of the 
death scene, including photographs of Foster’s body. 
Favish mounted his legal challenge under Exemption 7(C), which protects the personal 
information within law enforcement records against the disclosure which “could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”15 Ultimately, Favish, who 
                                                 
14 Ibid,104. 
15 5 U.S.C. § 552 7(C). 
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is an attorney, tried to gain access to the Vince Foster investigative record on behalf of a client 
through the federal courts in the District of Columbia. The United States Court for Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit determined that the photographs should be withheld under 
Exemption 7(C). However, Favish, on his own behalf, filed again in California where the United 
States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit Court granted him access to four of the ten 
photographs. Favish argued that the public had a right to know if there was any wrongdoing on 
the part of the government in their investigation. Upon ruling in Favish’s favor, the Ninth Circuit 
Court did recognize that Foster’s family had a right to privacy. 
The Department of Justice appealed the Ninth Circuit Court decision to the Supreme 
Court. The Court ruled that Favish did not have any pertinent evidence to show that there was 
actual wrongdoing on the part of the government. In this instance, the Court’s decision placed 
the future burden of proof on requesters. The requester will have to show “a meaningful 
evidentiary showing” that would require an agency to invoke the balancing test between personal 
privacy and public interest. The court declared that Exemption 7(C) “requires us to protect, in the 
proper degree, the personal privacy of citizens against the uncontrolled release of information 
compiled through the power of the state.”16
Foster’s family also did not want the photographs disclosed to the public. Favish, 
however, argued that Exemption 7(C) only recognized the personal privacy of the individual, in 
this case Vincent Foster, and that family members had no right of privacy over the pictures. The 
Supreme Court felt that Favish’s definition of personal privacy as an individual’s right to control 
information about oneself was too narrow. It ruled that Foster’s family had a right to invoke their 
own personal privacy protection. In writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated 
                                                 
16 NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580 (2004) 
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that “Foster’s relatives…invoke their own right and interest to personal privacy…They [Foster 
family] seek to be shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking 
culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased.”17  
What the court termed “survivor privacy” was predicated on three factors: 
• Broad definition of personal privacy to protect surviving family members; not 
“some limited or cramped notion of that idea” 
• Acknowledging a family’s control over the body and death images of the 
deceased  
• Under 7(C), two Attorneys General extended privacy protection to families.18  
Using the balancing test demonstrates a pattern that NARA engages in when personal 
privacy is an issue. The FBI and Foster cases had different outcomes. NARA has the discretion 
to disclose information which is protected under FOIA. However, NARA’s discretionary 
decisions can conflict with FOIA when personal privacy is an issue. The Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study records tested NARA’s decision-making.  
5.3 QUESTION TWO: IN LIGHT OF THESE POLICIES AND PRACTICES, HOW 
WERE THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS TREATED? 
 
NARA’s access policy and guidelines were not followed with respect to the recordkeeping of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. Although the records were deemed to have significant value 
and therefore retained for permanency by the CDC, the employees of the CDC were unwilling to 
                                                 
17 Ibid, at 1577. 
18 NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. (2004). 
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transfer the records to NARA in 1990. The employees of the Tuskegee Benefits Program were 
unaware of the retention schedule for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. The constant requests 
for documents forced the director of the program to seek assistance from the records manager. 
Once Jimmy Harrison, the records manager, discovered that it was time for the records to be 
transferred to NARA, the director, Arzell Lester, was hesitant to release the records.  
Lester was unaware of the role of the National Archives in preserving governmental 
records and the retention schedule covering the records of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Harrison 
made several visits to convince the director that NARA would not destroy the records. 
Unfortunately, agencies withholding records that should be transferred to NARA is not unusual. 
On behalf of NARA, a study was conducted to ascertain governmental employees’ views and 
perceptions about records creation, maintenance, use, and disposition. The study found that 
recordkeeping and current records management issues receive low priority from agency 
personnel due to lack of staff, budget, training and accountability. The study highlighted that, 
overall, NARA’s influence was needed in federal agencies. This was definitely the case with the 
management of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. 
As the research progressed, it became apparent that the transfer of the records from the 
CDC to NARA did not occur in accordance with standard procedures. As stated earlier in the 
chapter, agencies can make specific restrictions on their records that are being transferred to 
NARA. If an agency requests restrictions for their records after they are transferred, the agency 
has to identify the proper statute for nondisclosure and convince NARA of the need for the 
restrictions. However, in this particular case with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, the 
records manager Jimmy Harrison, the director of the Tuskegee Benefits Program, Arzell Lester, 
and NARA personnel entered into an agreement that restricted the medical records until 2030 
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based on Exemption 6. The transfer has far reaching implications reaching farther than an 
archaic agreement made to protect the participants and their family members. NARA’s decision 
to withhold the medical records in their entirety highlights how NARA trampled the public’s 
right to know what occurred even when there was a mechanism in place to protect the privacy 
interest at issue. 
5.3.1 May 30, 1990 Memorandum 
The 1990 memorandum that was written to deal with the sensitivity of the medical records was 
not disseminated to the Southeast Regional Center. As far as the staff knew, Exemption 6 was 
the reason that certain records, including the medical records, were restricted. There was no 
questioning this reason at NARA or the CDC. As stated earlier in this study, both agencies were 
using Exemption 6 as a shield. When asked how the staff learned about new policies and 
procedures or changes within NARA, Reeves stated, “We have training usually when the 
directors meet which is about once a year. That is part of our training and there is the National 
Archives web-site and memos and all kinds of regulations that are sent to us that we are 
supposed to study.”19
Even though Reeves receives information about new policies and procedures, he too was 
unaware of the memorandum. At the time of the transfer, the memorandum was shared between 
Mary Ronan, FOIA officer, and Trudy Peterson, Deputy Archivist of NARA. Reeves relied more 
on the contract as a guide and the OGC and the NARA FOIA officer to assist him with this 
matter.  Reeves stated, “I have contacted them a number of times about these records. Basically 
under what condition to grant access. What I could let them see and what I couldn’t let them 
                                                 
19 Charles Reeves, interview by author, March 12, 2003. 
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see.”20 In describing the contributions of the railroads to the development of managerial methods 
and formal internal communications, JoAnne Yates points out the significance of downward 
communication as a managerial tool. “Regular flows of upward, downward, and lateral 
communication as well as detailed record-keeping procedures played a critical role in the new 
systems.”21 In the case of NARA, there was a breakdown within the internal communication 
system between the NARA in Washington, D.C. and the Southeast Regional Center in Atlanta, 
Georgia. 
The 1990 memorandum was sent to me along with NARA’s decision stating that the 
records were going to be released. Since the memorandum existed, both Oliver and Rutgers 
offered the explanation that NARA did not categorically deny access to the records. Oliver 
pointed out, however, that Reeves and his staff had only the contract to go by and Reeves “didn’t 
think that he was empowered to do anything other…without somebody at a higher level making 
a different decision for him.”22 It would seem that if Reeves had known about the memorandum, 
there would have been less consultation with the NARA FOIA officer and the OGC. Thus, 
Oliver, Rutgers, and Reeves have conflicting outcomes of providing access to the medical 
records. 
5.3.2 Are the Records Unique? 
The staff at NARA also emphasized how the uniqueness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records 
has affected public access. Reeves stated “these records are somewhat different from normal 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 JoAnne Yates, Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989), 2. 
22 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 12, 2003. 
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records. We have an agreement with the CDC that they [the records] remain closed until 2030. 
So we have not allowed anybody to look at anything that reveals names, knowingly at least.”23 
Like Reeves, Oliver and Rutgers cited the agreement as well. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study is 
unique because of the political and social controversy, the racial element, and the government’s 
misconduct. However, the underlying rationale is that the records themselves are not unique in 
the way described by NARA. There was a written memorandum that stipulated how the records 
should be handled like any other records that are transferred to NARA.  
Again, NARA’s letter presents what actually happened with the transfer. For NARA, the 
CDC’s “recommendation” for restriction was based on Exemption 6 of the FOIA. However, 
NARA did not investigate the CDC’s claim for non-disclosure. There are two distinct duties that 
NARA must carry out with respect to government records. First, NARA has the authority to 
allow records to be transferred to it. Second, NARA must do an independent FOIA analysis to 
determine if restrictions placed on transferred records are tied to specific statutory or legal 
authorities that allow for the records to be restricted from public access, such as exemptions 
contained in FOIA, the Presidential Records Act, or the current Executive Order on classified 
national security information. When the records arrived at NARA, the FOIA officer, Mary 
Ronan, analyzed how NARA could protect the personal privacy of the men and their families 
while providing public access. It would seem that Ronan had judged the situation carefully. In 
her 1990 memorandum, Ronan stated that upon a request for restricted information any 
identifiable personal information would be redacted. Instead of following the memorandum, 
NARA recognized the agreement and categorically denied access. However, describing the 
                                                 
23 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
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records as “unique” does not preclude public access. FOIA determines the analytical framework 
of access, not uniqueness. 
In Pollard v. United States, a number of participants were named, including family 
members. The case not only contained a list of names, it revealed the participants’ medical 
status. Plaintiffs’ attorney, Fred Gray, commented, “If a person wanted the names, they could get 
them…all they have to do was go to the records of the court file and the settlement agreement 
which set out the names of everybody whether they were a control subject or syphilitic…living 
or dead.”24 In this document, there was a paragraph the participants had to sign that indicated 
their lack of knowledge of the study. The paragraph read: 
I am one of approximately four hundred (400) syphilitic 
participants in what has become known as the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study. I understand that the study was conducted by the United 
States Department of Public Health. The department kept detailed 
records of the activities and involvement of each participant in the 
study. At the time of my involvement, I was unaware of the fact 
that a study of untreated syphilis was being conducted, and that I 
was a participant in the experiment.25
 
Other participants substituted the word “syphilitic” with “control” for the same statement. 
The names and groups the participants belonged to are as follows: 
  Charles W. Pollard-S 
  Fred Simmons-S 
  Jessye Maddox-S 
  Sam Donar-S 
  Archie Foster-S 
  Lee Foster-S 
  Percy Gaines-S 
                                                 
24 Fred Gray, interview by author, June 16, 2003. 
25 Pollard v. United States 
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  Ben Eddie Foster-S 
  Charlie Griggs-C 
  Ernest Hendon-C 
  Fonzie Mahone-C 
  John Wesley Smith-C 
Otis Pace-S (contracted syphilis after study commenced) 
Jim Black-S (contracted syphilis after study commenced)26
 
For the public, access to the names of the participants seemed vital to understanding what 
happened during the study. However, it must be noted that even though the names are in the 
public domain, it is not relevant to increasing the public knowledge of what happened. 
Furthermore, information contained in medical files may be different and/or more invasive than 
information provided in legal or court files. Personal privacy means the ability to control 
information about oneself, i.e. name, addresses, social security numbers, etc. It may also include 
intimate and embarrassing details. So does this information shed light on what happened during 
the study? Demanding the names and any personal identifiers of the participants and their 
families redirects the focus to them and not to the government’s misconduct. Reeves commented 
that, “A number of the participants in the study have been on national television and all kinds of 
things. We aren’t able to keep up with everybody…who’s been on t.v…who has come forward 
and who has not. All we can do is keep them all restricted.”27 Although the participants have 
publicly expressed their outrage about the study, the underlying outcome is that their names do 
not add to the public knowledge about what happened during the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
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Including the names with the medical files, however, does expose more information about the 
participant, causing emotional harm to them and their family.  
The records document the longest non-therapeutic study in medical research. The records 
describe in great detail how the governmental physicians carried out the study. Those 
interviewed for this study gave different reasons why the records have significant value. James 
Jones stated that: 
I think the records are powerfully important…A one of kind 
study… It’s also one that has a large claim to the public’s 
attention. People still care about this. It hadn’t gone away. Those 
records are going to be important for future generations who will 
have other questions to ask and who want to make their own 
assessment of what happened.28
 
The information provided in those records enable the government to be held accountable 
for its actions even today. Richard Mulgan defines accountability as “the obligation to be called 
to account…a method of keeping the public informed and the powerful in check.”29 Accessing 
the records of government activities is a method of accountability. FOIA is a democratic measure 
used to guarantee equal access and to ensure that the government is keeping adequate records of 
its activities. In this case, the PHS physicians kept meticulous records documenting their 
activities. Such records guaranteed that the government would answer for its actions to the men 
and to the public. For Harrison, the records showed “the government had more than hands. They 
had hands, feet, arms, every appendage they seemed to use quite actively in this.”30  As a result, 
the government paid the ultimate price, public distrust. 
                                                 
28 James Jones, interview by author, December 3, 2003. 
29 Richard Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (New York: 
Palgrave, 2003), 1. 
30 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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The Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records are not without their own controversy. 
These records contain personal sensitive information about the health of these men. What can the 
public learn from the medical records that will shed anymore light on government misconduct? 
The administrative records that detail the study over a forty year period are available to the 
public. To play devil’s advocate, the files record the demographic information, types of 
examinations, and whether or not a participant was syphilitic or of the control group. So why 
should the public have access to these records? 
The participants’ medical files provide historical content, specifically corroborating the 
government physicians’ omission of treatment. The records also corroborate that the doctors did 
not deliberately infect the participants with syphilis. It is possible to glean from these files the 
social constructions of patient doctor relationships. Guenter B. Risse and John Harley Warner 
comment on patient records as “surviving artifacts of the interaction between physicians and 
their patients in which individual personality, cultural assumptions, social status, bureaucratic 
expediency, and the reality of power relationships are expressed.”31 The medical records 
provided the basic demographic information: name, sex, age, marital status, occupation, race, 
and place of residence. Moreover, these records allow the researcher to trace the medical history 
of the men over a forty year period. However, does the privacy interest of the participants far 
outweigh the public’s interest in disclosing the records?  
The interviewees for this study shared their opinions about disclosing the records, 
including the medical records. Dr. Bill Jenkins, manager of the Tuskegee Health Benefits 
Program, who has since retired from his position, succeeded Arzel Lester in 1995. Jenkins held 
                                                 
31 Guenter B. Risse and John Harley Warner, “Reconstructing Clinical Activities: Patient Records in 
Medical History,” The Journal of the Society for the Social History of Medicine 5:1 (1992): 189. 
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the position for over five years. During that time, Jenkins has developed a personal, even 
protective, connection with the men and their families. He has his own thoughts about what the 
public should have access to and why. Jenkins states that “the public should examine the 
administrative records… and…the ethics and politics of the study and not the individual physical 
health of these men.”32 For Jenkins: 
The issue about the Tuskegee Study in my mind is not whether Mr. 
Jones was positive for syphilis or whether Mr. Sams was positive 
for syphilis. The issue is what were the decisions around recruiting 
these men, informing these men, encouraging these men to 
continue in this study. Issues around when it became a question of 
ethics, maintaining correspondence, getting permission from the 
community. Those are the issues that are important which are in 
the correspondence, not in the medical records. The medical 
records only hide the real issues.33    
 
Dr. Jenkins commented that he would never give permission to anyone to look at the 
medical records. Jenkins would even support destroying the medical records. Thus, for Jenkins 
there is nothing to be gained from the medical records. 
Peter Buxtun, a former PHS official and whistleblower of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
thinks that all records should be released. Buxtun does have some reasons as to why the records 
are closed until 2030. And, although he would prefer the records to be open, he states that: 
They want all the doctors dead. They want all the participants and 
their wives dead. And a lot of their children directly born of those 
marriages to be either old enough that they are not going to hire a 
lawyer…makes it simpler for everyone. I do believe in getting as 
much data out that can be gotten out but hopefully not hurting 
people.34
 
                                                 
32 Dr. Bill Jenkins, interview by author, September 23, 2001. 
33 Dr. Bill Jenkins, interview by author, September 23, 2001. 
34 Peter Buxtun, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
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James Jones is one of those researchers who believed that, “The public’s right to know or 
need to know trumps other rights.”35 Jones also thinks that if the government wants to restrict 
something for a long time, then it is hiding something. He states: 
…the government wants to sequester material for X amount of 
time. Its to keep the public from knowing…I think the reason they 
do that is that they don’t want the truth told. They think that there 
are things in that record that will make individuals look bad, that 
will create opportunities for knowledge is power and that they have 
it and you don’t. They’ve got more power than you’ve got. I am 
always on the side of disclosure.36
 
With regards to records in general, Jones asserted, “They are the primary material that let 
us conduct an important part of our research in trying to understand the past.”37  He feels the 
same about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. “It has a large claim to the public’s attention. 
People still care about this. It hasn’t gone away. Those records are going to be important for 
future generations who will have other questions to ask and who want to make their own 
assessment of what happened…Those records always have to be there so whatever person wants 
to make an assessment will have those records to use.”38
Jimmy Harrison, records officer for the CDC, organized the records to be transferred to 
NARA. Harrison’s response to access to the records is that the public is “welcome to look 
through any administrative records…When we transferred these records to the National Archives 
in ‘91, ‘94, and ‘95 we transferred legal custody of them in accordance with Federal Law, so we 
no longer own the records. They belong to the Nation.”39 However, Harrison does feel that the 
                                                 
35 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
36 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
37 James Jones, interview by author, December 13, 2003. 
38 James Jones, interview by author, September 13, 2003. 
39 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
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medical records should be restricted until 2030. He stated, “We recommended a closure based 
upon the privacy issue so in a way maybe it’s not fair to the Archives. We shifted that 
responsibility to the National Archives but of course we still have a responsibility. We still feel 
connected to the records even though legal custody has been transferred.”40
Dr. David Satcher, former Surgeon General, believes the records are important for 
medical research. For Satcher, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study represents “one of the pivotal studies 
in the history of medical ethics from the standpoint of justice and beneficence…in the 
development of guidelines for medical research.”41 He, however, also had reservations about 
releasing medical records. He stated, “Ethics require I think that you protect the privacy of a 
patient record. I still feel that way about any patient records.”42
Charles Reeves, director of Archival Operations at the National Archives Southeast 
Regional Center, discussed his views about public access. “We should be able to release the 
records that tell what happened.”43 However, he commented on the fact that the Southeast 
Region to a certain extent has advertised that they have them. So in a sense he claims that “we 
are certainly not trying to conceal the fact that we have them and when we’ve done presentations 
to groups, we usually mention that these are among the records that we have.” And, he jovially 
pointed out that “the Center can brag on them a bit as important records in our holdings.”44 Fred 
Gray stated, “I think the facts and circumstances surrounding the study and how it was conducted 
should be a matter of public inquiry and a matter of public discourse.”45 Gray insisted that he did 
                                                 
40 Jimmy Harrison, interview by author, September 21, 2001. 
41 Dr. David Satcher, interview by author, August 11, 2003. 
42 Dr. David Satcher, interview by author, August 11, 2003. 
43 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
44 Charles Reeves, interview by author, September 20, 2001. 
45 Fred Gray, interview by author, June 16, 2003. 
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not support releasing medical files unless for medical purposes. Gray had in his possession 
medical files on each individual participant as well as other documents relating to the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study in his law firm in Tuskegee. When asked if he would donate his documents, Gray 
commented that he would get around to doing something about his collection of documents. 
Unfortunately, attorney Gray was too late. On February 11, 2004 at 4 a.m., Gray’s law office in 
Tuskegee burned down in what was considered one of the worst fires in the area since 1850. 





What is left of Attorney Fred Gray’s law firm in Tuskegee (Montgomery Advertiser, 
Tuskegee, Alabama ) 
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While watching the flames, Gray commented, “We talked just last week about moving 
those documents to another location so that the records of the civil rights movement would be 
preserved forever…Now they’re all gone.”46
5.3.3 NARA’s Decision to Release the Records in 2004 
In response to the researcher’s request, NARA stated that the records would be released in their 
entirety in 2004 instead of 2030. NARA asserted that under its FOIA policy and regulations, it 
had been releasing such redacted records over the years upon request. The agency referred to the 
May 30, 1990 memorandum (see APPENDIX G). “NARA never categorically withheld the 
medical records (see APPENDIX K).” However, the Director of Archival Operations at the 
Southeast Region Center commented that as far as he knew, the researcher was the only one to 
examine a medical record. There is no documentation to substantiate NARA’s assertion that 
access had been granted. From NARA’s response letter, it would seem that there is consistency 
in granting access to the medical records. However, responses from NARA staff and historians 
say otherwise. 
NARA’s decision to open the records in their entirety was based on the Exemption 6 
balancing test. NARA concluded that the medical records should be disclosed to the public 
because they provided even more documentation on government misconduct. In addition, most 
of the men were deceased, except two.47 However, in weighing the personal privacy interests and 
public interests, NARA chose to release the records with the participants’ names. Its 
interpretation of Exemption 6 appeared to be too narrow. The information in the medical records 
                                                 
 
47 All of the participants are now deceased. 
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deserved to be accessed. But that information could have been released without the patients’ 
names. At first the researcher felt the names were significant. However, the 1990 memorandum 
stated that the records presented a major privacy issue for NARA. The FOIA Officer worried that 
researchers could trace participants and their families in this specific community and know 
which participants had syphilis. The 1990 memorandum suggested that all personal identifiers be 
redacted in order to protect the privacy of the living. The memorandum also stated, 
“Pragmatically, I suggest [we] keep the records closed until get a FOIA [request]; only then 
should we take on the project of sanitizing.”48  
Arguably, releasing the names along with the medical records adds nothing to 
understanding the government’s involvement in the study. The decision from NARA attempts to 
explain how it takes into account third parties. It states that:  
Even information that is not particularly sensitive in and of itself 
may be withheld to protect the privacy interests of surviving family 
members if disclosure would cause a disruption of their peace of 
minds. Given the special sensitivities and the subject matter of the 
Tuskegee Study, NARA decided not to release the names in order 
to protect both the living individuals and survivors who might hold 
a privacy interest in the medical records.49
 
 
The rationale for protecting third parties from information that is not particularly 
sensitive in and of itself has been inconsistently applied to the Tuskegee Study. In reviewing a 
sample of the medical files, NARA determined that there were no personal, intimate details that 
affected them directly. However, releasing the names along with the medical file would seem to 
cause “a disruption of their peace of minds.” As the 1990 memorandum commented, Tuskegee is 
                                                 
48 National Archives memorandum, May 30, 1991. 
49 Ramona Oliver, NARA FOIA Officer, Office of General Counsel to author, February 11, 2004. 
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a small area and it is easy to identify victims’ families, wives and children. The statutory 
language of Exemption 6 does not specifically state who is being protected. To whom do the 
records specifically pertain to? It does not exclude third party interests. Invasion of personal 
privacy can include third parties. If a third party is considered, then including the names with the 
records would negatively impact the family. Sarah Rudgers commented that the sample did not 
reveal descriptive check-ups of the participants and was not descriptive in terms of a third party. 
As result, “Third party was a minimal issue.”50   
In this particular case, NARA should have considered the family members personal 
privacy. Indirectly, they were mentioned in the medical records. But directly releasing the 
records with the participants’ name hurts them as well. The personal privacy interest of the 
family members should have been factored directly into NARA’s decision. In NARA v. Favish, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Foster family needed to be shielded by Exemption 7(C) to 
“secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and 
tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased.” It would seem that the two cases are similar. With 
NARA v. Favish, the requester wanted access to photographs. In this particular case, the 
researcher wanted access to medical records.  But unlike the court case, NARA did determine 
that the medical records should be disclosed to the public. However, in an attempt to apply the 
balancing test under Exemption 6, NARA could have used this case and concluded that it was 
applicable to these records. If so, then the personal privacy interests that would have been 
considered directly are not those of the deceased individual but the living, i.e., the Tuskegee 
study participants’ surviving family members. Then the final outcome could have been 
disclosure, but with redactions. A compromise could have been reached. The privacy interests of 
                                                 
50 Sarah Rudgers interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
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the surviving family members could be protected and at the same time, the public would know 
the extent of the government’s misconduct that happened during this medical study. 
5.4 QUESTION THREE: DOES NARA’S ACCESS POLICY TOWARD 
RESTRICTED INFORMATION AND THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) UNDERMINE THE SPIRIT OF THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT WITH RESPECT TO THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 
RECORDS? IF SO, WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IN THIS PARTICULAR 
CASE? 
 
The written “agreement” or contract between NARA and CDC is inconsistent with the spirit of 
FOIA and the values that the statute espouses, such as promoting public discourse on matters of 
public interest. Federal agencies must follow the federal statutes passed by Congress. There has 
been conflict between federal statutes and agency regulations. As discussed herein, the contract 
between NARA and the CDC compromised the FOIA statute.  
As FOIA is a disclosure statute, NARA must uphold this principle.  Agencies can place 
their own restrictions on access, but they must comply with FOIA. If records have been 
accessioned by NARA, then NARA rather than the originating agency has the authority to decide 
what information is released to the public. Although OGC attorney, Sarah Rudgers, explained 
that NARA did not want to hinder the CDC’s efforts in performing their work, she did point out 
that the agreement in question was merely a suggestion between the two agencies. Rudgers 
stated, “The Archivist can at his discretion impose specific restrictions on records. And we 
clearly state that if the Archivist of the United States and the head of the agency that is 
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transferring records agree on this approach, then that is what will happen.”51 However, she 
conceded, “I guess by the CDC and NARA signing the schedule with the attachment we in 
essence agreed.”52 The CDC placed unreasonable restrictions on access that were not in 
alignment with FOIA. As a result, over the years, the staff of the Southeast Regional Center’s 
response to the public for access was consistent with the “suggestive” agreement.   
The researcher was confronted with this agreement when she requested to see the medical 
files. As stated earlier, the Director of Archival Operations stated that if he had read the 
agreement again, he would not have allowed access. However, Rudgers insisted that NARA 
archivists do have discretion in providing access to the medical records. But Oliver pointed out 
that NARA had been adhering to the agreement up until now. Thus, no one had gone back to 
review the agreement until there was a FOIA request. Rudgers and Oliver believed that the 
agreement was outdated. The response was that the agreement was signed. Rudgers commented 
that the agreement was just a suggestion. Oliver stated that the Director of Archival Operations 
contacted them because, “Charlie didn’t think that he was in empowered to do anything other 
than that without somebody at a higher level making a different decision for him.”53
Since there had been requests over the years, no one at NARA reviewed or reassessed the 
agreement. Oliver stated that when the records were transferred in 1990, NARA had been 
thinking of ways to release these records if personal information could be redacted. She claimed 
it was not a new issue. However, since the records had been transferred, it was learned that no 
one has ever had access to the medical records until now. Oliver pointed out that “…perhaps the 
                                                 
51 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
52 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22. 2003. 
53 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
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way it was phrased or perhaps you [the researcher] asked the right series of questions that made 
Charlie want to take a second look at this [agreement].”54
NARA’s letter stated that “upon a review of the files, NARA concluded that, other than 
names, there was no other mention, and certainly no intimate details about third parties.”55 But 
earlier in the letter, it stated that these records were not released in order to protect both living 
participants and their family members “who might hold a privacy interest in the medical 
records.”56 However, as discussed previously, NARA was able to protect third party interests 
while releasing pertinent information by redacting personal information from the medical files.  
Although there was this agreement between the CDC and NARA, the 1990 memorandum 
clearly advises that NARA should not do anything until they received a FOIA request. And when 
that happened, then the personal information could be sanitized or redacted. Even though NARA 
has stated that it has been providing the public with redacted medical records, the interviews and 
agreement between the two agencies contradict this assertion. Requests by the Southeast 
Regional Center on how to handle requests for medical records, demonstrates that the 1990 
memorandum has not been put into practice. The use of the agreement and Exemption 6 has 
curtailed the public from gaining access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records. The 
Exemption 6 balancing test was skipped. Among NARA officials there has been an inadvertent 
yet detrimental disconnect preventing the public from accessing the records over the years.  
The NARA decision disclosing the medical records does not effectively deal with the 
agreement. It does not disavow the agreement, especially considering that NARA regulations 
state that records of a sensitive matter can be released if redacted. The agreement has far 
                                                 
54 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
55 Ramona Oliver, letter to author, February 11, 2004. 
56 Ibid. 
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reaching ramifications. NARA’s abuse of its discretion of FOIA is highlighted in this contract. In 
their investigation of my FOIA request, NARA simplified its entering into an improper 
agreement with the CDC. Because the Director of the Tuskegee Health Benefits Program 
hesitated to transfer the records to NARA, NARA abused its discretion of FOIA to acquire the 
records using Exemption 6 as a shield and closing them until 2030. Rudgers characterized the 
agreement as archaic. But the contract violated the spirit of FOIA. In its investigation, NARA 
found a memorandum that described how requests should be handled. However, the archivists 
deferred to the agreement denying full access to the medical records. In the final analysis, 
NARA’s decision revealed that it was not being self-critical about how it managed the records.   
Upon my FOIA request, NARA conducted a FOIA analysis of the medical records. 
Rudgers and Oliver requested 30% of the medical records to determine if the records should be 
released. Both found that the records, although descriptive, did not impact family members 
directly. “So keeping that in mind, we felt that third party privacy was a minimal issue.”57
Exemption 6 and NARA regulations issued under FOIA do not allow NARA to decide 
categorically to withhold medical records without weighing the public interests in disclosure 
against the personal privacy interests at stake.  NARA FOIA regulations on restricting the use of 
records are contained in the 36 C.F.R. §1256.56 (2004). NARA interprets information that would 
invade the privacy of an individual as follows:  
Records containing information about a living individual which 
reveal details of a highly personal nature that the individual could 
reasonably assert a claim to withhold from the public to avoid a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, including but not limited 
to information about the physical or mental health or the medical 
or psychiatric care or treatment of the individual, and that contain 
                                                 
57 Ramona Oliver, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
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personal information not known to have been previously made 
public, and relate to events less than 75 years old.58  
 
This particular regulation, on its face, deals with first party privacy interests rather than 
third party privacy interests. As mentioned earlier, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records present 
third party privacy interests, which were apparently minimized by NARA in its decision letter 
determining to release the medical records in their entirety. 
Furthermore, agencies place restrictions on their records when transferring them to 
NARA. In the case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records, NARA agreed to restrict 
access until 2030. This agreement, however, did not comply with the Freedom of Information 
Act. 
5.5 QUESTION FOUR: WHAT DO THE RECORD KEEPING PRACTICES OF THE 
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS REVEAL ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF NARA’S ACCESS POLICY TO PROTECT THE PERSONAL PRIVACY WITH 
THOSE RECORDS. 
 
NARA’s handling of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records may be characterized as bureaucratic 
ineptitude. On the other hand, the handling of these records may have been plagued by massive 
miscommunication. Decisions made by upper level management cannot be implemented if they 
are not communicated to operational staff within an organization. According to the FOIA, 
NARA may release records that contain personal information with redactions. NARA may take 
into consideration the recommendations of the respective agency that submitted their records. 
                                                 
58 See National Archives and Records Administration’ 36 CFR § 1256.56 (2004). 
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However, NARA’s decision to release information from that agency’s records should not be 
based solely on the agency’s recommendation but in conjunction with an independent FOIA 
analysis of the records by NARA. With respect to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, NARA 
may have given too much deference to the CDC by entering into an agreement to withhold 
categorically the medical records, in complete violation of the spirit of FOIA.  
Nondisclosure challenges NARA’s policy of open access with regard to government 
records. The information and evidence provided in agency records holds the government 
accountable for its actions. Even more importantly, NARA needs to held accountable for its 
procedures for open access. Elena Danielson asserts, “Procedures can be designed that reconcile 
privacy rights and the right to information about one’s life and one’s national history.”59  
Overall, the release of requested information serves a democratic purpose. The U.S. statutes and 
NARA’s guidelines can “…build confidence in the democratic process.”60
NARA must provide citizens with access to evidence that sheds light on government 
activity, but it must do so without compromising personal privacy. Under Exemption 6, the 
agency bears the burden of justifying nondisclosure. In balancing personal privacy and public 
access, NARA must determine if disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, thereby causing undue stress and embarrassment or 
whether the disclosure of the information would advance public knowledge of governmental 
activity. Exemption 6 pertains to records containing information on government personnel, 
medical files and similar files containing personal information. 
                                                 
59 Elena Danielson, “Privacy Rights and the Rights of Political Victims: Implications of the German 
Experience,” American Archivist 67 (Fall/Winter 2004): 193. 
60 Ibid. 
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The extenuating circumstances that would cause NARA to disclose these types of records 
if the information has been disclosed by the individual, if the person is deceased, or if the records 
refer to the employment status and duties of government employees. Ramona Oliver stated 
NARA released the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical records because “The medical information 
was not extremely sensitive or descriptive. They were check-ups…They didn’t talk about 
anything graphic with regards to sores…any other thing that would be indicative of having 
STD.”61 Sarah Rudgers added that the participants’ names had been published and that the public 
knew who they were. In addition, there had been a public apology from President Clinton. Some 
of the men were at that ceremony. “We have to factor all of that into our decisions about what we 
are releasing.”62  
Rudgers describes how NARA decides if disclosure is necessary. Under Exemption 6, 
NARA can release all “reasonably segregable” nonexempt portions of requested records. 
However, redaction may not be possible if the request is limited to private information that could 
identify an individual. But what is significant about NARA’s decision-making process is that 
NARA is not bound by its decisions regarding disclosure or nondisclosure of records. Each 
request is different and NARA factors in all the information when deciding if information should 
be released.  
NARA has released the Tuskegee Syphilis Study medical files in their entirety based on 
the investigation they conducted as a result of my FOIA request. However, in the near future 
they could reverse that decision based on new facts. This is true for all their records. This is 
always a judgment call for NARA. There is no hard and fast way of thinking about requests. The 
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62 Sarah Rudgers, interview by author, December 22, 2003. 
 133 
outcome may be different for each case; one fact can change the analysis of a request; death, 
time frame, public interests, etc. Why should Y records be bound by the decision made about X 
records? This is why the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records are not unique. However, in this 
particular situation, NARA made a disturbing call by not redacting the participants’ names. 
5.6 QUESTION FIVE: HOW HAVE THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE TUSKEGEE 
SYPHILIS STUDY RECORDS AFFECTED THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF THE 
STUDY?  
 
For African Americans, the collective past is always present. More important, remembering 
historical events or experiences, tends to blur “the boundaries of the personal and the public, the 
individual and the collective.”63 The boundaries tend to blur even more when memories recall 
acts of violence, brutality, and exploitation, such as lynching, race riots, and being used as guinea 
pigs.  This ‘study’ integrates all such atrocities and permeates throughout the construction of 
social, historical, and cultural memory. Through images, narratives and records, the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study has not gone quietly into the night, but become a “case of remembering to 
remember.”64  Barbie Zelizer states that “…the authority of collective memories increases as 
time passes, taking on new complications, nuances, and interests. Collective memories allow for 
the fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing 
aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation, 
                                                 
63 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in American Life 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 149.  
64 Barbie Zelizer, Rememering to Forget: Holocaust Memory trough the Camera’s Eye (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 171. 
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power, authority, and political affiliation. Memories in this view become not only the simple act 
of recall but social, cultural, and political action at its broadest level…”65
Limited access to records, particularly the medical records of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, has continued to perpetuate misconceptions about the study, entangling fact with fiction.  
In addition, the public continues to distrust the government. The African American community 
has long been suspicious of the medical establishment.66 As a result, it has been difficult to get 
blacks to participate in clinical trials of any kind. Over the years there has been the creation of 
myths about the study. In a positive sense, such myths have kept the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
alive among the public. According to Colin Grant, “…the study of myth becomes even more 
significant when myth is understood in more positive terms.”67 However, such inaccuracy can 
override the truth, particularly when recalling a shared experience through time and space. 
Although more records have been released by NARA, including the medical records, the 
remembrance of previous exploitation has convinced the public and the African American 
community that the PHS physicians infected the participants with syphilis. As James Jones 
points out: 
…Tuskegee is the medical part of that story. It has become a 
metaphor for malpractice, neglect, for people being deceived, for 
people being injured by people who were supposed to help them. 
And when African Americans think today about Tuskegee they see 
                                                 
65 Ibid, 3. 
66 In the antebellum South, African Americans were used as human guinea pigs for medical 
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67 Colin Grant, Myths We Live By (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998), 1. 
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it not in isolation. They see it as part of a record, a few hundred 
years of contact and that…collective memory begins with capture, 
slavery…broken promises of reconstruction…Jim Crow and from 
Jim Crow it doesn’t get better it gets worse. The segregated 
society. There are no lengths to the degradations and constantly 
defining of a lower position of society.68
  
Although the records available at NARA say otherwise, the majority of the public insist 
that the government deliberately infected these men. David Thelen states that “from actors’ 
conflicts and negotiations over memory are born traditions, legends, myths, rituals, and more 
formalized cultural expressions of collective memory.”69 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study has 
emerged as justification by the public to expect dishonesty and nondisclosure from investigators 
concerning research risks. “Even if you give them informed consent, like the Tuskegee thing—
those men were told they would be treated but they weren’t.”70 Thus, the well publicized 
existence of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records is a double-edged sword for the government.  
There have been a number of surveys conducted that have enlisted African Americans to 
discuss reasons for not participating in clinical trials. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was one of 
the main reasons. Few could give accurate historical facts about the study. Those recruited 
believed that the participants in the study were injected with the disease. Even though there were 
400 African-American men who had syphilis and 200 who were part of the control group, those 
recruited for the survey believed that approximately twenty to forty men were in the study. 
Furthermore, some thought that the government infected the entire Macon County area. 
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However, when given the actual facts about the study, challenging their misinformation, the 
recruiters did not believe it. They insisted that the documentation could possibly be false.71  One 
recruiter stated, “I’m not saying you are lying or anything, but just like you are telling me one 
side, there could be a lot of different sides. You may have been misled as to the facts.”72  
Despite the fictitious information about the study, such misperceptions are what keep the 
memory alive today. Halbwachs defines collective memory as “… a current of continuous 
thought whose continuity is not all artificial, for it retains from the past only what still lives or is 
capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive.”73 The Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study continues to exist in the memory of those who had participated in the study, 
participant’s family members, the public at large, specifically in the African American 
community.  
5.6.1 Memories of Tuskegee Syphilis Study Participants and Their Families 
In Bad Blood, Jones states that “archival materials acquire a new meaning in the light of 
conversations with the participants in the study.”74 On the value of oral history, Ronald J. Grele 
has pointed out that such sources “are but one form of documentation. In some cases they are not 
the best form; in others they are the only form. When used with care and modesty, they increase 
our understanding of our past and reveal hidden levels of discourse.”75
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
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74 Jones, xiii. 
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(September 1987): 577. 
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By discussing their experiences, the participants in their own way documented the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study and broke the silence that had surrounded the participants and their 
families. When describing the spinal tap procedures done to him, Charles Pollard stated “they 
give me one of them back shots, and it put me down, put me down on the ground on my hands 
and knees for weeks. They stuck them needles in me for forty years so you couldn’t feel good. 
They never did tell me what was wrong with me.”76  
In Carol Kaesuk Yoon’s 1997 New York Times article “Families Emerge As Silent 
Victims of Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments,” Albert Julkes, Jr., the son of a participant, noted 
“You get treated like lepers. People think it’s the scourge of the earth to have it in your family.” 
Lillie Head, the daughter of a participant, lamented, “it was something to be ashamed of, so it 
wasn’t talked about.” Herman Shaw, a survivor of the study, offered one of the few memories of 
a wife’s reaction to learning the truth about the study. “She was somewhat shocked, may I say, 
because it was a disease. It wasn’t anything that we’d heard about and nobody seemed to know 
about.”77  
The lingering shame and distrust of the government for what they did to the participants 
and their family members and their community in the past is documented through the voices of 
the victims in the present. George Key, born in 1907 remembers the government officials using 
the term guinea pig. He recalls that “…some kind of funny name they called us…guinea 
pigs…That’s what they called us.”78 After realizing what had happened to her father, Mrs. 
Rosetta Deborah Wilson daughter of Reverend Seagram Charles Chappell, was suspicious of 
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tests, especially if it involved her family. She did not even want her children to be any part of 
any testing. She commented: 
I told my children when I found out what was happening about 
them going to get the blood tests and all that…Don’t get a blood 
test unless you’re sure getting one from the doctor. And don’t let 
anyone tell you to come and get tested and get paid for your 
blood…which someone told my twins in high school and I told 
them not to participate in it. I don’t know what was going to 
happen, but I was afraid the same thing was going to happen to my 
daughters that happened to my father. So I told them not to 
participate in it.79
 
 Publicly retelling these experiences has placed the Tuskegee Syphilis Study experiment 
upon the public stage. More important, memorializing the participants of the clinical tragedy 
cemented their experience within public memory. 
In 1998, a museum in Tuskegee, Alabama was established to memorialize the 
participants of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The Tuskegee Human and Civil Rights Center’s 
objective is to draw public attention and pay tribute to the participants of the study. Attorney 
Fred Gray commented that what these men wanted “was a permanent memorial in Tuskegee that 
would not only acknowledge their contribution but the contribution that others had made in the 
field of Civil and Human Rights.”80 Mrs. Rosetta Deborah Wilson praised the center “…because 
there’s a lot I don’t know and I need to know.”81 Albert Julkes envisions the center 
“…blossoming in years to come because there’s so much involved…Everyone should come to 
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that center and see exhibits not only that exist right now but those that will become a part of that 
Multicultural Center.”82
African American museums have held a dual responsibility to convey the African 
American story, while at the same time telling a broader American story. In addition, the African 
American museum has become a public forum for addressing something that is uncomfortable 
about our collective past. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study constitutes one of many examples of 
horrible treatment in African American history. The institution of slavery and the Civil Rights 
Movement, though a shared heritage, were not experienced in the same way by whites as by 
African Americans. In a broader sense African Americans who heard about the study felt a 
connection based on past experiences. For them, the memory of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
blurred the “I and… we.”83 Yet these subjects allow us to stimulate reconciliation and healing as 
well as self-knowledge for African Americans and others who are moved by the common 
experience. 
Currently in the museum are taped interviews with subjects remembering their 
experiences and photographs. When commenting on how significant photographs are in 
documenting historical events, James O’Toole states that: 
A written record describing an event might be valuable enough, 
but how more informative was a photograph that showed what the 
participants themselves actually did and saw. If writing could 
freeze time by describing what had happened, a photograph could 
freeze time even better by showing what recognizable individuals 
looked like and how they behaved”84
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The photographs gave faces to the physicians involved, disturbing examinations of the 
participants and their interaction with them. These pictures underscore how these doctors 
portrayed themselves as assisting these men while using them as ‘guinea pigs.’ Thus, 
photographic records, narratives and written documentation together breathe new life into the 
memory of this study. (See the following pages). 
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 Left: Dr. David Albritton, Nurse Eunice Rivers and Dr. Walter Edmondson (National 























Left: unidentified subjects, Nurse Rivers, Dr. David Albritton, Dr. Walter Edmondson 
(National Archives, Atlanta, Ga) 
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The Tuskegee Syphilis Study has come to symbolize the medical misconduct and blatant 
disregard for human rights that took place in the name of science. The participants in the study 
underscore the point that the burden of medical experimentation has historically been conducted 
on those unable to protect themselves. By failing to obtain informed consent and offering 
incentives for participation, the Public Health Service doctors were performing unethical 
experiments on human subjects. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was an immoral experiment from 
the outset. Moreover, similar comparisons can be made with inhumane medical experiments on 
humans living under the Nazi Regime during World War II as well as to other U.S. government 
experiments that tested drugs and chemical and biological weapons on unwitting U.S. citizens. 
Arthur Caplan, director of the medical ethics program at the University of Pennsylvania in 
Philadelphia, described the Tuskegee Syphilis Study as “America’s Nuremberg.” Caplan, author 
of When Medicine Went Bad: Bioethics and the Holocaust, commented that, “Tuskegee was 
really the experiment that set American medicine on its ear. I think Americans had this belief 
that they couldn’t or wouldn’t do the kind of evil things that the Germans did. Tuskegee was a 
gigantic wake-up call.”85 The outcry over the Tuskegee Syphilis Study led to experimental 
reforms, including the requirement of informed consent, the creation of institutional review 
boards, data and safety monitoring boards, and continuing ethics education for researchers. 
On May 16, 1997, President Bill Clinton did what the PHS officials refused to do twenty-
five years earlier when the experiments came to light. He offered a formal White House apology 
to the participants and the survivors. Even though there was an official apology and measures 
were put into place to prevent people from being treated again like laboratory rats, the underlying 
                                                 
85 Howard Wolinsky, “Steps Still Being Taken to Undo Damage of ‘America’s Nuremberg,” Annals of 
Internal Medicine (August 15, 1997): 18. February 25, 2004. <.org/journal/annals/15aug97/currnazi.htm>. 
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fact is that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was not an isolated incident. Rather, it was apart of a 
larger disturbing trend of unethical secret experimentation on humans throughout the twentieth 
century. Americans have not only been left to suffer silently from syphilis, but have also been 
injected with Plutonium 239, blistered with mustard gas, and sprayed with bacteria. Like the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the victims of these experiments were usually the most vulnerable 
members of society: poor African Americans, hospital patients, and children.86 Striking a 
balance between protecting vulnerable classes of subjects and seeing that minorities are 
adequately represented in and reap the benefits of clinical trials has become a challenge for 
medical investigators. The exposure of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study prompted the National 
Research Act of 1974 which mandated that institutional review boards approve federally funded 
proposed research involving human subjects. As a result, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records 
are relevant to the notion of accountability, ensuring that the contemporary biomedical 
community justifies its experiments through formal protocol process as well as a formal human 
subject review process. 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study did not just happen to the 625 men and their families living 
in Macon County, Georgia. The African American community connected with the experience 
because of the racial identity of the victims. Their community’s sense of a collective past is used 
as a means to force the U.S. government to be accountable for its actions. Through the vehicles 
of interviews, a commemorative museum, and public policies, the African American community 
is able to remember the participants of the study, their ordeal, and the government’s role. Paul 
                                                 
86 In March 1997, the Department of Energy paid $6.5 million to the families of seventeen individuals who 
were injected with plutonium and uranium in secret government Cold War era experiments. In November 1996, 
Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary paid $4.8 million to the families of another twelve victims of government 
radioactivity experiments. For a historical overview of children and research see Leonard H. Glantz’s article 
“Research with Children,” American Journal of Law and Medicine 24, 2-3 (1998): 213-244. 
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Antze and Michael Lambek contend that “memories are never simply records of the past, but are 
interpretive reconstructions that bear the imprint of local narrative conventions, cultural 
assumptions, discursive formations and practices, and social contexts of recall and 
commemoration.”87 The remembrance of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is a prime example of an 
American tragedy that continues to be an issue in both private and public memories.  
Since the administrative records were open to the public, I wanted to see what type of 
information the public requested from the CDC and NARA. I requested redacted letters written 
to the CDC and NARA after 1990.88 I chose 1990 because I wanted to know if requesters 
realized that the records had been transferred. NARA informed me in writing that such letters 
had been destroyed. The CDC, however, sent letters.  
A requester wanted “any or all materials relevant to the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment.” The FOI Officer of the CDC usually responded: 
We are providing a copy of the final report which may be helpful 
to you. Also, there are numerous reports in the medical literature, 
available in most libraries, which were produced during and after 
the Tuskegee Study.89
 
There was one letter that struck me. In March 1997, this individual submitted a hand 
written FOIA request to the CDC. She wanted information on her husband who she believed was 
part of the study. She needed to know for sure in order to produce evidence to prove she was a 
relative. Fred Gray had mentioned that over 10,000 people have received funds from the lawsuit. 
                                                 
87 Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, eds., Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), vii. 
88 Even though citizens who file FOIA requests have limited privacy (i.e. names are not redacted), I chose 
to request redacted letters. I felt the names were not significant for this study only the specific information requested 
by the requester. 
89 Thomas Mathews, CDC FOI Officer to author, September 12, 2004. 
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There have been many FOIA requests to the CDC and NARA for this reason. If she did not 
receive such information “I wood go to Jail” (see below). The requester did receive a response 






The Tuskegee Syphilis Study is a prime example of the complex interaction between 
history and collective memory. Memories of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study have survived since its 
exposure in the early 1970s. There have been plays, movies, documentaries and a number of 
articles written about the study. But how do memory and history coexist?  Memories do serve a 
purpose in keeping the most horrible acts alive in one’s mind. However, such memories can only 
take us so far. Documents play a significant role in cementing those memories, even correcting 
them. Catherine Clinton believes “the power of memory must draw us out of the novel and into 
the archives.”90 If this is done, then the story of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study will survive.
                                                 
90 Catherine Clinton, “With a Whip in His Hand: Rape, Memory and African-American Women,” in 
Genevieve Fabre and Robert O’Meally, eds. History and Memory in African-American Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 215. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This study began with an examination and analysis of the National Archives and Records 
Administration’s official policy on access to controversial records, including those of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study records as the case study. As the study progressed, however, the 
examination shifted to NARA’s access policy regarding the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records in 
particular. This dissertation argued that even though NARA reviews its access policy on a case 
by case situation, its management of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records was inconsistent with 
providing access to restricted information (i.e., medical records). During this study, NARA was 
prompted by a FOIA request from the researcher to examine its agreement with the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention on restricting access to the medical records of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study. NARA examined this agreement using the balancing test to determine if the 
personal privacy of the participants and their families outweighed the public’s right to further 
information about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. NARA decided to release the medical records in 
2004 instead of 2030 because the public’s right to know outweighed the personal privacy of the 
participants and their families. The release of the medical records altered this dissertation 
argument. However, NARA’s decision highlighted the process by which NARA used the 
balancing test to determine if disclosing the medical records shed more light on the government’s 
involvement during this study.  
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NARA’s access policy toward the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records was inconsistent with 
NARA’s regulations and federal statutes (i.e., Freedom of Information Act). NARA has 
discretion in deciding whether information from sensitive records should be disclosed, and if so, 
whether that information should be released in part or in its entirety. Such discretion is based on 
nine Exemptions of FOIA. In 1990, when the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records were transferred, 
NARA applied Exemption 6 of FOIA to restrict the medical records in full until 2030 in order to 
receive the records from the CDC. As a result, the agreement between the CDC and NARA was 
in violation of the spirit of FOIA. 
Upon investigating my FOIA request, NARA discovered a 1990 memorandum that 
stipulated how to handle the records. The memorandum stated that upon a request for access to 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records, personal identifiers would be redacted so that the 
information could be released. My interviews with NARA staff revealed that they did not know 
that the memorandum existed. It is important to note that the memorandum remained within the 
NARA office in Washington, D.C. NARA insists that access was to the medical records was 
granted to researchers requesting them. It asserted that the agreement between it and CDC 
categorically denying access was archaic and needed to be reevaluated. NARA released the 
records because it found that enough time had passed since the study, that at the time of its 
review of my FOIA request all but two of the 625 men were deceased, that the records contained 
limited information about third parties (i.e., family members), and that many participants had 
discussed their experiences in public forums. NARA released the records in their entirety, 
including the names of the participants.   
It is important to consider NARA’s decision to provide the names along with the medical 
records. In providing the names along with the medical files, NARA failed to give adequate 
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consideration to the privacy rights of individuals, specifically third parties with privacy interests 
in the records. Privacy entails the ability to control information. This concept of privacy is linked 
to protecting the individual which would include third party interests. The public has the right to 
have access to the medical records; however, the names of the participants do not advance any 
knowledge about the study. The public may know that a participant had syphilis. However, if the 
name is included with the medical file, the public also learns information that does not shed light 
on government activity. Thus, the personal privacy of the participants and their families is 
affected, causing undue stress, especially for the families. So the medical records are now open, 
but at what cost? 
 In addition, the study revealed that NARA deflected the criticism from itself in how it 
provided access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. Its assertion that the public had access 
to the medical records runs counter to the interviews conducted for this study. NARA staff at the 
Southeast Regional Center stated that they were unaware of the memorandum and were in 
constant contact with the Office of General Counsel upon requests for access to the medical 
records. Thus, it can be inferred that prior to my FOIA request, NARA categorically denied 
access to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records. 
Nondisclosure of restricted records that contain sensitive information, specifically the 
medical records, has affected the collective memory of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The 
restrictions have perpetuated myths and misinformation about the study. Some of the 
misinformation in the public sphere is as follows: 
1. The participants were deliberately infected with syphilis by the               
United States Public Health Service physicians.  
2. The entire Tuskegee community was infected. 
 153 
3. The Tuskegee Airmen were infected.  
4. Less than 600 men participated in the study. 
5. No participants were ever treated for syphilis.  
Even though the administrative records and the medical records counter these myths and 
misinformation, the public continues to believe otherwise, especially within the African 
American community.  
6.1.1 The Importance of This Case Study 
This case study demonstrates that there is a need for more studies that include government 
archivists and the challenges they face when confronting the issue of protecting personal privacy 
while providing access to the public, because most of the literature on privacy focuses on 
manuscript collections. The literature includes the issue of third parties, but again from the 
perspective of manuscript collections. The combination of privacy, access, and collective 
memory provides a unique way of including government archivists in this emerging discussion. 
Examining governmental procedures for providing specific information about governmental 
activity or personal information affects all three. How does the government reconcile the 
people’s right to know and personal privacy? How does the government define the personal 
privacy of individuals and third parties? There is a need for this discussion because answers to 




6.2 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
There are other areas related to privacy needing further study. NARA’s overall official policy 
towards providing access to controversial records in general remains a topic for future research. 
This dissertation briefly discussed the policy. Such a case study would include understanding 
how well informed NARA staff are about regulations and federal statutes. More importantly, it is 
essential to examine how NARA conducts FOIA analysis when records are transferred to 
NARA. Does NARA defer to federal agencies’ restrictions on their records or investigate 
whether or not those restrictions are appropriate?   
In a much larger framework, this study has broader, social implications. The Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records underscore the relationships among privacy, collective memory and 
access. Figure 6.1 suggests a model of these relationships, using the records of the Tuskegee 








As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, personal privacy has many layers involving individuals, third 
parties, and the general public. In providing access to public records, government archivists 
strive to balance the privacy rights protected by freedom of information and privacy legislation 
against the public’s right to monitor the government’s conduct documented in the records, which 
relies on open access. In reality, archivists can find it difficult to ensure a proper balance. But 
when attempting to balance personal privacy and the public’s right to know, providing access to 
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records that contain sensitive information can be achieved by redacting such information. 
NARA’s 2004 decision to provide access to the medical records of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
in their entirety sacrifices personal privacy to uphold government accountability.   
As long as the public had access to only the administrative records of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study, the public perceived that it was not able to hold the government accountable for 
its actions in this shameful episode in United States history. As a result, the collective memory of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study reflects the public’s efforts to provide for itself plausible rationales 
and interpretations of what happened during the study, especially in the African American 
community. This has perpetuated myths and misconceptions surrounding the study. The 
documentary truth of the event as embodied in the administrative as well as the medical records 
counters this myth-making. 
Also, there is a need for a comparative study of the access policies of national archives. 
Such a study might focus on national archival institutions in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and the United States. I have chosen these national archives because historically they 
have had the greatest impact on access to public records. This research would examine internal 
decision-making at the four governmental archives with respect to their administration of access 
to records. This would include investigating records in the custody of these institutions that had 
posed an access challenge to the archives. The myriad of access challenges would include 
considering the personal privacy of individuals and third parties, confidentiality, and the public’s 
right to know. There are a number of topics that could be explored: 
1. How knowledgeable are governmental archivists about regulations, laws, and procedures 
governing access to records and about the contents of their holdings? 
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2. How much discretion do national archives have in disclosure or nondisclosure of 
restricted records? 
 
3. How does each balance the right to privacy and the public’s right to know? 
 
4. What is the access policy toward administering access to records that contain sensitive 
information? 
 
Such a comparative study will allow national archives too learn from one another by 
highlighting similarities and differences in policies for administering access to records with 
sensitive information. In addition, this type of would enable historians, researchers, and the 
public at large to become more knowledgeable about requesting records that contain sensitive 
information. These kinds of dialog could lead to more government records being opened to the 




LISTING OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS, 1932-1972 
Adair, Green1 Austin, George Black, Ishman 
Adams, Courtney Austin, Hyth Black, Jim 
Adams, James Austin, Nelson Black, Tommie Lee 
Adams, Louis Austin, Wiley Black, Wiley 
Albert, Prince Baker, George Blackburn, Will 
Alexander, Ben Banks, Early Blackman, Prismus 
Alexander, Joe Banks, Jack Bledsoe, Pustell 
Alexander, Marion Barrow, David Borum, Muncie 
Allen, Jefferson Barrow, Seth Boyd, Grant 
Allen, Sam Battle, Enoch Boyd, Jimmie 
Allen, Selden Battle, Lee Boyd, Richard 
Anderson, George T. Beasley, Nathaniel Boyd, Tobe 
Anderson, George Beasley, Robert Brooks, Ealy (Eli) 
Anthony, Will Berry, John Brown, Bailey, Jr. 
Askew, Sebon Berry, Leornie Brown, Doll 
Austin, Alfred Bessick, Edward Brown, John C. 
Austin, Dean Bessick, Ernest Brown, Logan 
                                                 
1 Names of Participants are found in Fred D. Gray’s The Tuskegee Syphilis Study: An Insider’s Account of the 
Shocking Medical Experiment Conducted by Government Doctors Against African American Men. Montgomery, 
Alabama: Black Belt Press, 1998. 
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Brown, K. L. Carmichael, Gus Collins, Willie 
Brown, Riley Carr, Jim Collis, Dan 
Brown, Vance Caston, Eugene Collis, Sylvester 
Bryant, J. R. Caupbell, Charlie Comer, Ben 
Bryant, Willie Chambless, William Cooper, Amos 
Bryant, Winfield Chambliss, Henry Cooper, Frank 
Buchanan, Ben Chambliss, Jerry Cooper, Gentry 
Buchanan, Charlie Chambliss, Pollard Cox, Fletcher 
Buchanan, Columbus Chappel, Seaborn Cox, Jeff 
Buchanan, Gene Chappel, Hilliard Cox, Redonia 
Buchanan, John Charleston, Rufus Cox, Tom 
Buchanan, Sol Chatman, Georgie Crawford, George 
Buchanan, Wash Cheeks, John Crawford, Jimmie Lee 
Buford, James (Clemmie) Chisholm, Ben Crawford, John 
Burton, William Chisholm, Ed Crawford, Wash 
Buscom (Bascomb), Bishop Clabon, James Crawley, James 
Butler, Eli Clark, Joshua Crayton, Ernest 
Byrd, Sam Clark, Moses Crayton, Lonzo 
Caldwell, William Clements, Ludie Daniel, Albert 
Calhoun, Forney Cole, Allen Daniel, Clark 
Campbell, Alfred Coleman, Samuel Daniel, John Wesley 
Campbell, Charlie Collier, Isaac Daniel, Mac 
Campbell, Ishmael Collins, Algie Darkey, Floyd 
Campbell, Jack Collins, Jim Davis, Anthony 
Campbell, Judge Collins, John Davis, Bonnie 
Campbell, Will Collins, Julius Davis, Elbert 
Carlisle, Robert Collins, Relice Davis, Henry 
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Davis, Martin Evans, Lemuel Gamble, Elijah 
Davis, Meriman Felton, Cleve Garner, Alfred 
Day, Frank Felton, Tom Gaston, Will 
Demps, Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Green Gauchett, Nick 
Dennis, Nat Fitzpatrick, Ned Germany, Albert 
Dixon, Frank Fitzpatrick, Tom Germany, Fred 
Doggett, Zettie Fitzpatrick, Willie Gholston, Ben 
Donar, Kelley Foote, Bill Giles, Fred 
Donar, Mose Foote, Joe Gilmer, Quince 
Donar, Sam Ford, Abbie Gilmer, Doc 
Doner, Wilbert Ford, Arthur Glenn, Sam 
Doner, Wiley Ford, Percy Goode, John 
Dorsey, Aleck Fort, Calvin Goodson, G. C. 
Dorsey, Jim Fort, E. Gary Gordon, Virgil 
Dorsey, Will Fort, Jasper Gray, Desibe 
Dowdell, Crawford Fort, Sandy Greathouse, Clabon 
Downer, Willie Fort, Nathan Greathouse, Clifton 
Dozier, Bill Foster, Archie Greathouse, John E. 
Driscoll, Harvey Foster, Ben Eddie Green, Mose 
Dubose, N. D. Foster, Bonnie Green, Walter 
Echols, D. C. Foster, David Green, Will 
Echols, John Foster, Lee Greer, George 
Echols, Presley Foster, Reuben Griffin, Colonel 
Echols, Wade Foster, William  Griffin, Dave 
Echols, Wiley Foster, Pomp Griffin, Samuel 
Echols, Willie Foy, Jim Griggs, Charlie 
Ellington, John A. Foy, Louis Grimes, Emmett 
Ellington, Samuel Franklin, Ulysses Grimes, James 
Epps, Henry Gaines, Percy Grove, Frank 
Evans, Ben Galgher, Ben Hagins, G. B. 
Evans, Henry Mark Gamble, Bob Hall, Cary 
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Hagood, Andrew Henderson, Hilliard Jackson, Tommy J 
Hamilton, Columbus Henderson, James James, Clifton 
Haney, Sherman Henderson, Wilbur (Dick) James, George 
Hann, Freeman Hendon, Ernest James, Jessie 
Hardy, Albert Hendon, Louie James, John C. 
Harper, Clifton Henry, Johnnie James, Wilbert 
Harris, Adolphus Hicks, Phil Jenkins, Howard 
Harris, Alonzo Hicks, William Jenkins, West 
Harper, Robert Hill, Phillip Jenkins, William, Jr. 
Harris, Elisha Hoffman, Clayborn Jenkins, Willie 
Harris, George Holliday, Joseph Jernigen, Will 
Harris, Jak Holmes, Zan Johnson, Charles 
Harris, Jake Howard, Carter Johnson, Faegin 
Harris, James Howard, Tony Johnson, G. C. 
Harris, Louis Hudson, John Johnson, Jimmie 
Harris, Theordore Huffman, Benny Lee Johnson, Johnnie J. 
Harris, Will Huffman, Marcus Johnson, Price 
Harris, Will Hughly, Arthur Johnson, Simon 
Harris, William Hurt, Will Johnson, Spencer 
Harrison, Edward Hutchinson, Zack Johnson, Sylvester 
Harrison, Willie, Sr. Iszell, Minor Johnson, Thomas 
Hart, Frank Jackson, David Johnson, Thomas J. C. 
Hart, John Jackson, Fleming Jonakings (Jernigan), Jim 
Hart, L. Z. Jackson, Isiah Jones, Chancy 
Harvey, Charlie Jackson, James Jones, Clifford 
Harvey, Walter Jackson, Jim Jones, Dan Jeff 
Hatten, Ludie Jackson, Martin Jones, Hayes 
Hatten, Sandy Jackson, Randall Jones, Henry 
Hatton, Square Jackson, Roosevelt Jones, Major 
Hawkins, Henry Jackson, Stephie Jones, Roosevelt 
Henderson, Absolomi Jackson, Tom Jones, Shepherd L. 
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Jones, Willie Long, Will Moore, Felix 
Jones, Willie Moffett Love, Milton Moore, Marshall 
Jorden, James Loveless, Ed Morgan, Lenza 
Julkes, Albert Loyd, Ernest Morris, Hobbie 
Julkes, Ephrom Macon, V. M. Moore, Willie Bill 
Julkes, Warren Maddox, Jesse Moss, Frank 
Kelly, Ad Kelly Mahone, Dave L. Moss, Frederick 
Kelly, John K. Mahone, Fonzie Moss, Grant 
Kelly, Mitchell Manley, Charlie Y. Moss, John J. 
Kennebrew, Usher Martin, Governor Moss, Otis 
Key, Charlie B. Martin, Lewis Motley, Peter 
Key, George Martin, Roosevelt Mott, Julius 
Key, Henry Martin, Wesley Murphy, Dock 
Key, Jesse Mason, Frazier Murray, Albert 
Key, Ned Mays, Clabon Mutry, Jim 
Key, Nathan McGrady, Thomas Myrick, I. S. 
Kindell, R. T. McKee, Essex Neal, Rubin 
Kitt, Edmond McMullen, Wash Neal, Rufus 
Laine, Nathaniel McNeill, Willie Norwood, Ed 
Lane, John Edward Menefee, Joe Nunley, Willie 
Lane, Johnnie W. Menefee, John O’Neal, Thaddaus 
Lane, Wylie Miles, William Ogletree, York 
Laster, James Mims, Richard Pace, Eddie 
Laury, Andrew Mindingall, Samuel Pace, Elmore 
Levett, William Mitchell, Gary Pace, Evans 
Lewis, Peter M. Moore, Frank Pace, George 
Lewis, Sherman Mitchell, John Pace, Henry 
Ligon, Riley Moore, Aaron Pace, Lonzie 
Lockett, George Moore, Abner Pace, Nelse 
Lockwood, W. P. Moore, Alonzo Pace, Otis 
Long, Sim Moore, Ezekial Pace, Steve 
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Padgett, Whitelaw Pugh, Arthur Samuel, George 
Parker, Eli Randolph, Joe Samuel, Odell 
Patrick, Will Randolph, Johnnie Samuel, Tom George 
Patterson, Cleveland Randolph, Major Sanford, E. 
Paulk, Frank Randolph, Robert Sanford, Fletcher 
Payne, Ludie Ray, George Scott, Lester 
Pearsall, Pender Ray, William Scott, O. T. 
Pearson, Ed Reed, Andrew Scott, William 
Pendleton, John Reed, Douglas Seatts, John 
Philips, Tom Reed, Fletcher Shaw, Charlie 
Phillips, Charlie Reynolds, Charles Shaw, Herman 
Phillips, Ed Reynolds, Gus Shelton, John 
Phillips, John W. Rhone, C. H. Shelton, Purvis 
Phillips, Ned Ries, Clinton Shumpert, Paul 
Phillips, Prince Roberson, Lige Simmons, Fred 
Philpot, Roland Robbins, Tom Simmons, John 
Pinkard, Charles Lee Robert, Bob Lee Simpson, Bennie 
Pinkard, Charlie Robinson, Albert Simpson, Jimmie 
Plezes, Walter Robinson, Butler Sinclair, Anderson, Jr. 
Polk, Albert Rockamore, Ben Sinclair, Oscar 
Pollard, Charlie Rogers, Henry Sistrunk, Henry 
Pollard, Elbert Rowell, Charlie Slaughter, John 
Pollard, Lucius Rowell, Edmond Smith, Cain 
Pollard, Osburn Rowell, Theordore Smith, Dudley 
Pollard, Vertis Ruff, R. L. Smith, Eugene 
Pollard, Will Rush, Lieutenant Smith, Hilliard 
Pollard, Woody Rush, Wash Smith, Jimmie 
Porch, Bertha Russell, Clarence Smith, Joe 
Potts, Jethro Russell, Jeff Smith, John Wesley 
Pruitt, Taylor Russell, Willie McK. Smith, Lieutant 
Pugh, Armistead Samuel, Bill Smith, Low 
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Smith, Richard Thomas, Oran Watson, John L. 
Smith, Robert Harvey Thomas, Pat Watt, Willie 
Smith, Thomas K. Thompson, Pete Weathers, Alonza 
Sparks, Ed Thompson, Willie Weatherspoon, Sam 
Speed, Olin Tinsley, Edison Webb, William 
Spivey, Jim Todd, Walter Welch, Dan 
Stewart, Mack Tolbert, George Washington West, Anthony 
Story, Millard Tolbert, Jim Wheat, Tobe 
Swanson, Mark Tolbert, Ocie Wheeler, Jake 
Swanson, Please Tramble, Willie White, Archie 
Swanson, Tom Trammell, Percy White, Leonard 
Swanson, Tump Tredwell, Alf White, Sonny 
Swanson, Will B. Turk, Will Whitlow, Ed 
Swanson, Willie Turner, Joe Whitlow, Motelle 
Swift, Lawrence Turner, West Williams, Albert 
Swift, Son Turpin, Jim Williams, Andrew 
Talbert, Oscar Tyner, Stephen Williams, Bill 
Swint, Andrew Tyson, Freddie, Sr. Williams, Bill Henry 
Talley, Louis Upshaw, Milton Williams, Bill Jesse 
Tarver, Eugene Veal, Coleman Williams, Coleman 
Tarver, Oscar Veal, Jim Williams, Eugene 
Tate, Edward Wade, Mitchell Williams, George 
Tate, Robert Lee Waggoner, John Williams, Henry 
Tatum, Mayso Walker, Andrew Williams, James 
Tatum, Sylvester Walker, Johnnie W. Williams, Lewis 
Taylor, Richard Walls, Joe Nathan Williams, Mathew 
Taylor, Van Ware, Alex Williams, Meshack 
Taylor, Warren Warren, Atlee Williams, Morris 
Temple, George Warren, Ed Williams, Reuben 
Theney, Bob Warren, Sonnie Williams, Steve J. 
Thomas, Jessie Watson, John H. Williams, Tom 
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Willis, J. W. Wood, Louis Wright, Jim 
Willis, Wilbur Woodall, R. D. Wright, Ludie 
Wilson, Govenor Woodall, Nelson Wright, Rev. T. W. 
Wilson, Houston Woolfolk, Jesse Wright, Will 
Wilson, Logan Wood, Louis Wyatt, Tom 
Wilson, Ray Wood, Grant Yancey, Booker 
Wilson, Wilbur Woodall, R. D. Yarbough, Mark 
Wimbush, James Woodall, Nelson York, Harrison 
Wood, Charlie, Jr. Woolfolk, Jesse Young, Jack 
Wood, Charlie, Sr. Wright, Clarence  
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September 20, 2001 
 
Interviewee 
CR: Charles Reeves, Director Archival Operations, National Archives and Records 
Administration Southeastern Regional Center 
 
Interviewer 
TW: Tywanna Whorley 
 
TW: How many administrative boxes are there? 
 
CR: There are 38. 
 
TW: Are there any other boxes? 
 
CR: Yes, but they are separated from the administrative files. 
 
TW: Can you give my a list of those? 
 
CR: Yes and I can give you a list of those series here. For instance the patient medical records 
there are 47 boxes of those. Now it says there is actually the administrative records it says here 
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boxes 1-38 plus 32a. If you really want to know we can walk back and look on the shelf to find 
out. 
 
TW: Are the restricted records near the administrative files or are they in a separate place. 
 
CR: Some of the administrative files are restricted and they are shelved with the administrative 
files. The others are in a different location. 
 
TW: What is considered restricted information? 
 
CR: The restricted information is any patient identifier; name and social security numbers. I 
haven’t seen any of those addresses specific enough that we think you could trace it back and 
find out who was living there or names of next of kin because…One of the reasons these records 
are restricted even though the patients most of them are dead is to protect the next of kin.  
 
TW: Tell me why you can’t get back to the administrative files that have restricted information. 
 
CR: We went through them years ago and those that could fairly easily be redacted we redacted. 
The ones that we did not just had so many patient identifiers that you would have more holes 
than you would have. I haven’t looked at them recently but that was sort of a judgment call when 
we did it and again we could always go through them again and we might be able to release a 
few more but its just more trouble than we thought it was worth. 
 
TW: I reviewed the agreement between the CDC and NARA in the accession record. It says that 
no one, including researchers would not have access to the medical files. Is that in the spirit of 
FOIA? 
 
CR: You looked at that agreement more recently than I have because I did redact some of the 
medical files, 
 
TW: At the time of the agreement it seems that it’s not in agreement with FOIA. 
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CR: Obviously it could be challenged and you would see what would happen. CDC has some 
statutory provisions. Even now some of the records are being created cannot be released and they 
have to do that to be able to do their job and ask the questions they do and gather the information 
they do. 
 
TW: Have you received calls requesting to see the medical records? 
 
CR: As far as I know you are probably the first person who has looked at those medical records 
and it I had read that agreement again you might not have looked at them. 
 
TW: Have you released records with sensitive information upon death? 
 
CR: Yes other records. 
 
TW: What is the actual policy when it comes to sensitive information that are contained in 
records that NARA has in its custody? Do you work out an agreement with the agency first 
before you decide what your policy will be? 
 
CR: We don’t deal with sensitive information all that much when the agency offers to transfer 
their records. They can site FOIA and we typically will examine the records, examine the FOIA 
law, call our access people in Washington and make a case by case judgment. 
 
TW: What is your written policy? 
 
CR: The NARA regulations and whatever all those different section of the [audible] and privacy 
act. 
 
TW: When I requested to look at the medical files, did you contact the people in D.C.? 
 




TW: You made a judgment? 
 
CR: I probably made a judgment myself. 
 
TW: So other than the regulations on the WEB-Site do you have specifically a booklet on how to 
deal with other requests or you basically go by the regulations? 
 
CR: I go by the regulations. There are all kinds of regulations and we try to follow those. 
 
TW: How are the Tuskegee Syphilis Study records handled or treated differently? 
 
CR: Well they are treated differently basically because of the agreement between NARA. We 
would in this case protect the privacy of the dead and their heirs. That is the major difference 
between you know the general policy is that privacy ends with death but in this instance there is 
an exception. If I were looking at other records and if there was some indication that people had 
a disease such as syphilis or AIDS, we would probably treat those in a similar way or at least we 
would seek guidance. 
 
TW: Who are you protecting? 
 
CR: Well the idea with Tuskegee I’ve been told is such a small community and that people if you 
know that this guy was a part of the study and he had syphilis people there would know who are 
his children and who his grandchildren were. So that is another factor and obviously these aren’t 
just your run of the mill records. They are studies is and has been controversial and so they sort 
of treat them a little bit differently then just normal records. 
 
TW: How do you personally feel about the records?  
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CR: The only thing that gives me pause I guess is the way we treat the records. As you 
mentioned the names are out there and that doesn’t mean we would release the medical records. 
The other records I sort of wondering why we are still protecting them but the medical records 
contain the kinds of information I can understand those are kept private. 
 
TW: What about challenging the agreement between the CDC and NARA? 
 
CR: Obviously anybody can file a FOIA request for records and we would send it or confer with 
our access officer in the National Archives and decide either to say yeah or neigh. If we say 
neigh then any citizen has a right to file in Federal Court. 
 
TW: If you have a researcher asking to see certain documents, what is your response? 
 
CR: The National Archives is in the job of making records available and most of what we have 
that’s no problem. There are some exceptions with CDC records. 
 
TW: Do you think you those records would have been transferred? 
 
CR: Transfer dates are established if the agency is still using the records a lot of which happens 
all the time. They don’t have to transfer them, they have an extension on the transfer and we 
don’t particularly want records that the agency is still using heavily or anybody else is using 
heavily. 
 
TW: Do you run into problems getting records from agencies? If so, how does NARA deal with 
it? 
 
CR: Yeah, I mean we have no police obviously and some agencies are reluctant to transfer some 
of their records for various reasons and other agencies would like to transfer everything they can 
as quickly as they can partly because they don’t have the time to do the reference work. The 
other thing it takes a certain amount of work to get the records ready to transfer and last week, 
two weeks ago one of our staff members went to a couple of Federal Court Offices one in Macon 
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and one in Valdosta picked up records simply because the courts didn’t choose to spend the time 
to box them up and send them to us. 
 
TW: How often have you contacted the Office of the General Counsel about the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study records? 
 
CR: I have contacted them a number of times about the records. Basically under what condition 
to grant access, what I could let them [public] see and what I couldn’t let them see.  
 
TW: Why not release the records. People need to know what happened. 
 
CR: We should be able to release the records that tell what happened, what was done without 
releasing patient identifiers. We should be able to do that and I think we have. You can tell the 
story without telling the names of the people involved or at least the participants in the study. I’m 
sure there will always be people who are suspicious. 
 
TW: How important are these records? 
 
CR: This is a very important study and very important records so we to some extent want to 
advertise that we have them. On the other hand, if we have 40 people in a day come in and look 
at them, then we have more than we can handle. We’re certainly not trying to conceal the fact 
that we have them and whenever we’ve do presentations to groups we usually mention that these 
are among the records that we have. The center can brag on them a little bit as important records 
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